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Preface
This book addresses a tightly knit cluster of questions I’ve periodically struggled
with over the years. One of these questions is: (i) Are mental properties identical
with physical properties? An afﬁrmative answer to (i) would seem to secure the
truth of physicalism regarding the mind, i.e., the belief that all mental phenomena
obtain solely in virtue of physical phenomena. If the answer to (i) is negative, then
the question arises: (ii) Is there a dependence relation short of identity strong
enough to ensure that the mental depends on the physical in the way that physi-
calism requires? Answering (ii) requires answering two further questions: (iii) What
sort of dependence on purely physical phenomena does physicalism require?, and
(iv) What is it for a phenomenon to be purely physical? In this book, I try to answer
each of (i)–(iv).
How we should answer question (i) depends on how the multiple realizability
debate should be decided. The idea that mentality is multiply realizable has long
been considered a major threat to the view that mental properties are identical with
properties of physics, chemistry, or neuroscience. While many philosophers of
mind happily abandoned the prospect of psychophysical reduction, others have
tried to show that considerations of multiple realizability do not pose any fatal
threat. Chapter 1 traces the highlights of the multiple realizability debate over the
past few decades, providing an introduction to its many facets, including precise
formulations of different varieties of multiple realizability and what their presence
does and does not entail. The chapter, however, is not purely expository. In the last
third, I present and develop what I consider the best reason for thinking that
considerations of multiple realizability do in fact provide irresistible evidence that
mental properties are not identical with properties of any of the natural sciences.
The question of how physicalists should cope with this purported fact is the topic of
the subsequent chapters.
According to the physicalist regarding mentality, mental phenomena obtain
solely in virtue of physical phenomena. But how can this view be true if mental
properties are not physical? If mental properties are not physical, then it would
seem that mentality is not solely a product of the physical. It is here that question
(ii) above becomes relevant: Is there a dependence relation short of identity strong
vii
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enough to ensure that the mental depends on the physical in the way that physi-
calism requires? One notorious method for explaining how physicalism might be
true in the absence of psychophysical property identity is to characterize physi-
calism in terms of supervenience. The notion of supervenience does offer some
hope for understanding how it can be that a class of properties, A, is a function of
nothing more than a class of properties, B, even though A-properties are distinct
from B-properties. However, after countless attempts to formulate a supervenience-
based deﬁnition of physicalism, it is thought by many that characterizing physi-
calism in terms of supervenience is bound to fail. In Chap. 2, I explain what I
consider the major threat to a supervenience-based deﬁnition of physicalism.
Actually, the concern I raise is not an objection to appealing to supervenience in a
deﬁnition of physicalism; in fact, it seems that a supervenience thesis of the right
sort is entailed by physicalism. The concern which I think threatens “supervenience
physicalism” the most is whether nonreductive physicalism is even a coherent
position. As shown in Chap. 2, rather than revealing how a nonreductionist can
remain faithful to physicalism, the notion of supervenience only serves to make the
prima facie tension between physicalism and nonreductionism even more per-
spicuous. As explained in Chap. 2 (Sect. 2.4), it is a mystery why the type of
supervenience required by physicalism should be thought to obtain if mental
properties are not physical. The issue raised here is not the commonly expressed
concern that supervenience theses leave the nature of the mental–physical covari-
ance unexplained. The issue, which I consider the major threat to nonreductive
physicalism, is why we should think the type of supervenience that physicalism
requires could even obtain if mental properties are not physical.
One way to try to answer this threat to nonreductive physicalism is to formulate
the doctrine with the notion of realization. But as explained in Chap. 3, there are
serious concerns with realization-based deﬁnitions of physicalism. The basic idea of
realization is reviewed, followed by a presentation of Andrew Melnyk’s rigorous
formulation of the notion. With the notion of realization clariﬁed, we can see that in
addition to mentality being realized by physical phenomena, there are many cases
in which physical phenomena are realized mentally. This result threats the prospect
of capturing physicalist intuitions with the notion of realization, for if the mental
can and often does realize the physical, then whatever makes it the case that the
mental depends on the physical, it seems it is not that the former is realized by the
latter.
Two nonstandard accounts of realization are also discussed in Chap. 3—Sydney
Shoemaker’s subset account and the type of realization Derk Pereboom calls
“material constitution.” These accounts of realization are also shown to be inade-
quate for capturing the content of physicalism. The view that the mental is realized
by the physical, I conclude, fails to capture all that physicalism demands. I con-
clude, further, that the notion of realization does not sufﬁciently help with the threat
to nonreductive physicalism expressed in Chap. 2. We are still left wondering how
one could reasonably expect the physical to necessitate the mental in the way that
physicalism requires if mental properties are not physical.
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I offer a new deﬁnition of physicalism in Chap. 4. This deﬁnition answers the
threat to nonreductive physicalism raised in Chap. 2; it shows how it could be that
the mental depends solely on the physical even if mental properties are not identical
with those of the natural sciences. The analysis I offer borrows from Shoemaker’s
idea that there is something about mentality that is a subset of what obtains physi-
cally—not a subset of causal powers, but a subset of the concrete items involved.
Note, however, that while the deﬁnition of physicalism I provide shows how a
nonreductionist can earn the title “physicalist,” it does so only at a large cost—or
(more accurately) only with a large beneﬁt. The deﬁnition of physicalism I offer
suggests a couple of plausible and robust senses of what it is for a property to be
physical, according to which mental properties do qualify as physical properties
even if they are not identical with any properties of the natural sciences. Thus, I
argue, the sort of psychophysical dependence required for the truth of physicalism is
strong enough that if it were to obtain, then mental properties would plausibly
qualify as physical even if they are not properties of physics, chemistry, or biology.
Questions (i)–(iv) are thereby answered. To what degree they are adequately
answered remains to be seen.
Preface ix
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Chapter 1
Multiple Realizability
1.1 Introduction
Logical behaviorism began to lose popularity not long after its start in the 1920s.1
One of the most obvious objections to the theory is that it seems perfectly possible
for an individual to have some particular mental state without exhibiting any of the
behavior or having any of the behavioral dispositions that typically accompany that
mental state. This possibility is vividly illustrated by Putnam’s (1965) famous
example of the super-super-Spartans2 and Lewis’ (1966) case of the total paralytic.
These two examples aim to show that the behavior and the behavioral dispositions
characteristic of some mental state are not necessary for having that mental state.
Equally problematic is the possibility of the perfect actor, which shows that the
typical behavior and behavioral dispositions are not sufﬁcient for having the mental
state.3
Identifying mental states with brain states would seem to be the most effective
materialistic response to these problem cases. Yet, the mind-brain identity theory that
replaced logical behaviorism had an even shorter career in the twentieth century.
While there are many possible dualist objections to the identity theory,4 the most
1 The most famous expositions of logical behaviorism include those of Carnap (1932/1933),
Hempel (1949), and Ryle (1949). Logical behaviorism differs from the methodological
(psychological) behaviorism of John Watson and B.F. Skinner. The latter tells us how to conduct
the science of psychology, advising that psychological explanations should not appeal to
consciousness, unconscious activity, or any inner psychic causes, and should focus instead on
behavioral responses to sensory input. Logical behaviorism, on the other hand, is an account of the
meaning of mental terminology, revealed by analysis of our mental concepts. On this view,
sentences that employ mentalistic terminology are synonymous with sentences regarding actual
and potential behavior.
2 Unlike the super-Spartans Putnam describes, his super-super-Spartans do not exhibit any verbal
pain behavior and in general avoid all talk of pain.
3 See Block (1981).
4 Smart (1959) defends the identity theory against some of these.
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devastating objection came from the materialist camp itself. Putnam (1967) and
Fodor (1974) made popular the idea that mental states are multiply realizable. Given
the great variety of species that actually exist, Putnam suspected that the very same
mental state might be realized in a variety of different neural processes. It seems
there is no good reason to think that what instantiates pain in humans is of the same
neural type as what instantiates pain in pigs, or ducks, or ﬁsh. To suppose that pain is
neurally realized in the same way across the wide spectrum of sentient organisms is,
as Putnam says, “certainly an ambitious hypothesis” (1967, p. 44).
The idea that mental properties are multiply realizable has been thought by many
to show that the identity theory is false. If mentality is multiply realizable at the
neural level, then instances of the same mental property can be instances of different
neural properties. In terms of the popular type-token jargon: tokens of the very same
mental state-type might be tokens of different neural state-types. If so, then it would
seem to follow that the relation between mental properties and neural properties is
one-many rather than one-one. Instances of one mental property may be instances
of different neural properties.5
Multiple realizability is a threat not just to mind-brain identity claims. It poses a
threat to identifying mental properties with features of any of the natural sciences.
What motivates the thought that the same mental state can be realized by different
brain states is the widespread intuition that what makes something a mental state,
and the type of mental state it is, is not its inner composition, but the causal role the
state plays. Place (1956), Smart (1959), Armstrong (1968), and Lewis (1966)
offered causal analyses of mental concepts, which deﬁne mental terminology in
terms of the typical environmental causes and behavioral effects of the mental state.
If what makes something a mental state, and the type of mental state it is, is the
causal role it plays, then there are no restrictions on the inner composition of a
mental episode. It might be a brain state, a metallic state, or even a hydraulic state
(in the Martian that Lewis 1980 describes). The intuition that functional role and not
inner structure is what matters to mentality is preserved in the varieties of func-
tionalism that evolved from these causal analyses. If this basic functionalist intui-
tion is correct, then it would seem there is a one-many relation, not just between
mental properties and brain properties, but between mental properties and any
features of any of the natural sciences. Whether brain states, metallic states, or
hydraulic states, the one-to-one correlations of the sort needed for true identity
claims would seem to be absent.
When focusing on levels of physical structure lower than the level of neurons,
the prospect of there being one-one correlations with mentality is even more dim.
Neural properties (and their metallic or hydraulic counterparts in computers or
Lewisian Martians) are multiply realizable themselves. Processes of the same neural
5 What is questioned here is the identity theory in its traditional from, the type-identity theory of
the sort that, e.g., Smart, Place, and more recently, Hill (1991) defended. Multiple realizability is
certainly compatible with the token-identity thesis. According to the token thesis, each token of a
mental state-type is a token of some physical state-type or other, but not necessarily the same
physical state-type on each occasion (and perhaps not even a neural state-type on some occasions).
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type might be constituted in different molecular ways. Molecular properties, in turn,
are multiply realizable at the subatomic level, e.g., with carbon dioxide molecules
differing from each other in their arrangement of electrons, positrons, and neutrinos.
It seems, then, that if mental properties are multiply realizable at one level of
physical structure (neural, metallic, hydraulic), then they are also multiply realiz-
able, and to a far greater degree, at lower levels of physical structure, including the
molecular, atomic, and subatomic levels. And if so, then mental properties are
multiply realizable with respect to properties of the natural sciences generally, from
which it would seem to follow that mental properties are not identical with any
properties of any of the natural sciences.
It is tempting to draw this anti-reductionist conclusion, and this conclusion has
been drawn by many. But is it really a consequence of the multiple realizability of
mentality? This question will occupy us for the remainder of the chapter. While
many have argued that this failure of identity is not a consequence of the way in
which mentality is multiply realized, we shall see by the end of this chapter that
despite efforts to prove otherwise, mental properties really are distinct from those of
physics, chemistry, and biology.
1.2 Multiple Realizability and Reductionism
In his famous support of the autonomy of psychology, Fodor (1974) appeals to
Nagel’s (1961) inﬂuential account of theoretical reduction. On the Nagelian account
of reduction, a theory T is reducible to a theory T* only if each statement of T is
derivable from a statement of T*. Typically, the vocabulary of the reduced theory T
is not synonymous with the vocabulary of the reducing theory T*. So generally the
laws of T will be derivable from the laws of T* only with the help of bridge
principles linking the predicates of T to those of T*. Fodor supposes that these
bridge principles will be true biconditionals—of the form, ‘F1x ↔ G1x’ and ‘F2y
↔ G2y’, where the F-predicates are the predicates of one of the theories and the G-
predicates are those of the other theory. Fodor claims, moreover, that successful
reduction of T to T* requires that these biconditional bridge principles are true as a
matter of nomic necessity. For “bridge laws are laws” and “a law must succeed with
the counterfactuals” (1974, p. 104), where counterfactuals are conditionals whose
truth or falsity depends on what obtains in other possible worlds with the same laws
of nature. Now, where the reduction of psychology to the natural sciences is
concerned, Fodor ﬁnds it doubtful that there are true biconditional bridge principles,
and quite improbable that these biconditionals are true as a matter of nomic
necessity. As he remarks, “it seems increasingly likely that there are nomologically
possible systems other than organisms (namely, automata) which satisfy natural
kind predicates in psychology, and which satisfy no neurological predicates at all”
(p. 105). He concludes that psychology is not reducible to neurophysiology or any
other natural science.
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With his talk of ‘psychological’ theories, Fodor presumably means not just
theories that actually have been endorsed by psychologists or those that will end up
being popular in their ﬁeld, but theories of any mentalistic variety, including “folk
psychology.” To avoid focusing only on the science of psychology, let’s use the
term ‘mental’ instead of ‘psychological’ and represent Fodor’s line of argument as
follows:
(1) Mental properties are multiply realizable with respect to properties of the
natural sciences.
(2) If mental properties are multiply realizable with respect to those of the natural
sciences, then there are no nomically necessary biconditionals linking the
former to the latter.
(3) If there are no nomically necessary biconditionals linking mental properties to
those of the natural sciences, then mentalistic theories are not reducible to
those of the natural sciences.
Therefore, (4) mentalistic theories are not reducible to those of the natural
sciences.
Let’s call this the “Multiple Realizability Argument for Non-Reductionism,” or
“MRNR” for short.
While MRNR has been one of the main reasons for the immense popularity of
non-reductionism in the philosophy of mind for the past few decades, it has not
been without its share of criticism.
1.3 Reduction without Nomic Equivalence
A common reply to MRNR is to object to premise 3. It has been shown that there are
widely recognized cases of reduction in which the reduced property happens to be
multiply realized, from which it is concluded that multiple realizability is no threat
to reductionism. For example, Bickle mentions that while temperature is considered
a physical phenomenon,
[w]hen you think in terms of the velocity and momentum of each individual molecule, you
will see that there are an indeﬁnite number of ways for a given aggregate of molecules to
realize any given temperature (1992, p. 53),
and Robert Richardson reports that
oxygen has three isotopes—0–16, 0–17, and 0–18—varying not with respect to charge, but
in the number of neutrons—eight, nine, and ten, respectively—in the nucleus…. The
existence of isotopic variants is a common feature in chemical “elements”…. Even in the
reduction of chemistry to physics, what is one type at a higher level (chemistry) is seg-
regated into several importantly different types at immediately adjacent levels (1982,
p. 132).
If multiple realizability is compatible with reductionism, as these examples seem
to show, then where and how exactly does MRNR fail? Fodor assumes that
4 1 Multiple Realizability
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reduction requires the presence of true biconditionals linking the properties of the
reduced theory to those of the reducing theory. Yet, as Richardson indicates,
reduction “requires no more than a mapping from lower to higher level types and
not a mapping from higher to lower level types” (1979, p. 548). The reduction of
theory T to T* requires the derivability of the statements of T from those of T*,
which demands only true one-way conditionals linking the predicates of T to those
of T*; true bi-conditionals are not required. In fact, as Richardson notes, Nagel
himself claims that “the linkage between A [a term in the secondary science] and
B [a term in the primary science] is not necessarily biconditional in form, and may
for example be only a one-way conditional: If B, then A” (Nagel 1961, p. 355).6
Moreover, as is widely recognized, it is not even necessary that the reduced
theory is itself derivable from the reducing theory. As Paul Churchland reminds us,
“relativistic mass is not identical with Newtonian mass, nor even coextensive with
it, even at low velocities,” and yet “the reduction of Newtonian by Einsteinian
mechanics is a paradigm of a successful reduction” (1985, p. 10). Churchland
claims that T being reducible to T* requires no more than that T* (along with
limiting assumptions and boundary conditions) entails a set of principles, I, that is
an adequate isomorph of T. On this model, there is no need for conditionals, bi- or
even one-way, linking the terms of T to those of T*, for on this model, it is an
image of T rather than T itself that is derivable from T*.7 As Churchland notes, this
approach to intertheoretic reduction is developed by Hooker (1981). And inspired
by Hooker’s insights, Bickle (1998) provides a detailed elaboration of the isomorph
model of reduction and calls it “new wave” reductionism.
Whether we endorse Bickle’s elaboration of Hooker’s idea or some other version
of the isomorph model, we allow reduction even without the derivability of T from
T*. And even if we think of reduction as requiring the derivability of T itself, there
is Richardson’s point that this derivability requires only one-way conditionals. In
either case, the consequence for psychophysical reduction is the same. Even if
mental properties are multiply realizable, and even if this entails that there are no
true biconditionals connecting the statements of mentalistic theories with those of
the natural sciences (as premise 2 of MRNR maintains), mentalistic theories might
still be reducible to theories of the natural sciences after all. So if Churchland,
Bickle, and Richardson are correct about what reduction does and does not require,
then premise 3 of Fodor’s anti-reductionist argument as formulated in the previous
section is false; theory reduction does not require biconditional bridge principles.
In response to this objection to premise 3, one might insist that without nomi-
cally necessary biconditionals linking the properties of T to those of T*, T simply
does not warrant being called “reducible.” This line of response is not very
promising since the word ‘reduction’ is far from univocal. Not only are there many
different ways, and arguably perfectly legitimate ways, to understand theoretical
reduction in the sciences, there are other varieties of reduction that philosophers
6 This is quoted by Richardson (1979, pp. 548–549).
7 See, also, Churchland (1979, Sect. 11).
1.3 Reduction without Nomic Equivalence 5
rfrances@mail.sdsu.edu
often mention.8 Given the variety of ways the word ‘reduction’ has been used in the
philosophical literature, it would seem unfair to accuse views that do not require
nomically necessary biconditionals as relying on an illegitimate understanding of
reduction.
Yet, while there is good reason to reject MRNR, there is a closely related
argument that is not so easily refuted, one that focuses on the special brand of
reduction that requires property-identity.
1.4 The Multiple Realizability Argument for Non-Identity
The goal of a philosophical theory of mind is to reveal the nature of mentality, and
this obviously involves, among other things, revealing what exactly the various
mental properties are, i.e., specifying that with which the various mental properties
are identical. Now, on any plausible account of property identity, if property F is
identical with property G, then it is nomically necessary that for any individual x, Fx
↔ Gx. Thus, while some varieties of reduction do not require nomically necessary
biconditional bridge principles, there is one highly signiﬁcant brand of reduction that
does—the brand of reduction that aims to specify property-identities.9 It is arguable
that property-identity, and identity in general, requires a brand of necessity stronger
than nomic necessity; it is arguable that F = G only if it is metaphysically necessary
that for any x, Fx↔ Gx. However, revising MRNR to escape the reductionist reply
described in 1.3 does not require that we appeal to metaphysical necessity. It requires
no more than replacing the reference to reduction with talk of identity.
(1) Mental properties are multiply realizable with respect to properties of the
natural sciences.
(2) If mental properties are multiply realizable with respect to those of the natural
sciences, then there are no nomically necessary biconditionals linking the
former to the latter.
(3) If there are no nomically necessary biconditionals linking mental properties to
those of the natural sciences, then the former are not identical with the latter.
Therefore, (4) mental properties are not identical with those of the natural
sciences.
8 See, for example, Searle’s (1992, pp. 112–116) description of some of the many different
varieties of reduction.
9 This brand of reduction warrants the title “ontological reduction.” As Clapp indicates, “[i]n the
sense in which reduction is relevant to the mind-body problem …, the reduction of one theory T1
to another theory T2 collapses the ontological commitments of T1 to those of T2” (2001, p. 114).
Also, as Enc informed us, “one of the objectives of scientiﬁc reduction is a reduction in the
ontology of things and of properties. And this will not be achieved unless type-type identities are
established between the two sciences. And clearly these identities cannot be established unless
bridge laws express coextensionalities” (1983, p. 280).
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Let’s call this argument the “Multiple Realizability Argument for Non-Identity,”
or “MRNI” for short.
The reductionist response to MRNR does not threaten MRNI, for the fact that
there are many legitimate senses of ‘reduction’, some of which do not require true
biconditionals, is no objection to the new premise 3.10 It seems that the only option
for refuting the new argument, MRNI, is to reject either 1 or 2. To help decide which
of these premises should be rejected, if either, it will be useful to distinguish
between some different varieties of multiple realizability.
1.5 Mild and Robust Multiple Realizability
Let us say that a property F is mildly multiply realizable with respect to a class of
properties C if and only if
there are members, G and H, of C such that G ≠ H and it is nomically possible
that: an instance x of G instantiates F and an instance y of H instantiates F.11
For any particular sample of gold, there is another sample that differs somewhat in
physical detail, perhaps containing a few more Au atoms, or by differing in the
number and kind of other constituent atoms. So what instantiates the property of
being gold in one case might differ chemically from what instantiates that property
in another case. So gold is mildly multiply realizable with respect to the class of
chemical properties.
But this fact, obviously, does not prevent gold from being nomically coextensive
(and even identical) with a chemical kind. Since Au is itself a chemical kind, there
is a chemical feature common to all possible instances of gold (at least all nomically
possible instances), and since that chemical feature (being comprised of Au) is also
present only in those instances, there are nomically necessary biconditionals linking
the property of being gold with being comprised of Au. So being multiply realizable
in the mild sense with respect to some class of properties does not entail being
nomically inequivalent to each of those properties. As Polger (2004) mentions,
10 Even if one thought, with Bickle, that reductionism “is a claim about how distinct scientiﬁc
endeavors relate to one another… not explicitly an account of how phenomena relate—objects,
entities, properties, processes, states of affairs, and the like—nor an account of the relations that
obtain among them” (2010, p. 256), one who cared about the nature of mentality would still have
to contend with MRNI.
11 Funkhouser defends a deﬁnition equivalent to this. He proposes that a property-type X is
multiply realizable relative to science Y iff there are possible instances of X that “exactly resemble
one another with regard to their X-ness,” but “their Y-realization bases do not exactly resemble
each other with regard to their Y-ness” (2007, p. 476). On this account, mental properties are
multiply realizable at the neural level precisely because instances that exactly resemble each other
mentally (i.e., are instances of the very same mental property) do not exactly resemble each other
neurally (i.e., are instances of different neural properties). What I am calling “mild” multiple
realizability is also similar to what Polger (2004, p. 6) labels “weak” multiple realizability.
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carburetors are multiply realizable in that “[t]here are many manufacturers of car-
buretors, which are made of various materials and of various designs,” yet “there is
a single structural feature that all carburetors have: they all have venturi” (pp.
19–20). So while carburetors are multiply realizable with respect to physical
properties in the mild sense deﬁned above, there is still a physical feature that is
both necessary and sufﬁcient for being a carburetor—i.e., being a device for mixing
air and fuel according to the venturi principle.
Recall the cases of scientiﬁc reduction mentioned in Sect. 1.3. Bickle is right to
point out that “there are an indeﬁnite number of ways for a given aggregate of
molecules to realize any given temperature” (1992, p. 53). Yet, as Endicott reminds
us, “temperature is not multiply realized with respect to all the physical properties
because temperature is itself a property of physical science (thermodynamics), and
no property is multiply realized with respect to itself” (1989, p. 218). Since tem-
perature itself is a physical property, there is a physical property that is exempliﬁed
if and only if the property of having a certain temperature is exempliﬁed. Also recall
Richardson’s isotope example. It is true that the three isotopes of oxygen differ in
the number of neutrons. But despite this difference there is a commonality. There is
a common subatomic feature that makes the three isotopes of oxygen isotopes of the
same atom, the property of having the same number of protons. In both cases, there
is mild multiple realizability but not without true biconditionals linking the property
to a property of physical science.
How does this relate to minds and brains? Kim wrote, “the fact that two brains
are physico-chemically different does not entail that the two brains cannot be in the
‘same physico-chemical state’” (1972, pp. 189–190). Of course, two brains can
differ while having some neural similarities. But there is a further point that Kim
wishes to make, i.e., two individual processes might differ neurologically while still
having some neural similarities. Adams makes the same point: “just because two
systems are different kinds of stuff does not mean that they do not share some
identical property-kinds” (1979, p. 158). It is clear, then, that a mental property’s
being multiply realizable in the mild sense with respect to neural properties allows
that there is a neural property that accompanies the mental property with nomic
necessity. So it seems that the standard examples from the philosophical literature
(e.g., pain instantiated in one type of neural state in humans, another in dogs,
another in octopi) shows that mental properties are multiply realizable in the mild
sense, but they do not show that they are multiply realizable in a way that entails
premise 2 of MRNI.
12 Even imagined cases in which non-biological entities bear
mentality (e.g., human-made metallic machines or Lewis’ Martian) fail to establish
premise 2. Even if an individual with mentality is wholly inorganic, for each of its
mental properties, there might be a property describable by one of the natural
sciences (physics or chemistry presumably) that it shares with us, and one that
qualiﬁes as nomically necessary and sufﬁcient for the presence of the mental
property.
12 I stress this point in my (1997).
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It is clear, then, that some stronger brand of multiple realizability is needed to
establish the absence of nomically necessary biconditionals. Let’s try the following.
Suppose that property F is multiply realizable with respect to a class of properties
C if and only if
there are members, G and H, of C such that G ≠ H and it is nomically possible
that: an instance x of G instantiates F and an instance y of H instantiates F, and
there is no property I of C that x and y both instantiate.
This formulation requires that there are different instances of F that have nothing in
common C-wise—e.g., different instances of a mental property that have nothing in
common physically, chemically, or biologically. So if mental properties are mul-
tiply realizable in this strong sense with respect to those of the natural sciences, then
thanks to the italicized clause there are no true biconditionals linking the former to
the latter, just as premise 2 of MRNI claims.
Nonetheless, the formulation above makes multiple realizability far too difﬁcult
to come by. Suppose that substance dualism is false, and suppose it is false as a
matter of nomic necessity; suppose that the laws of nature that actually obtain
prevent mentality from being realized in some wholly non-physical way. In that
case, every instance of any mental property instantiates the highly general physical
properties of occupying physical space and inhabiting the physical universe as a
matter of nomic necessity, which thanks to the italicized clause entails that no
mental property is multiply realizable with respect to physical properties in the
sense above.
Here is a type of more than mild multiple realizability that is more likely to
obtain. Let’s say that a property F is robustly multiply realizable with respect to a
class of properties C if and only if
there are members, G and H, of C such that G ≠ H and it is nomically possible
that: an instance x of G instantiates F and an instance y of H instantiates F, and
there is no property I of C that x and y both instantiate and that is common only
to instances of F.13
For any mental property M, occupying physical space and inhabiting the physical
universe are not peculiar to M. So this new formulation allows the multiple real-
izability of mental properties despite some general physical properties that each of
their instances share. At the same time, if mental properties are multiply realizable
with respect to properties of the natural sciences in the robust sense above, then it is
assured that there are no nomically necessarily biconditionals linking them to any
properties of the natural sciences.14
13 This formulation is equivalent to Endicott’s (2005) deﬁnition of multiple realizability.
14 Aizawa and Gillett (2009, 2011) offer the following analysis: A property G is multiply realized
if and only if (i) under condition S, an individual s has an instance of property G in virtue of the
powers contributed by instances of properties/relations F1-Fn to s, or to s’s constituents, but not
vice versa; (ii) under condition S* (which may or may not be identical to S), an individual s*
(which may or may not be identical to s) has an instance of property G in virtue of the powers
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One might wish to add to our formulation Shapiro’s (2000) requirement that a
property or kind is multiply realizable only if there are different ways to causally
implement the function that deﬁnes that property/kind. Shapiro proposes that “two
realizations of a kind T are in fact different kinds of realizations of T only when they
differ in their causally relevant properties, that is, the properties by which they con-
tribute to the capacity, purpose, goal, and the like that serves to individuate T as the
kind that it is” (2000, p. 646). To use his example, it might be thought that the steel
corkscrew and the aluminum one are different realizations of the kind corkscrew. But
since the properties causally relevant to removing corks are the same in both cases,
Shapiro denies that this is a genuine case of multiple realizability. On the other hand,
the double-lever corkscrew and the waiter’s corkscrew achieve the goal of removing
corks in different ways; so they count as different realizations of the corkscrew kind.
It is arguable, however, that a difference in realization does not require a dif-
ference in the method of realization. Suppose that some functionalist account of
mentality is correct, and that two physical properties realize the same mental
property by virtue of playing the causal role deﬁnitive of the mental property. Since
the mental property is realized in both cases in virtue of the same causal role being
played, the causally relevant properties are the same in this case. So on Shapiro’s
account, this would not qualify as a case of genuine multiple realizability. But it
certainly seems that it does qualify, especially if the difference in realizers is as
great as the difference between Martian pain and human pain. Indeed, the very
notion of multiple realizability was introduced precisely to allow for the possibility
of such cases: the same functional role being played by diverse physical realizers.
And even if one wishes to reserve the label ‘multiple realization’ for cases where
there is a causal difference, the type of variable realization that poses a threat to
psychophysical identity claims is not restricted to cases of causal difference. Even if
different C-properties, G and H, give rise to F in exactly the same way, without a
C-property common to all and only instances of F, F is not identical with any
C-property. So in considering the type of variable realization that threatens psy-
chophysical identity claims, we should not conﬁne our attention to cases in which
the realized property is instantiated in causally distinct ways.15
(Footnote 14 continued)
contributed by instances of properties/relations F*1-F*m of s* or s*’s constituents, but not vice
versa; (iii) F1-Fn ≠ F*1-F*m, and (iv), under conditions S and S*, F1-Fn of s and F*1-F*m of s* are
at the same scientiﬁc level of properties. Despite its merits, their detailed account does not preclude
an F-level property which F1-Fn and F*1-F*m share, and which is nomically necessary and suf-
ﬁcient for the realized property G.
15 Shapiro contends that those who support the multiple realizability of mentality face a dilemma.
Either the realizing kinds differ in their causally relevant properties or they do not. If they do not,
then we do not have a case of genuine multiple realizability. If they do, then there is reason to
suspect that they are not realizing the same mental property. For if the realizers “have no or only
few causally relevant properties in common, then there are no or just a few laws that are true of
both of them” (2000, p. 649), in which case, it is arguable that we have here the realization of
genuinely different functional kinds. However, if I am right, one can and should resist at least the
ﬁrst horn of this dilemma.
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One might wonder how Gillett’s (2003) distinction between ﬂat and dimen-
sioned views of realization relates to our formulation of robust multiple realiz-
ability. On the ﬂat account the realized property and the realizer are instantiated in
the same individual; e.g., the realized property of being a corkscrew is a property of
the very same object that has the realizer property, being an aluminum object of
such-and-such physical dimensions. The dimensioned account, on the other hand,
allows realized and realizer properties to be instantiated in different individuals. It
allows, for instance, that the realizer property is instantiated not in the object that
has the realized property, but in the parts of that object. Gillett borrows Shapiro’s
corkscrew example to illustrate the difference between the two accounts. On the ﬂat
account, “the properties/relations of the constituent steel molecules and aluminum
atoms cannot be the basis for a multiple realization,” since these properties/relations
“are not instantiated in the corkscrew, but in its constituents” (p. 597). However,
since the dimensioned account allows properties of constituents to be realizers, we
can plausibly view the case of the steel and aluminum corkscrew as an instance of
multiple realization even if we accept the causal difference requirement. “For with
one corkscrew the properties/relations of steel molecules result in the powers in-
dividuative of the property of removing corks, while in the other corkscrew the
distinct properties/relations of aluminum atoms play this role” (p. 598).16
I will not discuss here which account is to be preferred, the ﬂat or the dimen-
sioned view,17 but only note that both are perfectly compatible with multiple
realizability in the robust sense described above. Recall:
there are members, G and H, of C such that G ≠ H and it is nomically possible
that: an instance x of G instantiates F and an instance y of H instantiates F, and
there is no property I of C that x and y both instantiate and that is common only
to instances of F.
This formulation allows that G and H are properties of the same individual that has
property F, but this same-subject realization is not required. Suppose that F is the
property of desiring pizza and that F is instantiated at the atomic level in manner P
on one occasion and in manner P* at the atomic level on some other occasion. Also
suppose that G is the property of atomic constituents distributed and arranged in
manner P and that H is the property of atomic constituents ﬁtting proﬁle P*. In this
case, an instance of G is an instance of F and an instance of H is an instance of F,
even though G and H are properties of the constituents (the constituent atoms) while
F is a property of the whole (the pizza craver herself). And assuming there is no
16 Gillett argues that Shapiro’s reasoning against the multiple realizability of mental properties is
ineffective since it presupposes the ﬂat account of realization whereas the non-reductionist’s appeal
to multiple realizability is based on the dimensioned view.
17 Although see Polger’s (2007, 2008) critique of Gillett’s dimensioned account. Also see Polger
and Shapiro (2008).
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property at the atomic level common to all and only nomically possible instances of
F, F is multiply realizable in the strong sense at the atomic level on the dimensioned
view.
It’s not clear whether we should accept premise 2 of MRNI and that’s because its
truth depends on the brand of multiple realizability at issue. We saw that with the
mild variety, 2 is false, but it’s true with the robust brand. So let’s focus on the
robust brand and reﬁne the ﬁrst two premises of MRNI as follows:
(1) Mental properties are robustly multiply realizable with respect to properties of
the natural sciences
and
(2) If mental properties are robustly multiply realizable with respect to those of the
natural sciences, then there are no nomically necessary biconditionals linking
the former to the latter.
It seems fairly clear that mental properties are multiply realizable in the mild
sense with respect to properties of physics, chemistry, and biology. However, it is
not at all clear that they are multiply realizable in the robust sense, for as we have
seen, any lower-level differences may be accompanied by lower-level similarities.
So now the ﬁrst premise of MRNI becomes the major source of controversy.
Objections to our new premise 1 will be discussed in Sect. 1.7. But ﬁrst let’s
consider a popular response to multiple realizability arguments which might be
used to question our new premise 2 or the original premise 3 of MRNI.
1.6 Species-Speciﬁc Property Identities
That mental properties can be realized differently in different populations does not
prove that there are no true biconditionals linking mental properties to properties of
physics, chemistry, or biology. For there might be true psychophysical bicondi-
tionals that are relativized to populations. Even if M is multiply realizable in the
robust sense across species, it might be that for any species S, there is a property P
of the natural sciences, such that M↔ P for species S. And these species-speciﬁc
biconditionals might license species-speciﬁc identity claims: M = P for species S. In
the literature on multiple realizability, the appeal to species-speciﬁc reductions has a
long history. Lewis (1969, 1980) and Kim (1972) have endorsed species-speciﬁc
identities. Churchland (1979, 1982, 1984) did as well, noting that the appeal to
domain-speciﬁc reductions is standard scientiﬁc practice. Churchland points out
that temperature has been “cited as the paradigm of a successfully reduced prop-
erty” even though temperature is mean kinetic molecular energy only for a gas,
“where simple particles are free to move in ballistic fashion.” In a solid, “tem-
perature is realized differently, since the interconnected molecules are conﬁned to a
variety of vibrational motions,” in a plasma, “temperature is something else again,”
and “even a vacuum has a so-called ‘blackbody’ temperature” (1984, p. 41). So
contrary to the new premise 2 of MRNI, even if mental properties are robustly
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multiply realizable with respect to those of the natural sciences, there might still be
nomically necessary biconditionals of the species-speciﬁc variety, linking the for-
mer to the latter. And against premise 3 of MRNI one can appeal to identity claims
of the form M = P for species S despite the falsity of the unrelativized
biconditionals.
The appeal to species-speciﬁc identity claims is not without objections. There is
the worry that with species-speciﬁc identity claims, we are no longer capturing the
nature of the mental property itself. Pain is supposed to be a mental property that we
share with dogs, birds, and octopi, but if we are told only what pain-in-birds is or
pain-in-dogs, then we are not being told what that general feature is in virtue of
which we are all in some sort of pain. The appeal to species-speciﬁc identities, as
Block puts it, “sidesteps the main metaphysical question: ‘What is common to the
pains of dogs and people (and all other pains) in virtue of which they are pains?’”
(1980, pp. 178–179).
A related worry is that if the best we can ﬁnd are species-speciﬁc identity claims,
then it seems that the common mental property, M, with which we started simply
does not exist. Suppose M is to be identiﬁed with physical property P1 in species S
and physical property P2 in species S*. Since P1 and P2 are different properties, it
follows that the mental property instantiated in the members of S is a different
mental property than the one instantiated in the members of S*. In that case, the
members of S and S* would not really be sharing the same mental property.
Churchland’s temperature example only reinforces the worry that with species-
speciﬁc reduction, the property originally thought to be shared is not a common
feature after all; the phenomenon called “temperature” in a gas is not the same
phenomenon as that labeled “temperature” in a liquid, which is not the same as that
called “temperature” in a solid. So with only species-speciﬁc psychophysical
identity claims available, it seems that there is no genuine sharing of mental
properties across the different species. The properties that we thought were shared
would not really exist.18 This seems to be an implausible consequence. Granted, the
qualitative character of the pain felt by some bird differs from the qualitative
character of your most recent pain episode, and the content of a dog’s belief that it’s
raining is different from the content of my belief that it’s raining, but it certainly
seems that there are some general mental properties (e.g., feeling pain of some sort,
and having some belief about the weather) that we share.
There is another, more obvious problem with the appeal to species-speciﬁc
psychophysical identities. Even within the same species, there is no guarantee that
each mental property is realized in the exact same way. For all we know, it might be
that what neurally underlies my belief that 2 + 3 = 5 is not the same as what realizes
that belief in you. Lewis acknowledges this possibility—that pain “might even be
one brain state in the case of Putnam, another in the case of Lewis” (1969, p. 25).
18 Perhaps this is what Endicott has in mind when he says that “we should not look on the NRS
[the ‘narrow reductive strategy’] as a reductive strategy at all, but as a form of eliminativism”
(1993, p. 310).
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Kim also admits that to generate psychophysical laws, “biological species may turn
out to be too wide; individual differences in the localization of psychological
functions in the brain are well known” (1989, p. 38). Even more worrisome for the
appeal to species-speciﬁc identities is that multiple realizability might occur within
the life of the very same individual.19 Given the plasticity of the brain, it would
seem that intra-personal multiple realizability actually obtains quite often. There is
much empirical evidence that with brain damage, head trauma, changing task
demands, and ordinary development, the neural regions and machinery that serve a
certain cognitive function at one time in an individual’s life might differ from what
plays that cognitive role at another time in that individual’s life.20
In response to the objection regarding intra-species and intra-personal multiple
realizability, one might propose identity claims that are relativized to individuals,
and to individuals at times. But then, as Endicott points out, it seems we are no
longer talking about type-identities: “the whole rationale for talking about types or
properties is that they are general features, instantiated or instantiatable on different
occasions,” which is not true of something like M for individual x at time t; “the
more narrow we make our properties, the less general they become, and the less
general they become, the more they become like particulars” (1993, p. 317). So
with extreme relativization, type-identities are turned into token-identities.
It seems that the most promising way to refute MRNI is not to question 2 or 3,
but to question the revised premise 1—i.e., the claim that mental properties are
multiply realizable in the robust sense with respect to properties of the natural
sciences.
1.7 Empirical Evidence against Robust Multiple
Realizability
An article by Bechtel and Mundale (1999) has deservedly attracted much attention.
A better understanding of actual neuroscientiﬁc research, they argue, reveals that
multiple realizability is not as rampant as many philosophers have supposed. One
major point of their discussion is that many who accept the multiple realizability
argument against psychophysical reduction (including psychophysical identity
claims) do so because they individuate mental properties more coarsely than they
individuate neural properties. By using a coarse grain in classifying mental states
and a ﬁne grain in distinguishing between brain states, one is bound to ﬁnd many
mental similarities amidst the neurological differences. It is inevitable that we will
ﬁnd a coarsely individuated mental property corresponding to several ﬁnely
19 Horgan (1993, p. 308) makes this point regarding intentional states.
20 For details about neural plasticity see, for example, Endicott (1993), Buonomano and
Merzenich (1998), Stein and Hoffman (2003), Draganski et al. (2006), Wieloch and Nikolich
(2006), and Richardson (2009). Although, Polger (2009) argues that neural plasticity does not
provide deﬁnitive evidence of multiple realizability.
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individuated neural properties. However, if one individuates mental properties with
the same grain used to individuate neural properties, then it is more likely that one-
one correspondences will be found.
They are, of course, exactly right about this. There are ways of individuating
mental kinds and neural kinds that yield a one-many correspondence between the
two classes, which shows that mental kinds are mildly multiply realizable with
respect to neural kinds. But it is compatible with this that there is a way to indi-
viduate mental and neural kinds that yields a one-one correspondence. At the same
time, the fact that one can individuate properties more or less coarsely does not by
itself show that there actually is a method of individuating that reveals a one-one
mapping of mental kinds onto neural kinds. Is there any good reason to believe
there actually is a method of carving that yields such a correspondence?
Bechtel and Mundale argue that there is evidence to support this belief coming
from actual neuroscientiﬁc practice. They point out that it is “precisely on the basis
of working assumptions about commonalities in brains across individuals and
species that neurobiologists and cognitive neuroscientists have discovered clues to
the information processing being performed” (1999, p. 177). They report that
Korbinian Brodmann’s famous brain maps were developed comparatively, by
considering brain regions in many different species, including humans, marmosets,
lemurs, hedgehogs, and ground squirrels, and from these brain maps Brodmann
concludes (as Bechtel and Mundale report) that there is “similarity in the overall
patterns of parcellation, constancy in broader regions (pre-central, granular frontal
region, etc.) across species, and persistence of individual areas” (pp. 180–181).
Bechtel and Mundale also mention Franz Gall’s attempt to map psychological
functions onto the brain on the basis of cranial protrusions and indentations,
pointing out that Gall “demarcated cranial areas in light of psychological functions,
insuring that function was built into the characterization of the region” (p. 184). In
addition, there is David Ferrier’s brain stimulation research in the late nineteenth
century, which was highly comparative, with experiments on a variety of mammals
(including macaque monkeys, dogs, jackals, cats, rabbits, and guinea-pigs) and a
few non-mammals. Bechtel and Mundale also describe the comparative nature of
recently developed techniques such as PET and fMRI for studying brain activity
(pp. 189–190). Since there are differences between individual brains, researchers
using these techniques have found it necessary to refer to a common atlas to
designate which areas are active, and this requires a mapping of different brains
onto the common atlas.
In the studies Bechtel and Mundale report, (a) neuroscientiﬁc research is guided
by the assumption of brain commonalities within and between species. There is also
the crucial point that in these studies (b) brain areas and processes are individuated
in terms of the cognitive role they play. And with an emphasis on cognitive con-
tribution in individuating brain regions, it is not implausible to think that (c) the
grain of individuating brain processes will in many cases approximate the grain
with which the relevant mental processes are individuated.
It seems that Bechtel and Mundale have clearly achieved what they identify as
their “primary concern”—i.e., to disprove “the implication drawn from the multiple
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realizability argument that information about the brain is of little or no relevance to
understanding psychological processes” (p. 176). No one should believe that
information about the brain is of little relevance to understanding psychology; it is
clear that brain research of the sort Bechtel and Mundale mention has greatly
enhanced the understanding of cognitive functions.21 It is also arguable that their
detailed analysis of neuroscientiﬁc research shows that (d) multiple realizability
(of the robust variety) is not quite as pervasive as philosophers have thought.
While granting (a–d), the question remains whether Bechtel and Mundale have
shown that there’s room for optimism about a one-one mapping of mental states
onto brain states. It is doubtful that they have shown this. Firstly, to justify
accepting mind-brain identity claims (and not just the species-speciﬁc identity
claims discussed in 1.6), one needs to show that with respect to all instances of the
same mental property across all species, there is a way to individuate brain states
that yields a one-one correspondence with mental states. However, as Sungsu Kim
(2002) and Richardson (2008) point out, Bechtel and Mundale place too much
emphasis on homologues, species sharing a common lineage. Richardson notes that
“[w]hat we would expect, from an evolutionary standpoint, is for multiple reali-
zation to show up when we look to more distant forms. Homology will obscure the
range of possibilities” (2008, p. 534). Shapiro (2008) makes the additional point
that by focusing on homologous cases, whatever differences in brain structure are
found may be explained in terms of slight differences in the property being realized.
For example, “hummingbirds and eagles share ﬂight properties in virtue of pos-
sessing wings that are similar, and whatever differences there are in their wings
explain only differences in their ﬂight properties” (p. 524). However, if we consider
non-homologous cases, e.g., hummingbirds and bats, we are more likely to ﬁnd
clearer instances in which differences in structure underlie the very same property.
Thus, as Kim informed, it is “homoplasies, not homologies, that can provide evi-
dence for or evidence against multiple realizability” (2002, p. 610).
So even with points (a–d) above, which Bechtel and Mundale have established,
it remains doubtful that there are the interspecies mind-brain correspondences
needed to support identity claims. In fact, Bechtel and Mundale admit that the very
researchers they mention found evidence that their comparative approach does not
apply to all species. “While Brodmann also drew attention to differences between
species, his primary concern was to show commonalities in brain regions, not
differences” (1999, p. 181), and Ferrier’s stimulation “studies on pigeons, frogs,
and ﬁshes” showed “very few locations where stimulations could elicit any
responses,” unlike his experiments on mammals (p. 185).22
21 In Sect. 4 of their essay, they describe in detail how studying the structure of the brain has
greatly contributed to our understanding of visual processing.
22 For additional objections to the reasoning of Bechtel and Mundale (1999) see Aizawa’s (2009).
Aizawa argues against two premises in what he calls the “Central Argument” of Bechtel and
Mundale. Aizawa objects to the idea that brain taxonomy requires an appeal to psychological
function, and he argues against the premise that if psychological functions were multiply realized,
then brain taxonomy would have to be carried out independently of psychological function and
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On behalf of Bechtel and Mundale, one might argue that whenever there are
interspecies neural differences for what seems to be a common mental feature, what
is exempliﬁed is not really the same mental feature after all. Polger contends that
“species-speciﬁc variation of mental states is to be expected,” a variation of the
mental states themselves, not just the underlying neural or otherwise physical states.
“We expect only very similar creatures to have very similar sensations. To the
extent that a creature differs from us, so will its experiences” (2004, p. 15). So,
Polger contends, given the physical differences, there is reason to suspect that pain
“in human beings may not be exactly similar to pain in dogs, dolphins, or Martians”
(p. 15). And Couch (2004) points out that in many cases of apparent multiple
realizability, it is not implausible to think that the realized property is actually not
the same property; e.g., one can appeal to functional differences to argue that the
visual properties realized by primate eyes are different from those realized by the
octopus eye.23,24 Granted, it is not unreasonable to expect genuine mental differ-
ences (and not just neural differences) in the way that some feature M (e.g., vision,
hunger, or pain) is exempliﬁed in two different species. However, it seems that in
many such cases, there is some broadly individuated mental property—M itself
(hunger or pain in general)—that is had in common despite the neural differences.25
The type-identity theorist might still hold fast, insisting that in every case where
it seems that there is no neural condition common to the various instances of the
same mental property, there really is some brain feature common to all of them, and
a brain feature that is also sufﬁcient for the presence of the mental property.
However, this insistence seems little more than desperate hope. Bear in mind that if
M = B, then M ↔ B is not only actually true, but necessarily true (at least as a
matter of nomic necessity). So even if it were true that mental properties correlate
one-one with brain properties across all actual species, we would still be far from
justiﬁed in accepting mind-brain type-identity claims. We would also need reason
to believe that mental properties had to correlate one-one with brain properties
(Footnote 22 continued)
without comparative evaluation across species. Also see Figdor (2010) for additional critique of
Bechtel and Mundale. Here Figdor also provides an informative and detailed description of the
cognitive neuroscience research program that attempts to map brain structures to cognitive pro-
cesses; in particular, Figdor provides a sketch of the phenomenon of degeneracy in cognitive
neuroanatomy and explains how the multiple realizability claim is a live empirical hypothesis.
23 The primate’s eye and the octopus eye are homoplasies—similar organs or features in different
species not inherited from a common ancestor. So, according to Couch, even with homoplasies
there is insufﬁcient evidence for multiple realizability.
24 Besides Polger and Couch, those who emphasize that differences in realizers are arguably
always accompanied by differences in the property realized include Shagrir (1998) and Shapiro
(2008). Although, see Craver’s (2004) discussion of when the “no dissociable realization”
principle (that if there are two distinct realizers, then there are two distinct realized kinds) does and
does not apply.
25 Relevant here is the point made by Aizawa and Gillett (2011) that despite differences between
individuals in what underlies color vision (e.g., differences in photoreceptors, lens, and the
macula), vision scientists still acknowledge the property of normal color vision. Here is a case in
which differences in realizers do not lead scientists to deny a common realized property.
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given the laws of nature that actually obtain. That there is a one-one correlation
between mental properties and brain properties in every nomically possible world
seems rather implausible.
So despite the actual neuroscientiﬁc practice Bechtel and Mundale mention, it
remains quite doubtful that there are nomically necessary biconditionals linking
mental properties to the properties of neuroscience. Still, we cannot yet be com-
pletely conﬁdent that premise 1 is true. There are two obstacles to being fully
conﬁdent about premise 1.
(i) As Kim (1972) and Adams (1979) taught us (and as mentioned in 1.3), any
evidence that there are signiﬁcant neurological differences between the species is
compatible with neural similarities alongside the differences. So any empirical
evidence of neural differences in the realization of some mental property proves
only that the mental property is mildly multiply realizable with respect to neuro-
scientiﬁc properties. Even if non-organic systems can have mentality, there is still
no reason to deny the presence of a common neuroscientiﬁc feature since some
features mentioned in neuroscience (e.g., conducting electricity) are not peculiar to
organic systems. This brings us to a second obstacle to full conﬁdence in premise 1.
(ii) Even if there is no neural property common to all and only the bearers of some
mental property, this is no reason to think the mental property is multiply realizable
(in the robust sense) with respect to all properties of the natural sciences. There
might be some chemical or physical feature of a non-neural variety that is nomically
necessary and sufﬁcient for having the mental property.26
In the next section I modify MRNI to help us avoid these two obstacles.
1.8 Immaterial Realizers
Even if one grants that mental properties are not identical with the properties of
physics, chemistry, or biology, one might still believe that every instance of a
mental property is in fact an instance of some physical property or other (though
not necessarily the same physical property on each occasion). While it seems this
token-identity claim is actually correct, it also seems that the world could have been
otherwise. As Lewis remarks, “[m]aterialism is meant to be a contingent thesis, a
merit of our world that not all other worlds share” (1983, p. 362). Let’s suppose that
all mentality actually is realized purely physically. Even so, it is not implausible to
think that mentality could have been realized in wholly immaterial substances—
where ‘immaterial’ is being used here not in the physically kosher sense of being
comprised of energy rather than matter, but in the more traditional sense of tran-
scending the physical universe, as angels, spirits, and souls are supposed to do.
26 Churchland (1982) speculated that a reductive base for cognition might be found at the
thermodynamic level. And focusing on memory consolidation, Bickle (2003, Chap. 3 and 2010)
argues that at the molecular level there is likely to be underlying unity.
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In what sense are immaterial realizers possible? It’s doubtful that immaterial
realizers are nomically possible. By ‘nomic’ we are including all the laws of nature
that obtain, including all laws regarding the presence of mentality. And if in fact
there are no immaterial realizers, it’s arguable that that’s because the causal laws
connecting mental properties to those of physics, chemistry, and biology prevent
the occurrence of such things. However, even if immaterial realizers are nomically
impossible, it does seem that they are possible in a broader sense. Immaterial
realizers are certainly logically possible; nothing about the laws of logic prevents
their occurrence. They also seem to be conceptually possible. While substance
dualism may be false, it is not analytically false; it is not false by the very meanings
of our words (although a logical behaviorist is likely to claim otherwise). Imma-
terial realizers would seem to be metaphysically possible as well. It is not just that
immaterial realizers are compatible with the laws of logic (which is obviously true)
and not just that they are compatible with the meanings of our mental terms (which
also seems to be the case), but that immaterial realizers really could have existed.
Even if there actually are no spirits or souls, there is the strong intuition that the
world could have been such that these things exist.
The possibility of immaterial realizers introduces a brand of multiple realiz-
ability different from that usually discussed in the literature on psychophysical
reduction. Differences in physical (including chemical and biological) realization
are the differences usually discussed. Yet, the focus on immaterial realizers pro-
vides a more powerful argument against non-identity.
Suppose that F is multiply realizable in the following manner with respect to a
class of properties C:
there are members, G and H, of C such that G ≠ H and: (i) it is nomically
possible that an instance x of G instantiates F and an instance y of H instantiates
F, and (ii) it is metaphysically possible that there is no property I of C that x and
y both instantiate and that is common only to instances of F.
And let’s say that in this type of case F is robustlym multiply realizable with respect
to C-properties (where ‘m’ stands for metaphysical).
This brand of multiple realizability is not as robust as the robust brand intro-
duced in Sect. 1.5. Unlike that variety, this one allows that there is a C-property
whose instantiation is nomically necessary and sufﬁcient for the instantiation of F.
Still, thanks to condition (ii), robustm multiple realizability is robust enough to
entail that F is not identical to any C-property. For with (ii) there is no C-property
whose presence is both metaphysically necessary and sufﬁcient for the presence of
F. Given the necessity of identity, it follows that there is no C-property with which
F is identical.
It is true that some trivial, universally essential properties of physics, chemistry,
and biology are necessary features even of immaterial substances. All possible
Cartesian egos have the property of being either a quark or not a quark and being
comprised of ammonia molecules if comprised of ammonia molecules. Some
negative properties of the natural sciences are also essential to being an immaterial
item—e.g., not positively charged. But, clearly, none of these trivial or negative
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features is sufﬁcient for the instantiation of any mental property. So it seems safe to
say that no property of physics, chemistry, or biology that is sufﬁcient for some
mental property is also necessary for that property—if immaterial realizers are
possible. So if immaterial realizers are (metaphysically) possible, then mental
properties are robustlym multiply realizable with respect to the entire class of
physical properties.
Incorporating robustm multiple realizability into MRNI gives us the following:
(1m) Mental properties are multiply realizable in the robustm sense with respect to
properties of the natural sciences.
(2m) If mental properties are multiply realizable in the robustm sense with respect
to those of the natural sciences, then there are no metaphysically necessary
biconditionals linking the former to the latter.
(3m) If there are no metaphysically necessary biconditionals linking mental
properties to those of the natural sciences, then the former are not identical
with the latter.27
Therefore, (4) mental properties are not identical with those of the natural
sciences.
Premise 1m seems to be true. Even if physicalism is true, even if mental phe-
nomena do obtain solely in virtue of physical phenomena, it seems the world could
have been otherwise. In particular, it seems that immaterial mental substances could
have existed. And if so, then there is a metaphysically possible world in which
instances of mental properties are not instances of physical properties (i.e., not
instances of any physical properties which, like the trivial ones mentioned before,
are indiscriminately shared by all items). Premise 2m is certainly true. For if F is
multiply realizable in the robustm sense with respect to property-set C, then given
condition (ii) of the deﬁnition, there are no metaphysically necessary biconditionals
linking F to any property of C. Also, given the necessity of identity, 3m is every bit
as true as premise 3 of our initial MRNI.
The merit of this latest version of MRNI is that it offers a clear way to avoid the
two obstacles to proving non-identity noted at the close of 1.7. Recall: (i) there is
the difﬁculty proving that mental properties are robustly multiply realizable, in our
original nomic sense, with respect to neuroscientiﬁc properties, since any empirical
evidence of neural differences in the realization of a mental property is consistent
with the mental property being only mildly multiply realizable (allowing that there
are neural similarities despite the differences), and (ii) there is the difﬁculty showing
that mental properties are robustly multiply realizable, in the nomic sense, with
respect to all properties of the natural sciences, and not just neuroscientiﬁc prop-
erties. With our new ﬁrst premise, 1m, both obstacles are avoided. Suppose there
27 As Melnyk (2008, p. 1294) mentions in a footnote, a “genuine multiple realizability objection
would appeal to the metaphysical possibility of, say, pain without the neurophysiological state
thought to be identical with pain; such a bare possibility would be enough to contradict the
proposed identity claim, given the necessity of identity.”
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were a neural feature that corresponds one-one with some mental property and does
so as a matter of nomic necessity. Still, with the metaphysical possibility of
immaterial realizers, this correspondence between the mental and neural property
fails to obtain in some possible worlds. Likewise, any one-one correlation between
a mental property and a property of any other natural science would also fail to
obtain in some possible worlds. Given the necessity of identity, it follows that the
mental property is not identical with any property of the neurosciences or any other
natural science.
One might feel uncomfortable with the talk of metaphysical possibility/neces-
sity. One might think that while it makes sense to speak of logical, nomological, or
physical possibility/necessity, it makes no sense to speak of possibility/necessity
simpliciter, which is what those who speak of the metaphysical brand of modality
have in mind. For anyone who wishes to avoid talk of metaphysical possibility/
necessity, I offer one ﬁnal version of MRNI.
Recall Lewis’ claim that “[m]aterialism is meant to be a contingent thesis, a
merit of our world that not all other worlds share.” Perhaps materialism (physi-
calism) is true of the actual world. Even so, it seems that the world could have been
otherwise. With Lewis, Terence Horgan supports the actual truth of physicalism
while acknowledging that the world could have contained immaterial items—
ghosts, spirits, etc. Moreover, the world might have contained these spooky items,
Horgan contends, even with all of the physical laws that actually obtain:
[w]e who claim that the microphysical facts determine all the facts want to deny that such
beings [Cartesian souls, angels or gods] exist in our actual world. However, we need not
deny that there are some possible worlds in which they do exist and in which the micro-
physical laws of our world are never violated. In such worlds the spirits would not interfere
with the ordinary operations of physical laws upon physical substances; they would simply
co-exist with the physical (1982, pp. 34–35).
Provided that the immaterial items do not causally interfere with the physical
world, their existence is consistent with the actual physical laws. Immaterial items
could have existed, even with all of the actual physical laws in place, provided that
the spooky extras do not causally interfere with the way the world is physically. If
Horgan is right about this, and it seems that he is, then immaterial realizers are
physically possible.
So let us consider our ﬁnal variety of robust multiple realizability. Suppose that
F is multiply realizable with respect to C in the following manner:
there are members, G and H, of C such that G ≠ H and: (i) it is nomically
possible that an instance x of G instantiates F and an instance y of H instantiates
F, and (ii) it is physically possible that there is no property I of C that x and y
both instantiate and that is common only to instances of F.
And let’s say in this type of case that F is robustlyp multiply realizable with respect
to C-properties. With the notion of robustp multiple realizability, we can modify
MRNI one last time to read:
1.8 Immaterial Realizers 21
rfrances@mail.sdsu.edu
(1p) Mental properties are robustlyp multiply realizable with respect to properties
of the natural sciences.
(2p) If mental properties are robustlyp multiply realizable with respect to those of
the natural sciences, then there are no physically necessary biconditionals
linking the former to the latter.
(3p) If there are no physically necessary biconditionals linking mental properties
to those of the natural sciences, then the former are not identical with the
latter.
Therefore, (4) mental properties are not identical with those of the natural
sciences.
Premise 1p appears to be true. Even if we are physicalists, even if we think
mental phenomena obtain solely in virtue of physical phenomena, it seems there’s
no reason to deny that the world could have been otherwise. It seems that some
immaterial items could have existed, and as Horgan notes, they could have existed
even with all the actual physical laws in place—provided that the immaterial items
do not interfere with the operations of the physical world. If so, then in some
physically possible world, mental property M is instantiated, but there is no
physical property P, such that all instances of M are instances of P.28 And in that
case, M is multiply realizable in the robustp manner with respect to the set of
physical properties.
Premise 2p is certainly true. If mental properties are robustlyp multiply realiz-
able, then given condition (ii) in the deﬁnition, there are no physically necessary
biconditionals linking the mental property to some physical property. Also, given
the necessity of identity, 3p is just as true as 3 of our initial MRNI.
As with the metaphysically infused version of MRNI, the two obstacles to
accepting the ﬁrst premise are avoided with this version as well. Suppose there were
a neural feature that corresponds one-one with some mental property and does so as a
matter of nomic necessity. Still, with the physical possibility of immaterial realizers,
this correspondence between the mental and neural property does not obtain in every
physically possible world. So given the necessity of identity, the mental property is
not identical with any neural property. Likewise, given the physical possibility of
immaterial realizers, any actual or nomically necessary correlation between the
mental property and a property of any other natural science would also fail to obtain
in some physically possible worlds. So, given the necessity of identity, the mental
property is not identical with any property of the natural sciences.
There is, however, one more obstacle we need to address before we can con-
ﬁdently accept this latest version (or any of our versions) of MRNI. This obstacle is
a notorious objection to multiple realizability arguments that we have not yet
addressed.
28 We’re imagining again that P is some non-trivial physical property—unlike, e.g., either a quark
or not a quark, indiscriminately had by all items.
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1.9 The Disjunctive Strategy
Suppose that P is the disjunction of all nomically possible realizers of some mental
property M. Also suppose that each disjunct of P is nomically sufﬁcient for the
presence of M; i.e., given the laws of nature, the instantiation of the disjunct ensures
the instantiation of M.29 Suppose, further, that each disjunct of P is a property of
one of the natural sciences (e.g., a property of physics, chemistry, or biology). Then
there is a nomically necessary biconditional linking M to a property, P, of the
natural sciences. So, it seems, while M is not nomically equivalent to any non-
disjunctive property of the natural sciences, there is a property of the natural sci-
ences with which M is nomically equivalent, and therefore with which M might
qualify as identical.
Fodor rejects the disjunctive strategy. He claims that “a necessary condition on a
universal generalization being lawlike is that the predicates which constitute its
antecedent and consequent should pick out natural kinds” (1974, p. 108). Yet, it
seems that for any disjunctive property nomically equivalent to some mental
property, the various disjuncts will be widely heterogeneous (including not only all
the different possible neural realizers, but also all the possible realizers of the mental
property in inorganic systems). So, Fodor concludes, any disjunctive property
nomically equivalent to some mental property will not count as a natural kind.
The idea that the properties employed by the disjunctive strategy are excessively
heterogeneous is a common complaint.30 Actually, there are at least two distinct
heterogeneity complaints that might be made: that (i) heterogeneous disjunctions do
not denote properties belonging to the natural sciences, and that (ii) heterogeneous
disjunctions do not denote genuine properties of any sort. However, both (i) and (ii)
can plausibly be resisted. Perhaps there is good reason (concerning explanatory
ability or predictive power) to deny that disjunctive properties with heterogeneous
disjuncts are the sort to ﬁgure in the sciences. But even if this is correct, which is
controversial,31 it does not tell against their being genuine properties, at least not
without the contentious view that science names the only properties that exist. Even
if we endorse a causal account of properties, and one which entails that all instances
of the same property share the causal powers distinctive of that property, one need
not and arguably should not deny that disjunctive predicates denote genuine
properties. For it is arguable that the diverse disjuncts are causally similar at least
29 To be nomically sufﬁcient for the mental property, each disjunct will be what Shoemaker
(2007, p. 21) calls a “total” realizer and not merely a “core” realizer. The core realizer of a mental
property is what plays the deﬁnitive functional role, whereas the total realizer includes not just the
core realizer, but whatever relations the core realizer bears to other states of the organism to ensure
that it plays the requisite functional role. So each disjunct will be a highly complex physical
property.
30 In addition to Fodor, critics of the disjunctive strategy include Pereboom and Kornblith (1991),
Zangwill (1995), and Seager (1991).
31 See Clapp’s (2001) and Walter’s (2006) reasons for thinking that disjunctive properties with
heterogeneous disjuncts can qualify as properties of the sciences.
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insofar as they are able to play the functional role deﬁnitive of the mental prop-
erty.32 So the attempt to reject the disjunctive strategy on the basis of either (i) or
(ii) is not without controversy.
The appeal to immaterial realizers, however, avoids the controversy of (i) and
(ii), providing a more effective response to the disjunctive strategy. Suppose that P
is a disjunctive property, whose disjuncts are realizers of mental property M, each
of which is sufﬁcient for the presence of M. Now, for it to be true that M = P, the
disjuncts of P will need to include all nomically possible realizers of M.33 And all
nomically possible realizers of M include all physically possible realizers of M. So
if it is physically possible for M to have immaterial realizers, then for it to be true
that M = P, some of the disjuncts of P will not be properties of physics, chemistry,
neurobiology, or any other natural science. Thus, given the physical possibility of
immaterial realizers, M is identical with a disjunctive property only if that dis-
junctive property contains disjuncts that are not properties of the natural sciences. It
would appear, then, that the physical possibility of immaterial realizers neatly
undermines the disjunctive strategy of reducing mental properties to those of the
natural sciences.34
1.10 Concluding Remarks
As Bechtel and Mundale show, the empirical evidence and facts about neurosci-
entiﬁc methodology suggest that mental properties are not likely to be as multiply
realizable as philosophers are inclined to think. However, given the actual evidence
for neural differences across the species as well as neural variation within the life of
the same individual, it still seems doubtful that mental properties correspond one-
to-one with neural properties across all actual species of thinking and feeling
organisms. And yet, despite the reason for doubt, there are two obstacles to con-
ﬁdently concluding non-identity. (i) Any empirical evidence of neural differences in
the realization of some mental property M proves only that M is mildly multiply
realizable with respect to neuroscientiﬁc properties, for even with great neural
differences in the instantiation of M, there may still be crucial neural similarities.
32 And this similarity in causal role would seem to require some similarity in physical structure, as
Walter indicates (2006, p. 58).
33 Given the necessity of identity, all metaphysically possible realizers will also need to be
included.
34 One who is already convinced that mental properties are identical with physical, chemical, or
biological properties might rely on the necessity of identity and simply deny the possibility of
immaterial realizers. However, this is not a viable response for proponents of the disjunctive
strategy, since considerations of multiple realizability have already led them to reject the identity
of mental properties with (non-disjunctive) properties of the natural sciences. Without the belief in
these non-disjunctive type-identities, there is no good reason for them to reject the physical
possibility of immaterial realizers.
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The neural similarities might extend even to non-organic systems since not all
neuroscientiﬁc features are peculiar to organic systems. Moreover, (ii) even
assuming there is no neural property common to all and only the bearers of M, this
is no reason to think that M is robustly multiply realizable with respect to properties
of each of the natural sciences.
The appeal to either the metaphysical possibility or the physical possibility of
immaterial realizers helps us avoid these two obstacles. For even if each mental
property actually did correspond one-to-one with some physical, chemical, or
biological property, and even corresponded as a matter of nomic necessity, the
physical (not to mention metaphysical) possibility of immaterial realizers shows
that mental properties are not identical with any neuroscientiﬁc properties, and also
not identical with any properties of any of the other natural sciences. In addition, the
physical possibility of immaterial realizers undermines a third obstacle to denying
type-identities. The disjunctive strategy appeals to the one-to-one correspondence
between some mental property M and the disjunction of each of the nomically
possible realizers of M. Yet, with the physical possibility of immaterial realizers,
some of the disjuncts of the disjunctive property with which M corresponds as a
matter of physical necessity are not properties of the natural sciences. That’s
enough, given the necessity of identity, to entail non-identity.
Suppose that at least one of our versions of MRNI is sound and therefore that the
conclusion is true—mental properties are not identical with properties of the natural
sciences. The truth of this conclusion would, at least initially, seem to be at odds
with the doctrine of materialism, more commonly called “physicalism” in recent
decades.35 The physicalist regarding mentality believes that mental phenomena
obtain solely in virtue of physical phenomena. However, if mental properties are not
identical with properties of physics or any of the other natural sciences, then it is not
clear how this view could be true. For if mental properties are not identical with
properties of physics or any of the other natural sciences, then it seems that mental
phenomena are not due solely to physical phenomena.
Yet, many philosophers who accept the conclusion of multiple realizability
arguments also claim to be physicalists. For those who support non-reductive
physicalism, there are two popular ways to explain how it can be that mentality
depends entirely on physical phenomena despite the lack of true psychophysical
type-identity claims. There is the highly popular appeal to the notion of superve-
nience. There also is the idea that mental properties, while not physical, are realized
physically. Despite the popularity of these two appeals, in the next two chapters I
argue that neither succeeds in showing how physicalism might be true without
mental properties being identical with physical properties. The answer to how one
can accept the conclusion of the multiple realizability arguments while still earning
the label ‘physicalist’ is revealed in the ﬁnal chapter.
35 A main reason that ‘physicalism’ came to be considered a more appropriate label is that the
physical sciences are not restricted to what qualify as material items.
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Chapter 2
Supervenience and Physicalism
Thanks to the lure of functionalist accounts of mentality and the wide degree of
multiple realizability they entail, a dominant view in the philosophy of mind for the
past few decades is the belief that mental properties are not identical with neural
properties or any other properties of the natural sciences. Yet, many of those who
endorse this non-reductionist view also claim to be physicalists, believing that all
concrete phenomena obtain solely in virtue of, depending on nothing other than,
physical phenomena. This pair of views (often called “non-reductive physicalism”)
is at least initially surprising since it is not entirely clear how mental phenomena
can obtain solely in virtue of physical phenomena if mental properties are not
physical properties. If mental properties are not physical, then it would seem that
mental phenomena (which obviously involve the instantiation of mental properties)
are something more or other than physical phenomena, in which case, the former do
not depend wholly on the latter. So non-reductive physicalists have some
explaining to do. The task is to explain how one can consistently deny that mental
properties are physical while remaining faithful to physicalism.
One popular way to make sense of how physicalism might be true even if mental
properties are not physical is by appealing to the notion of supervenience. The
notion of supervenience offers hope for understanding how it can be that a class of
properties, A, is distinct from a class of properties, B, even while A-properties are a
function of nothing other than B-properties. I do not object to relying on the notion
of supervenience in a deﬁnition of physicalism; as explained in Sects. 2.2 and 2.3, it
seems that the right brand of supervenience along with a robust physical compo-
sition requirement can capture all that physicalism demands. What I object to,
instead, is the appeal to supervenience as a way to make sense of how one can be a
physicalist while denying that mental properties are physical. As shown here, rather
than revealing how a non-reductionist can remain faithful to physicalism, the notion
of supervenience only serves to make the prima facie tension between physicalism
and non-reductionism even more apparent. For, as described in Sect. 2.4, it is a
mystery why the supervenience required by physicalism should be thought to
obtain if mental properties are not physical.
There are numerous ways to formulate the idea that mental properties supervene
on physical properties, and the philosophical literature is replete with descriptions of
© The Author(s) 2014
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various brands of supervenience. Despite the vast discussion on the subject, I shall
review only enough of the details regarding supervenience needed to appreciate what
I consider the main threat to non-reductive physicalism, described in Sect. 2.4.
2.1 Supervenience: Background
The basic idea is that a class of properties A supervenes on a class of properties B
just in case a difference in A-properties requires some difference in B-properties. As
Lewis crisply puts, “no difference of one sort without differences of another sort”
(1986, p. 14). Suppose that no two individuals and no two actions could differ
morally without differing in some physical respect. Then moral properties super-
vene on physical properties. On the other hand, if there could be a moral difference
in the absence of any physical difference, then moral properties fail to supervene on
physical properties. Likewise, to say that mental properties supervene on physical
properties is to say, as Davidson puts it, “that there cannot be two events alike in all
physical respects but differing in some mental respect, or that an object cannot alter
in some mental respect without altering in some physical respect” (1970, p. 88).1,2
Here Davidson describes a local supervenience thesis. The claim is that no two
individuals (objects or events) can differ mentally without differing physically. One
might instead opt for a global supervenience thesis, which is what Haugeland
expresses when he writes, “[t]he world could not have been different in any respect,
without having been different in some strictly physical respect” (1984, p. 1). Here
the claim that non-physical differences require physical differences is applied to
possible worlds as a whole. Applied to mentality, the global thesis is that the world
could not be different in any mental respect without differing physically.
If mental (or moral) differences require physical differences, then physical
sameness entails mental (moral) sameness. Thus, as Kim expresses the notion of
global supervenience, for any sets of properties, A and B, A globally supervenes on
B “just in case worlds that are indiscernible with respect to B (“B-indiscernible,” for
short) are also A-indiscernible” (1984, p. 168). When applied to the mental and the
physical, the claim is that
(GS) for any possible worlds, w1 and w2, if w1 and w2 are physically indiscernible,
then w1 and w2 are mentally indiscernible.
1 See Kim (1990) for a nice review of the history of the term ‘supervenience’, from its use in the
moral philosophy of Henry Sidgwick, G.E. Moore, and R.M. Hare, to the writings of the British
emergentists, and to its use by Davidson (1970) which sparked renewed interest in the concept of
supervenience in contemporary philosophy of mind.
2 From here on talk of properties is meant to include relational properties. So the claim is that
items differing in their mental properties, including mental relations, differ in their physical
properties/relations.
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Of course, worlds themselves don’t have mental properties. Individuals in worlds
have the mental properties. So to say that worlds w1 and w2 are mentally (or
physically) the same is to say that the distribution of mental (or physical) properties
over individuals is the same in both worlds.
The local counterpart to GS is:
(LS) for any possible worlds, w1 and w2, and any items, x in w1 and y in w2, if x
in w1 is physically indiscernible from y in w2, then x in w1 is mentally
indiscernible from y in w2.
Or instead of LS one might choose as a local supervenience thesis what Kim (1984)
famously calls “strong” supervenience. To say that mental properties strongly
supervene on physical properties is to say that
(SS) necessarily, for any mental property M, and any item x that has M, there is a
physical property, or set of physical properties, P, such that x has P, and
necessarily, for any item y, if y has P, then y has M.
The second occurrence of ‘necessarily’ distinguishes SS from what Kim (1984)
calls “weak” supervenience. With the second modal operator SS (like LS) guar-
antees that physical duplicates are mental duplicates across as well as within
possible worlds, capturing the idea that individuals could not differ mentally
without differing physically.3,4
Whether any of these accurately captures an essential component of physicalism
depends on whether physicalism is a contingent thesis. It is arguable that even if
physicalism is actually true, it could have been false. Recall, again, Lewis’ claim
that “[m]aterialism is meant to be a contingent thesis, a merit of our world that not
all other worlds share” (1983, p. 362). If physicalism is contingent, then to capture
3 McLaughlin (1995, Sect. 2) calls SS the modal operator version of strong supervenience and LS
the possible worlds version. And as McLaughlin notes, there is a signiﬁcant difference between SS
and LS. SS requires that an individual has mental properties only by having physical properties,
but LS allows that one can have mental properties without any physical properties. So with LS
there could be a mental duplicate of you or me who lacks physical properties altogether. However,
this result can be avoided if we include in the set of subvening properties the negation of certain
properties we normally consider physical. For example, if not having weight and not instantiated
in physical space are regarded as physical properties, then the possibility of mental items being
wholly non-physical is avoided. So a version of LS may be rendered logically equivalent to a
version of SS by making the supervenience base closed under complementation, where for each
property in the base set its negation is also included.
4 One might wish to avoid the reference to individuals in LS and SS and talk about the regions of
space they occupy. With his notion of a P-region, a spatio-temporal region of a physically possible
world, Horgan (1993a, p. 571) expresses his regional supervenience thesis as: “There are no two
P-regions that are exactly alike in all qualitative intrinsic physical features but different in some
other qualitative intrinsic feature.” Also see Horgan (1982, p. 37).
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its content, the supervenience claims above will need rephrasing. To allow worlds
where the physical facts do not ﬁx the mental facts, GS might be replaced with
(GS*) for any possible world w, if w is physically indiscernible from the actual
world, then w and the actual world are mentally indiscernible.
LS and SS can also be modiﬁed to render physicalism contingent. Like GS, LS may
be changed to quantify over worlds that are physical duplicates of the actual world,
and the ﬁrst modal operator in SS may be dropped.
The debate over which brand of supervenience thesis is best ﬁt to characterize
physicalism is surprisingly large and complex. There is the issue, just mentioned, of
whether to endorse a supervenience thesis that renders physicalism contingent.
There is also the major issue of whether to prefer a global supervenience thesis or a
local one.5 And there is vast discussion of whether a global supervenience thesis
may be considered logically equivalent to a local thesis, and which types of
properties need to be allowed in the supervenience base (including which property-
forming closure principles the base set would need to satisfy) to make a global
thesis equivalent to a local one.6
Another widely discussed issue is whether we should characterize physicalism in
a way that allows the possibility of mental extras. The idea that the physical facts
ﬁx the mental facts entails that a world that physically duplicates the actual world
has all the actual mental episodes, but this seems to allow that the world might also
have some additional mental extras. Provided that these mental additions do not
interfere with any of the physical laws that obtain, the physicalist view that all
actual mentality is solely a function of the physical seems to be preserved. Recall
Horgan’s point (quoted in 1.8) that while physicalists insist that immaterial mental
substances do not in fact exist, they “need not deny that there are some possible
5 Relevant here is Kim’s (1987, pp. 322–324) point that a local supervenience thesis can apply to
extrinsic supervening properties by allowing extrinsic properties in the base set. Also, by
employing Kim’s (1988) notion of “multiple domain” supervenience, we can allow with a local
thesis that the individuals with the subvening properties differ from those that have the
supervening properties (e.g., with the bearers of the physical properties being proper parts of those
that have the mental properties). There’s also Kim’s (1987, p. 321) famous distant ammonia
molecule example which suggests that global supervenience claims allow mental differences
despite only seemingly irrelevant physical differences.
6 In an oft-cited debate, Petrie (1987) argues that contrary to what Kim (1984, p. 168) suggests,
GS does not entail SS. Paull and Sider (1992) point out that Petrie’s method of proving the
inequivalence is inadequate and they provide an improved example to show the inequivalence,
while also noting that when restricted to intrinsic properties, the global and strong theses are
equivalent. Kim, who initially (1987, p. 318) concedes Petrie’s point about the inequivalence, later
claims that “if extrinsic properties are included in both the supervenient and subvenient sets—in
particular, if, along with the usual Boolean operations, identity and quantiﬁcation are allowed for
property composition—again the equivalence will obtain” (1993, p. 170). Stalnaker (1996, p. 238)
provides the proof of the equivalence. Also see Moyer’s (2008) appeal to an intuitively plausible
“Recombination Principle” to argue that even weak (local) supervenience is equivalent to SS.
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worlds in which they do exist and in which the microphysical laws of our world are
never violated.” In those possible worlds, “the spirits would not interfere with the
ordinary operations of physical laws upon physical substances; they would simply
co-exist with the physical” (1982, pp. 34–35). If the possibility of mental extras is
consistent with physicalism, then our supervenience thesis used to deﬁne physi-
calism should allow that some physical duplicates of the actual world are not
mentally duplicates (since they contain mental extras). For this reason, Jackson
(1994, p. 28) introduces the idea of a minimal physical duplicate of the actual
world, which is what you get if you duplicate the actual world physically and stop
right there. With the notion of a minimal physical duplicate, Jackson characterizes
physicalism as the view that all minimal physical duplicates of the actual world are
mental duplicates of the actual world. This allows that there are non-minimal
physical duplicates with mental extras, which arguably is consistent with physi-
calism. Or we might choose Chalmers’ (1996, p. 40) method of allowing for extras
—by construing physicalism as the claim that any physical duplicate of our world
has all the positive facts of our world. This allows that physical duplicates of the
actual world differ from the actual world by having additional positive facts
regarding the presence of immaterial extras (and thereby lacking actual negative
facts such as the fact that there are no immaterial mental items).7
Another source of debate is that it’s not entirely clear how to understand talk of
the same distribution of properties in global supervenience theses. For one thing, it
is not clear whether the same distribution should be considered a distribution over
the same objects. Consider, for instance, those who deny transworld identity by
endorsing counterpart theory. These philosophers will not regard non-actual worlds
that physically duplicate, and therefore mentally duplicate, the way things actually
are as worlds with the same items as those that actually exist. And if we allow that
the worlds being compared do not contain the same items, then questions arise
regarding which distributions of subvening properties over individuals are supposed
to ensure which distributions of supervening properties over individuals. For these
reasons, we can expect different possible ways to construe a global supervenience
thesis. For example, Stalnaker (1996) and McLaughlin (1997) distinguish between
strong and weak global supervenience. Consider any two possible worlds, w1 and
w2, and a one-one mapping of each item x in w1 onto some item y in w2, and
suppose that this isomorphism is ϕ-preserving for some class of properties, ϕ, just in
case for every property F in ϕ, Fx in w1 just in case Fy in w2. Then we can say that a
class of properties, A, strongly globally supervenes on a class of properties, B, just
in case for any w1 and w2, every B-preserving isomorphism between w1 and w2 is
an A-preserving isomorphism between them. And A-properties weakly globally
supervene on B-properties just in case for any w1 and w2, if there is a B-preserving
isomorphism between w1 and w2, then there is an A-preserving isomorphism
7 For other ways to restrict a supervenience thesis to allow for immaterial extras, see Horgan
(1982, p. 36), Lewis (1983, p. 364), Leuenberger (2008), and Yoshimi (2007). (Although, in
Francescotti (2014) I argue that physicalists should avoid these restricted supervenience claims and
not allow mental extras).
2.1 Supervenience: Background 33
rfrances@mail.sdsu.edu
between them. Bennett (2004) adds a middling variety of global supervenience,
which obtains just in case for any w1 and w2, if there is a B-preserving isomorphism
between them, then at least one B-preserving isomorphism between them is itself an
A-preserving isomorphism. For discussion of which of these brands of global su-
pervenience, if any, best captures our physicalist intuitions, see Bennett (2004),
Leuenberger (2009), and Shagrir (2009, 2013).
In what follows, I shall ignore each of the technical issues mentioned above, and
that’s because none are crucial to the main focus of this chapter, which is the issue
of whether a supervenience thesis enables one to earn the title ‘physicalist’ if one
denies that mental properties are physical properties. A choice to be made among
the various brands of supervenience that is crucial to this issue is presented in
Sect. 2.3. However, before getting to that important choice, it should ﬁrst be noted
that while a supervenience thesis may be a necessary component of physicalism,
there is one major reason that it cannot satisfy our physicalist intuitions all by itself.
The reason I have in mind is the widely recognized point that the supervenience of
the mental on the physical is perfectly compatible with mental properties being
instantiated in a wholly non-physical fashion.
2.2 Supervenience and Substance Dualism
While supervenience claims tell us how mental properties covary with physical
properties, they do not tell us how mental properties are realized (i.e., instantiated).
Thus, a supervenience claim in itself leaves open the possibility that mental
properties are realized in ways wholly unacceptable by physicalist standards. In
fact, a supervenience thesis is compatible not only with property dualism (as the
non-reductive physicalist would hope8) but also with substance dualism. Suppose
that any bearer of mental properties is comprised of an immaterial soul, existing in
some non-physical realm, in addition to a physical body. Suppose also that all
immaterial souls are dependent on the operations of physical bodies in such a way
that any variation in soul properties occurs only with a variation in physical
properties of the body. Then any physical duplicates of this world will be mental
duplicates of this world. So this scenario is compatible with varieties of global
supervenience. This scenario is compatible even with Kim’s strong supervenience.
Suppose that mental properties are instantiated only in immaterial souls. Suppose,
also, that necessarily any individual x that has an immaterial soul has a physical
body on which that soul is dependent, and dependent in such a way that each
mental property of the soul is necessitated by some physical property of the body.
In this case, necessarily, for any mental property M of individual x, there is some
physical property P, such that necessarily for any individual y, if y has P, then y has
8 By denying that mental properties are physical properties, the non-reductionist does qualify as a
property dualist even if there is an allegiance to physicalism.
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M. So the mental strongly supervenes on the physical in this case despite the
substance dualism.9
Whatever else physicalism allows, it certainly does not allow that substance
dualism is true. Clearly, then, the content of physicalism is not adequately captured
with a supervenience thesis alone. However, one might still think there is hope for
an adequate formulation of physicalism that is largely supervenience-based. To
avoid substance dualism, we simply need to conjoin a supervenience thesis with
some constraint on the composition of mental items. The constraint might be what
Hellman and Thompson (1975) called the “Principle of Physical Exhaustion,”
according to which, “everything concrete is exhausted by basic physical objects” (p.
555).10 Applied to mentality, this principle amounts to the following physical
decomposition claim,
(PD) each mental particular (i.e., each instance of a mental property or bearer of
mental properties) is either a physical item or possesses a decomposition
into parts, all of which are physical items.
PD alone is not enough to satisfy our physicalist intuitions. Since it places no
constraints on how mental properties covary with physical properties, PD is com-
patible with there being a possible world that is physically indistinguishable from
the actual world but with a radically different distribution of mental properties, and
perhaps completely devoid of mentality. At the same time, a supervenience thesis
does not itself fully capture the content of physicalism, for it allows that mental
processes are purely immaterial. However, by conjoining the two (supervenience
plus PD), one might suspect that we do express all that physicalism requires.11
Whether the combo of PD and a supervenience thesis really does provide suf-
ﬁcient conditions for the truth of physicalism depends on the answer to another
major issue regarding the supervenience relation. Supervenience theses, whether in
9 I am imagining that the x and y are thinkers or feelings that bear the mental properties. But the
individual items that have mental properties also include particular mental events/episodes; an
episode that instantiates mental property M has the mental property of being an instance of M.
Despite the substance dualism, strong supervenience can hold for mental episodes as well. For any
instance of mental property M that occurs within one of these immaterial souls, there is the
(apparently) physical property, being dependent on P, where having this physical property
necessitates being an instance of M.
10 Or, as Pettit puts it, “[e]verything in the empirical world is composed in some way—composed
without remainder—out of (subatomic) entities of the kind that microphysics posits, or it is itself
uncomposed and microphysical” (1993, p. 215).
11 Hellman and Thompson add to their Principle of Physical Exhaustion a commitment to truth-
determination: “If one kind or realm of facts determines another, then, at a minimum, the truth
values of sentences expressing facts in the latter realm cannot vary without variance of the truth
values of sentences expressing facts of the former kind” (1975, p. 558). They formulate this basic
idea with what they call their “Principles of Physical Determination” (1975, Sect. 2.1), which
capture the sort of necessitation that supervenience theses aim to express. So, they propose, “[t]he
physicalism that appears plausible has two components: ontological physicalism—the Principle of
Physical Exhaustion—and Physical Determinationism” (p. 561).
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their global or local versions, are necessitation claims. To capture the idea that
mental facts depend entirely on physical facts, supervenience claims tell us that the
physical facts determine/necessitate the mental facts. But a crucial question arises.
What brand of necessity is at issue here? Is it logical necessity? Nomic necessity?
Or is it some other variety? To know whether a supervenience thesis (conjoined
with PD) captures the content of physicalism, this question needs to be answered.
2.3 Varieties of Necessitation
The physical details, the details regarding which individuals have which physical
properties, clearly do not logically necessitate the mental details. The laws of logic
alone do not enable us to derive the latter from the former. Yet, one might wonder
whether the laws of logic together with the meanings of our words allow us to
derive claims expressed in mental vocabulary from those expressed in physical
terminology. One might wonder whether
(NL/C) facts about the distribution of physical properties and relations logically/
conceptually necessitate all the facts about the distribution of mental
properties/relations.
This way of stating the necessitation is meant to be amenable to global and local
theses alike; it may be construed as a claim about what the totality of the world’s
physical details necessitate or as a claim about what the physical condition of each
individual entails. Yet, NL/C seems implausible at least on standard interpretations
of ‘physical’. Suppose we restrict the term ‘physical’ to properties described by the
science of physics itself. Then the obvious difference in meaning between mental
vocabulary and the vocabulary of physics seems to show that NL/C is false. Suppose
we use the word ‘physical’ loosely enough to include properties of the natural
sciences generally, and brain properties in particular. Even if mental properties were
identical with brain properties, NL/C would still be highly dubious. Since mental
talk is not synonymous with neuroscientiﬁc talk, mind-brain identity theorists
rightly held their view, not as an analytic truth, but as a signiﬁcant empirical
hypothesis.12
Not only does NL/C seem to be false, it also appears to be more than what
physicalism requires. It might be that mental phenomena depend entirely on
physical phenomena, as physicalists regarding mentality believe, without there
being a logical or conceptual tie between the two. Predicates that differ greatly in
meaning and logical form might denote the very same property. So even if mental
properties were identical with physical properties, it would not follow that facts
about the latter logically or conceptually guarantee facts about the former.
12 See, for example, Smart (1959) and Place (1956).
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That mental differences require physical differences would seem to have much to
do with the laws of nature that actually obtain. If mental properties are not physical,
then which mental properties are exempliﬁed would seem to depend not only on the
physical properties exempliﬁed but also on the causal laws that actually obtain,
especially the psychophysical laws (the laws regarding which mental properties
accompany which physical properties). So perhaps we should say that
(NN) facts about the distribution of physical properties/relations nomically
necessitate all the facts about the distribution of mental properties/relations.
Yet, while it is reasonable to think that the supervenience of the mental on the
physical is a matter of the laws of nature that obtain, it is widely recognized that NN is
too weak to do all the work a physicalist would want from a supervenience thesis. The
physicalist who appeals to supervenience is trying to acknowledge that mentality
depends entirely on the way the world is physically without being committed to the
view that mental properties are identical with physical properties. Suppose, then, that
mental properties are not physical properties. Then the psychophysical laws are not
purely physical laws; they are laws connecting physical properties with non-physical
properties. So it is consistent with NN that there is a possible world that is physically
indistinguishable from the actual world, but with a very different distribution of mental
properties, and even without any mentality at all. If a physical duplicate of the actual
world with radically different mentality were possible, then clearly the mental facts
that actually obtain would be a function of more than just the physical facts, contrary to
physicalism.13 So, against the idea that NN captures the content of physicalism, there is
Crane’s point that “ifﬁxing the mental facts requires psychophysical laws, then ﬁxing
the physical facts alone is not sufﬁcient to ﬁx the mental facts” (1991, p. 237).
To capture physicalist intuitions, it seems we need a supervenience thesis that
entails:
(NP) facts about the distribution of physical properties/relations physically
necessitate the facts about the distribution of mental properties/relations,
where p physically necessitates q just in case ‘p and not q’ is not true in any
possible world with the same physical laws as those that actually obtain.14 If the
physical laws did allow worlds with the same distribution of physical properties but
13 A radical mental difference in physical duplicates of the actual world is a consequence of
Chalmers’ naturalistic, according to which there are fundamental phenomenal laws that obtain
alongside the fundamental physical laws. This view allows worlds that physically duplicate the
actual world with all of the actual physical laws, but whose psychophysical laws differ in such a
way that there is a radically different distribution of phenomenal properties, and perhaps without
any instances of phenomenal features (a zombie world).
14 And to allow the possibility of mental extras, we might restrict the claim to positive mental
facts, as Chalmers (1996, p. 40) mentions, which allows a physical duplicate of the actual world
that does not duplicate the actual world’s negative facts (such as the fact that there are no
immaterial items).
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a different distribution of mental properties, then there would be a clear sense in
which the mental facts are at least partly due to something other than physical facts.
So it seems that our physicalist intuitions demand just the type of necessitation that
NP describes.
One might wonder about the prospect of combining NP with a claim about
logical/conception necessitation. Imagine the complete set, S, of facts about the
world expressed in the vocabulary of an ideal physics, and suppose this set includes
all of the physical laws that obtain. According to Kirk, physicalism requires that the
relation between S and the set of mental facts is one of strict implication, where a
“statement A strictly implies a statement B just in case ‘A and not-B’ involves
inconsistency of a broadly logical or conceptual kind” (2006, p. 525). If Kirk were
correct, then the physical necessitation described in NP would itself hold as a matter
of logical/conceptual necessity. There is a big debate in the literature about what
does and does not follow a priori from the physical facts.15 I wish to avoid this
issue here and merely note that one certainly can earn the label ‘physicalist’ without
believing that NP is true as a matter of logical/conceptual necessity. It would be a
mistake, then, to insist on this robust brand of necessitation in a deﬁnition of
physicalism.
So perhaps we should rest modally content with mention of only physical
necessity in NP. Or if we wish to speak of metaphysical necessity, then we can say
that in all metaphysically possible worlds with the same distribution of physical
properties/relations and all the same physical laws, the same mental facts obtain.
So, if one prefers, NP may be replaced with:
(Np*) facts about the distribution of physical properties/relations together with
the physical laws metaphysically necessitate the facts about the distribution
of mental properties/relations.
Unlike NN, NP and NP* capture the physicalist idea that what necessitates the
mental facts are facts that are purely physical (the distribution of physical proper-
ties/relations and the purely physical laws). Suppose we also endorse the Principle
of Physical Decomposition (PD) to ensure that mentality is not only necessitated
physically, but also instantiated physically. Then, it might be thought, we have all
that our physicalist intuitions demand.
Unfortunately, the road to non-reductive physicalism is not quite so smooth. In
the next section, I present a major worry for the non-reductive physicalist that has
not been adequately recognized or addressed in the philosophical literature.
15 Jackson (1994, 1998) and Chalmers (1996) contend that much more follows a priori from the
physical facts than we might be inclined to think. Although, for Chalmers and Jackson, these do
not include facts about the qualitative character of conscious experience, which they think is a
reason to reject physicalism regarding the qualitative character of consciousness. (Although
Jackson, e.g., 2003, 2012, subsequently embraces physicalism).
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2.4 The Major Concern for the Non-Reductive Physicalist
Kim points out that a supervenience thesis “itself says nothing about the nature of the
dependence” of the mental on the physical; “it tells us neither what kind of depen-
dency it is, nor how the dependency grounds or explains the property covariation”
(1993, pp. 165–166). Thus, a supervenience thesis all by itself leaves us wondering:
Is it a matter of causal dependence? Is it in some way analogous to mereological super-
venience? Is it after all a matter of meaning dependence, as logical behaviorists and some
functionalists claim? Perhaps, a matter of divine intervention or plan as Malebranche and
Leibniz thought? Or a brute and in principle unexplainable relationship which we must
accept “with natural piety,” as some emergentists used to insist? (1993, p. 167)
The worry that a mere supervenience claim leaves the nature of the mental-physical
covariance unexplained is a common concern with deﬁning physicalism in terms of
supervenience.16 The reason unexplained mental-physical covariance is worrisome is
that, as physicalists, we would hope not only that there’s an explanation of the
covariance, but also that there’s an explanation that preserves our physicalist com-
mitments. As physicalists, we would hope for what Horgan calls “superduperve-
nience”—“ontological supervenience that is robustly explainable in a materialistically
acceptable way” (1993a, p. 577).17 And one good reason to desire a materialistically
acceptable explanation of the dependence is that without such an explanation we could
not be sure that the mental really does depend on nothing other than the physical.18 So
for those non-reductive physicalists who aim to deﬁne physicalism in terms of su-
pervenience (instead of identity), the following worry is a common one:
(I) with a mere supervenience thesis, the covariance of mental properties with
physical properties is left unexplained.
While I has been a major concern with supervenience-based accounts of
physicalism, it seems to me that there is no fatal worry here simply because I is not
entirely true. It should be clear from the presentation in Sect. 2.3 that deciding
which brand of necessity should ﬁgure in a supervenience claim can take us a long
way toward explaining why mental properties covary with physical properties in the
way that physicalism requires. Suppose it were the case that mental properties
supervene on physical properties as NL/C describes. Then there would be an easy
explanation of why physical sameness guarantees mental sameness; the laws of
logic and the meanings of our mental and physical terms would be wholly
16 Others, besides Kim, who have expressed this concern include Gardner (2005, pp. 201–205),
Heil (1998), Horgan (1993a, Sect. 8 and 1993b, Sect. 5), and Moreland (1998, pp. 49–53). See
also Kim’s 1989, Sect. 4.
17 Although, Horgan (1993a, Sect. 8 and 1993b, Sect. 5) gives reason to doubt that there is such
an explanation.
18 Without an explanation we could not be sure simply because an explanation is meant to help us
understand why some fact obtains (in this case, why the mental is ﬁxed by the physical).
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responsible. So the demand for superdupervenience would be satisﬁed with NL/C.
Given the implausibility of NL/C it is fortunate that NP (or Np*) also explains the
covariance of mental properties with physical properties in a physicalistically
acceptable way. If NP is true, then the explanation of the covariance is that for any
mental property M and any physical property P on which M supervenes, the
physical laws that actually obtain are what make it the case that M is instantiated
whenever P is. One might insist on further explanation, for the question does remain
why it should be that the physical laws necessitate the psychophysical law, P→M,
given that M is not identical with P; as Horgan mentions, “there remains the need to
explain why these bridge laws themselves are true in all physically possible worlds”
(1993a, p. 578). Yet, to be told that the physical facts ﬁx the mental facts due to
purely physical laws is certainly some explanation of the mental-physical covari-
ance; it does at least answer the questions Kim poses in the quote above. Granted,
“it is hard to see,” as Horgan mentions, “how one could possibly explain inter-level
supervenience facts without allowing oneself some sort of information about
higher-level properties, concepts, or terminology” (1993b, p. 314). Yet, the
explanation that NP and NP* provide seems explanation enough for the truth of
physicalism as an ontological doctrine; the mental facts might be solely a function
of the physical facts (as NP and NP* entail) even without a full explanation, or even
a satisfactory explanation, of the covariance.19
There is, however, a related but distinct concern for the non-reductive physicalist,
one which seems to me more troublesome. According to physicalism, the mental
facts are solely a function of the physical facts, and as explained in 2.3 it seems that
physicalism requires the mental facts to be ﬁxed by the physical facts in the manner
expressed by NP (or Np*), i.e., with the distribution of physical properties/relations
together with the physical laws making it impossible that those mental facts fail to
obtain.20 Now if mental properties are identical with physical properties, then it is
easy to see why there should be this sort of necessitation; if mental properties are
physical, then mental facts are physical facts, and every fact trivially necessitates
19 Our understanding of any of the necessitation claims described in 2.3 requires a grasp of mental
concepts. This does not prevent the grounding of the mental by the purely physical as, for
example, NP and NP* claim. Also, despite the fact that a grasp of mental concepts is required for
comprehension of NP and Np*, it might be that these claims these claims nevertheless provide a
sufﬁciently full explanation of the dependence of the mental on the physical. Gardner writes:
“Since no P–N law can be inconsistent with or violate any purely physical law, there does not seem
to be anything in virtue of which the set of actual physical laws can make it impossible for a given
P–N relation to fail to obtain,” and he concludes that “if there are P–N laws that are necessitated by
the physical laws of the actual world …, then this necessitation is wholly without explanation and
the P–N laws are thus unacceptably brute” (2005, p. 202). However, there is another conclusion
that might be drawn from the fact that P–N laws must be consistent with the physical laws. One
might conclude that the P–N laws cannot violate the physical laws precisely because they are made
true in virtue of nothing other than the physical laws, in which case, the P–N laws are not
unacceptably brute.
20 Physicalism at least requires that the physical facts ﬁx the positive mental facts.
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itself. But suppose that mental properties are not physical. What reason would there
be in that case to expect the physical facts to ﬁx the mental facts?
It’s doubtful that there would be any reason to expect the physical to necessitate
the mental. To see why it’s doubtful, imagine a case of absent mentality. This is a
possible scenario in which,
(Absent) there is the same distribution of physical properties/relations as what
actually obtains, and all the same physical laws, but some of the actual mental
episodes are absent.
According to physicalism, the mental facts (at least the positive ones) are neces-
sitated by the physical facts, including the physical laws; for if the mental facts were
not necessitated by the physical facts, mentality would be a function of something
more than the physical facts.21 So, it seems, the actual truth of physicalism does not
allow even the possibility of Absent cases.
However, if we thought that mental properties are not physical, then it’s not clear
why we should consider Absent cases impossible. Suppose P is a physical property
that actually underlies M. If mental properties are not physical, then it seems there is
a possible world, physically indistinguishable from the actual world, in which P is
instantiated without M. One might suspect that the physical laws would prevent the
absence of M in the presence of P. But on the assumption that mental properties are
non-physical, the physical laws do not range over mental properties. Perhaps M is a
consequence of P and the other physical details (including the physical laws), but
being non-physical, M would not itself be part of the physical details. So why, then,
should we deny that there is another possible world with all those physical details
but without the instantiation of M?
Consider a world that contains what Hawthorne (2002) calls a “blocker.” This is
a world in which some non-physical entity (e.g., a god or spirit of some sort) blocks
an instance of some physical property from having its typical mental consequence.
Without changing any physical operations, the “blocker” prevents the physical
event from yielding a mental episode of the sort normally produced by physical
events of that type. Leuenberger (2008, p. 147) also has us imagine a mental
episode being blocked. Consider a world where on day eight, after setting all the
physical facts and having a day of rest, God infused someone’s foot with “algo-
plasm,” which has the effect of making phenomenal properties disappear. If mental
properties were physical properties, then keeping the physical details the same
21 Again, I speak of positive mental facts to allow that physicalism is compatible with the
possibility of mental extras.
22 Leuenberger (2008) claims that physicalism is compatible with the possibility of blockers, and
proposes what he calls “ceteris absentibus physicalism,” according to which, “[t]he actual physical
facts are ceteris absentibus sufﬁcient for all actual facts” (p. 148). On this account, if a world
physically duplicates the actual world, then other things being absent (which includes no blockers)
it mentally duplicates the actual world. However, since the other things being absent includes
properties that are not purely physical, it seems that ceteris absentibus physicalism does not fully
capture the physicalist belief that the mental is solely a function of the physical.
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could not result in these mental absences. However, if mental properties are not
physical, then it is not at all clear why these blocker cases should be impossible.22
The concern is not that the necessitation lacks an explanation. The question is why
we should think the necessitation even obtains (explicable or not) if we deny that
mental properties are physical.
The notion of a blocker provides a reason to suspect that Absent cases are
possible, i.e., reason to suspect they are possible on the assumption that mental
properties are not physical. But there are Absent cases that do not involve blockers;
consider those zombie scenarios where consciousness is absent in physical dupli-
cates of us but without any blockers involved. Now, if sameness of physical details
is consistent with mental absences in worlds with immaterial blockers, then there
seems no reason to deny that sameness of physical detail is also consistent with
mental absences and no blockers. It may be that Absent cases require the violation
of actual psychophysical laws, and if they do, then these cases do not obtain in any
nomically possible worlds. But if mental properties are not physical, then it’s not
clear why we should deny that they obtain in some physically possible worlds, even
without intervening blockers. Suppose that instances of some mental property M
accompany instances of physical property P in all nomically possible worlds.
Unless M itself is a physical property, there seems no reason to deny the possibility
of a creator, intelligent or not, that produced a physical duplicate of the actual world
with all of the actual physical laws (though not all the same psychophysical laws),
in which instances of P are not, or at least not always, accompanied by instances of
M. In this case, the creator is not blocking the mental episodes at the time, but rather
has designed a world that physically duplicates the actual world but where instances
of M do not always accompany instances of P as they do at the actual world.
The worry that is being expressed here is not merely that Absent scenarios are
logically or conceptually possible. It seems clear that the physical facts do not ﬁx
the mental facts solely as a matter of logic and deﬁnition; moreover, the idea that
Absent cases are logically/conceptually possible is perfectly compatible with
physicalism since mental facts can obtain solely in virtue of the physical facts, as
physicalism demands, without doing so analytically. The real worry for the non-
reductive physicalist is that if mental properties are not physical, then Absent cases
seem to be metaphysically possible, i.e., genuine possibilities, and this does conﬂict
with the physicalist view that the mental obtains solely in virtue of the physical. It
seems, then, that the non-reductive physicalist faces the following worry:
(II) mental properties not being identical with physical properties prevents the
physical facts from necessitating the mental facts in the way that physicalism
requires.
Note that this concern for the non-reductive physicalist is different from I. There
are supervenience theses, which if true would explain, at least to some degree, why
mental properties covary with physical properties. NP is one such supervenience
thesis, and it seems just the sort of supervenience a physicalist would demand. Yet,
even with explanatory concern I aside, the worry remains that there’s reason to
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doubt the physical necessitation (explicable or not) expressed by NP if mental
properties are not physical.
The preceding points are not meant to support the possibility of Absent cases.
For all that has been said here it might be that mental properties are in fact physical,
and if so, then given the necessity of identity, Absent cases are not possible. It
might also be that Absent cases, for some non-obvious reason, are impossible even
with mental properties not being physical. The point here is simply that it is quite
unclear why we should think they are impossible if we deny that mental properties
are physical. This is a worry for the non-reductive physicalist since the possibility
of Absent cases seems to be incompatible with the actual truth of physicalism. For
if we allow that the physical details can be exactly the same without all the same
(positive) mental facts, then it seems we forfeit the idea that the mental facts obtain
solely in virtue of the physical facts.
The worry for the non-reductive physicalist may be expressed as follows. (i) If
physicalism is true, then Absent cases are impossible. (ii) If mental properties are
not identical with physical properties, then Absent cases are not impossible. So (iii)
if mental properties are not identical with physical properties, then physicalism is
not true. Assuming that (i) is true, as it seems to be,23 the proponent of non-
reductive physicalism owes some good reason for thinking that (ii) is false, i.e., a
good reason for thinking that II is false. Of course, showing that II is false does not
require showing that physicalism is in fact true, but only that non-reductionism does
not itself prevent physicalism from being true.24
Since the rise of non-reductive physicalism, much talk has been made of mental
phenomena being realized by physical phenomena. In the next chapter, we will
consider whether the appeal to realization helps to show why II should be rejected.
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Chapter 3
Realization and Constitution
Physicalism regarding the mind seems to entail that mental properties supervene on
physical properties. In particular, physicalism seems to require that the distribution
of mental properties is necessitated by the distribution of physical properties together
with the physical laws that obtain. However, as was illustrated in Sect. 2.4 with the
possibility of absent mentality cases, it is not clear what would justify the belief that
mental properties supervene on physical properties in this way if one denies that the
former are identical with the latter. The worry, we saw, is what I labeled “II”—the
worry that mental properties not being identical with physical properties prevents the
physical facts from necessitating the mental facts in the way that physicalism
requires. To be convinced that non-reductive physicalism is a viable position, we
need to be shown why II is false, where showing that II is false does not require
showing that physicalism is in fact true, but only that non-reductionism does not
itself prevent physicalism from being true.
Since the rise of non-reductive physicalism much talk has been made of mental
phenomena being realized by physical phenomena. Perhaps the idea that mentality
is realized physically reveals why II is false, thereby showing how one can remain
faithful to physicalism despite being a non-reductionist. In this chapter, we will
consider whether this is the case.
In Sects. 3.1 and 3.2 the basic idea of realization is reviewed, with a discussion
in Sect. 3.3 of Melnyk’s rigorous formulation of the notion. In Sect. 3.4 we consider
Shoemaker’s subset account of realization, and in Sect. 3.5 the type of physical
realization Pereboom calls “material constitution” is discussed. It is argued that
none of these accounts of realization shows why II is false. And if this conclusion is
correct, then none of the accounts of realization discussed here adequately reveals
how one can justiﬁably accept physicalism while denying that mental properties are
physical.1
1 The ideas in Sects. 3.1–3.3 have been published elsewhere, in Francescotti (2010). They are
presented here in revised form.
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3.1 Functional Properties and Realization: The Basic Idea
A functional property is a property an item exempliﬁes in virtue of playing a certain
functional role. That is,
F is a functional property = there is a functional role, R, such that for any x, x’s
exemplifying F consists in x’s playing role R.
Being a soda-machine, for example, is a functional property since there is a certain
function—the function of dispensing beverages when the right coins are inserted
and tabs pressed—and being a soda machine consists in being a machine that
performs (or was designed to perform) this beverage-dispensing function.2 Being a
heart is also a functional property since an object exempliﬁes this property if and
only if it plays (or evolved to play) the right sort of blood-pumping role. It is also
commonplace, thanks to the popularity of functionalism in the philosophy of mind,
to think of mental properties as functional. To be in pain, we are told, is to have
some inner event that plays the right causal role with respect to sensory input (e.g.,
cuts, burns. and pressure), behavioral output (grimacing, wincing, groaning), and
other mental states (beliefs about the source of the pain and the desire to avoid that
source).
With the notion of a functional property comes the notion of a realization of that
property. In general, for any functional property, F, what plays the functional role
deﬁnitive of F is called a “realization” of F. The large object in the hallway is a
realization of the property of being a soda-machine in virtue of playing the role of
dispensing soda, and the pumping thing in your chest realizes a heart in virtue of
serving to pump blood. In general,
(a) property F is realized by item x at time t = there is a functional role, R, such
that exemplifying F consists in playing R, and x plays R at t.
The word ‘item’ includes any concrete particular. It might be an object, as when a
physical structure realizes the property of being a table, heart, or soda-machine. Or
it might be an event or process, as when instances of different types of movement, e.
g., walking and running, realize the same behavioral property of locomoting or
when events of different neural types realize the same mental property.
If some property, F, is a functional property, then whether an item exempliﬁes F
depends entirely on whether the object plays (or was designed to play) the right
functional role. The internal composition matters to whether an object is F only to
the extent that the inner composition enables the object to perform the right
function. It is no surprise, then, that functional properties are multiply realizable.
Two objects might be comprised of different types of metal but function equally
well as a soda-machine, or one object comprised of wood and another made of
plastic might both perform the function of a table.
2 Recall Block’s (1978) classic functional description of a soda-machine.
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The deﬁnitions above treat functional properties as ﬁrst-order properties, but we
might wish to view them as second-order instead. Rather than saying that having
functional property F consists in playing role R, we might prefer to say that having
F consists in having a property that plays R. In that case, F is viewed as the
property of having a property that plays R, which is a second-order property. As
Block (1990, pp. 155, 163) illustrates, dormitivity may be viewed simply as the
ﬁrst-order property of causing sleep or it may be considered the second-order
property of having a property that causes sleep.
In the philosophical literature mental properties are often described as second-
order. Van Gulick states that “having a given mental property M is a matter of
having some set of other properties P1 ,…, Pn that satisfy the functional relation
RM,” where ‘RM’ speciﬁes the functional role deﬁnitive of M (1992, p. 164).
Papineau proposes that “[i]n order for a mental or other special type M to be
realized by an instance of some physical type P, M needs to be a second-order
property, the property of having some property which satisﬁes certain requirements
R” (1993, p. 25). Block describes functional properties as “properties that consist in
the having of some properties or other (say non-functional properties) that have
certain causal relations to one another and to inputs and outputs” (1990, p. 155). If
we wish to follow their lead and construe functional properties as second-order, we
might choose the deﬁnition:
F is a functional property = there is a functional role, R, such that for any x, x’s
exemplifying F consists in x’s having a property that plays R.
If we think of realized properties as second-order, then it is natural to view the
realizers as properties as well. The realizer of second-order property F will be one
of the ﬁrst-order properties that plays R. Thinking of functional properties as sec-
ond-order and their realizers as ﬁrst-order properties that play the right functional
role yields the following account of realization:
(b) property F is realized by property G for individual x at time t = there is a
functional role, R, such that exemplifying F consists in having a property that
plays R, and G plays R for x at t.
Deﬁnitions (a) and (b) mention functional roles rather than causal roles to allow
that some functional properties are non-causal. We might wish to view mental
properties as computational rather than causal, which is why Melnyk (1996, p. 391)
mentions that in addition to “causal-functional” properties, there are computational-
functional properties. What allows for realization in this case is not the causal role
played by the object’s states, but the isomorphism between the object’s states and
states of a program. To illustrate a third type of functional property, Melnyk notes
the property of being a heart. Being a heart consists in having a certain biological
function—the biological function of pumping blood. But suppose the heart has
been damaged and doesn’t adequately perform that function. We would still wish to
call it a heart because we know that there is a function that all hearts, including this
damaged one, have evolved to perform. Understanding the function an organ
evolved to perform obviously requires understanding its ancestry, and Melnyk
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points out, “if this notion of ancestry cannot itself be spelled out causally, then we
will have to acknowledge a third type of functional property, which may be called
functional-functional” (1996, p. 392). One might wonder whether these “functional-
functional” properties can be reduced to causal properties, whether each causal
property can be construed as a computational property, and whether there are other
major brands of functional property in addition to these three. I shall not address
these issues here. Sufﬁce it to say that there may be reason for viewing the role
deﬁnitive of some functional properties as something other than causal, which is
why deﬁnitions (a) and (b) do not mention causal roles.
Melnyk believes that mental properties are not identical with physical properties,
yet he still considers himself a physicalist. He proposes that “a doctrine of retentive
physicalism can be formulated using only the notion of realisation; neither claims of
supervenience nor claims of token identity nor disjunctive deﬁnitions … play any
part whatever” (1996, p. 390). On Melnyk’s understanding of physicalism, “[e]very
property exempliﬁed in the actual world is either (i) a physical property or (ii) a
functional property of one of the allowed types and physically realised simpliciter,
either directly or indirectly” (p. 395). If physicalism is to be deﬁned in terms of
realization, as Melnyk proposes, then the doctrine ends up being perfectly com-
patible with property dualism.3 According to the basic notion of realization,
expressed as either (a) or (b), what realizes a mental property M on one occasion
might be physically very different from what realizes the same mental property on
some other occasion. Also, the differences in realization might be such that there is
no one property of physics, or any other natural science, that is necessary and
sufﬁcient for the presence of M,4 in which case, M is not identical with a property of
physics or any other natural science.
It is clear, then, that the mental can be realized by the physical, in either sense (a)
or (b), even though mental properties are not themselves physical. However, as
shown in the next section, the appeal to realization, of type (a) or (b), does not by
itself capture the content of physicalism. In particular, an account of physicalism in
terms of realization, of type (a) or (b), fails to reveal why II is false. In Sect. 3.3, I
argue that the limitations of “Realization Physicalism” described in Sect. 3.2 also
apply to Melnyk’s more sophisticated (2006) analysis of realization.
3 Applied to the mental and the physical, property dualism is the view that mental properties are
not identical with physical properties, which in itself allows the truth of physicalism—assuming,
that is, that non-reductive physicalism is a coherent position.
4 This would be an instance of robust multiple realizability, as deﬁned in Chap. 1 (and robustp
with the absence of physically necessary and sufﬁcient conditions, and robustm with the absence of
metaphysically necessary and sufﬁcient conditions).
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3.2 The Mental Realizing the Physical
According to Melnyk’s Realization Physicalism, “[e]very causal or contingent
token of any type … is either (1) a token of a physical type or (2) a physically
realized token of a functional type” (2006, p. 131). If this view is to have any chance
of being true, Melnyk had better be using the word ‘functional’ quite broadly,
to include all non-physical types; and he does admit that his “account uses ‘func-
tional type’ very liberally indeed, to refer to any type whose tokening just is the
tokening of some or other type that meets a speciﬁc associated condition, where the
condition could be of any kind” (2006, p. 129).
Now, in Melnyk’s broad sense of ‘functional’, functional properties are abundant
in the realm of physics as well as the other natural sciences. For many if not most
physical types, there is an associated functional role that must be played in order to
have a token of that type. An item is an electron just in case it plays the role of
being a subatomic particle with negative electric charge. And associated with the
physical kind, boson, is the functional role, particle with integer spin obeying Bose-
Einstein statistics, and something is a boson if and only if this condition is met.
Since these physical properties qualify as functional types, physical properties can
be realized in sense (a) and (b). This alone is no threat to Realization Physicalism
since the claim that all concrete phenomena depend entirely on physical phenomena
does not prevent physical properties themselves from being realized physically.
However, the question does arise: if some physical properties are functional in
character, and therefore realizable, can they also be realized by items that are non-
physical? For instance, can physical properties be realized by mental items?
It seems the answer is “yes.” Consider the very general physical property of
having a certain density. This qualiﬁes as a functional property, at least in the loose
sense of ‘functional property’ Melynk describes, according to which, a functional
property is one whose instantiation consists in the satisfaction of a condition of any
kind. There is a functional role, R, such that an item has density just in case the item
plays R, where R is the property of having some ratio of mass to volume. Although
Cartesian egos, and immaterial souls generally, seem to be logically and even
metaphysically possible, it is not implausible to think, as physicalism demands, that
as a matter of fact all sentient organisms are bodies in physical space and therefore
have a certain density. So assuming that substance dualism is false, each sentient
organism plays the role of having a certain ratio of mass to volume, which is
deﬁnitive of having density. Thus, each sentient organism realizes the property of
having density according to (a). Having density is a genuine property and a genuine
property of physics, and being sentient certainly qualiﬁes as a mental property. So
in this case a physical property is realized by mental items (sentient organisms) in
manner (a).
In this case the realizer is a concrete individual item—the sentient organism. If
we think of realization in terms of (b), then we will view realizers as properties,
3.2 The Mental Realizing the Physical 51
rfrances@mail.sdsu.edu
properties playing the roles deﬁnitive of higher-order functional properties. Yet, the
property of being sentient can qualify as a realizer according to (b) just as much as
the sentient organism can qualify as a realizer given (a). Having density may be
construed as the second-order property of having a property that plays role R,
where R is instantiated in an item with a certain ratio of mass to volume. The
mental property of being a sentient organism plays role R, and in virtue of doing so
it realizes the property of having density, according to (b). Thus, whether we
endorse (a) or (b)—whether we think of functional properties as ﬁrst- or second-
order, and whether we think of realizers as concrete particulars or as properties—we
get the conclusion that the mental can realize the physical.
This instance of mental realizing physical is not an isolated case. In addition to
having a certain density, there are a number of very general physical properties that
are realized by mental items. These physical types include: having weight, having
potential energy, and containing fermions. Each of these is a general feature of
physics. And each may be considered a functional type since having these features
consists in a certain role being played. For the three physical types just mentioned,
there is the role: is subject to gravitational force, has stored energy, and contains
elementary particles with half-integer spin, respectively. Assuming that substance
dualism is false, each thinking or feeling organism plays these roles and by doing so
has weight and potential energy and contains fermions. So in each of these cases,
mental items (thinkers and feelers) realize a clearly physical property according to
(a). And regarding (b), let the realizer be the property of being sentient, and let the
realized property be the higher-order property of having a property that plays role
R, where R is being instantiated in an item that _____, with the ellipsis ﬁlled in by
‘is subject to gravitational force’, ‘has stored energy’, or ‘contains elementary
particles with half-integer spin’.
The physical types mentioned so far are extremely general in character. How-
ever, mental realizing physical in the sense of (a) and (b) also occurs in the case of
highly speciﬁc physical properties. Take any type of color sensation, M, and any
instance e of M. Assuming that physicalism is true, whenever M is instantiated, M
is instantiated in some physical process or other. Now, suppose that P is the
physical property that mental event e instantiates, and let R be the functional role of
being an instance of P. Then mental event e realizes physical property P, according
to (a), since it plays the role of being an instance of P (which is trivially what having
P consists in). So here we have a highly speciﬁc physical property being realized by
a mental item (color sensation e) according to (a). And suppose we let P* be the
higher-order property of having a property that plays role R, where R is being
instantiated P-ly. P* is clearly a physical property, given that P is. So in this case
mental property M realizes a physical property, according to (b). Thus, whether we
think of realization in terms of (a) or in terms of (b), we must acknowledge that
highly speciﬁc physical properties can be realized mentally.
One might wonder whether in each of these cases, the role R that is described
qualiﬁes as a genuine functional role, for one might think that the role must be
sufﬁciently causal or perhaps adequately purposive to deserve the label ‘functional’.
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However, as Melnyk recognizes, if Realization Physicalism is to have any chance
of being true, the word ‘functional’ will need to be construed very liberally, since
on his view, all non-physical types with contingent tokens qualify as functional
types (functional types ultimately realized physically). And it is arguable that some
non-physical types are not especially causal or purposive; some of them might even
be considered intrinsic features of the items that bear them, and therefore not at all a
matter of how the items relate to distinct things. One certainly can earn the title
‘physicalist’ while allowing that some mental (or otherwise non-physical) proper-
ties are intrinsic and therefore not functional in any robust sense. So to have even a
chance of success, the word ‘functional’ in the formulation of Realization Physi-
calism had better, as Melnyk recognizes, be used quite liberally indeed.5
The fact that there are cases in which physical properties are realized mentally
would seem to undermine the prospect of characterizing physicalism in terms of
realization. Physicalists believe that all concrete phenomena occur solely in virtue
of physical phenomena. But if a mental item can realize a physical property, then it
seems that whatever makes it the case that mentality obtains in virtue of physical
phenomena, it is not simply that the former is realized by the latter. So, it seems, the
fact that mentality is realized physically is not enough to guarantee that the mental
is grounded in the physical, and therefore not enough to capture our physicalist
intuitions.
The fact that the physical realizes the mental is not itself what makes it the case
that the latter obtains in virtue of the former. But, one might suggest, what makes it
the case that the mental obtains in virtue of the physical is that the physical realizes
the mental together with the fact that the ultimate realizers are physical and not
mental. That is, for any mental property, there is a level of physical structure at
which the mental property is realized physically and the physical realizer is not
itself realized mentally. That’s what makes it the case that the mental is dependent
on the physical and not the other way around—or so one might contend.
But it is simply not true that there’s a physical level that’s not realized mentally.
Suppose that P is a fundamental physical property (or highly fundamental if there is
no most fundamental level). And suppose that M is some mental property that
supervenes on P, and that an individual has P and thereby has an instance e of M.
As before, let R be the functional role of being an instance of P. Then even though
P is a fundamental physical property, mental event e realizes P according to (a),
since e plays the role of being an instance of P. Also, as before, let P* be the higher-
order property of having a property that plays role R, where R is being instantiated
P-ly. Assuming that P is fundamental, P* is as fundamental as a higher-order
property can be. And clearly P* is physical since P is. So in the case we are
considering, mental property M realizes a fundamental physical property according
to (b).
5 The associated “condition could be of any kind, and needn’t be the playing of a causal role”
(Melnyk 2006, p. 129).
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It seems, then, that characterizing physicalism in terms of realization does not
fully capture the content of physicalism. And, in particular, the idea that mentality is
realized physically offers no help in showing that the worrisome II is false. Since
mental properties can realize physical properties, and even fundamental physical
properties, the fact that mentality is realized physically gives us no reason to believe
that mental facts are necessitated by physical facts in the way that physicalism
requires. Quite the contrary, since mental phenomena can and do realize even basic
physical phenomena, the idea that mentality is realized physically does nothing to
prevent not only the possibility, but the actuality of the world being ultimately
purely mental! So it’s consistent with Realization Physicalism (the idea that all
concrete phenomena are realized by physical phenomena) that there are possible
worlds, physically indistinguishable from the actual world but in which everything
is ultimately mental. Thus, Realization Physicalism does not entail that the physical
ﬁxes the mental in the way that physicalism requires.
The analysis of realization Melnyk (2006) offers is much more sophisticated than
(a) and (b). For that reason one might wonder whether this account avoids the result
that physical properties (at least fundamental physical properties) can have mental
realizers.
3.3 Melnyk’s Account of Realization
According to (a), realizers are concrete particulars, either the objects that exemplify
the properties or the processes that instantiate those properties. According to (b),
realizers are properties, the properties that play the requisite functional roles. But
either way, the thing that is being realized is a property.
While not the typical way to proceed, one might also view the realized items as
concrete particulars (realized by other concrete particulars). For instance, we might
speak of a particular refrigerator being realized by a certain physical object, or a
certain instance of pain being realized by some instance of a neural property. This is
how Melnyk thinks of realization—as relating tokens (particular instances) to other
tokens. He offers the following analysis:
Token x realizes token y (or: token y is realized by token x) iff
i. y is a token of some functional type F (i.e., some type whose tokening just is
the tokening of some or other type that meets a certain condition, C);
ii. x is a token of some type that in fact meets C; and
iii. the token of F whose existence is necessitated (in the strongest sense) by the
holding of clause (ii) is numerically identical with y. (2006, p. 129)
Let’s label this analysis “RM,” to indicate realization Melnyk-style.
Note that clause (iii) does not require that the realizer token, x, is identical with
the realized token, y. What (iii) requires to be identical with y is the token of F
whose existence is necessitated by x’s being a token of a type that meets condition
C, which does not entail that x itself is identical with this token of F. So, for
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example, neural event x that realizes my current pain, y, must be of a type that plays
the right functional role, thereby necessitating an instance of pain, but x need not be
identical with this instance, y, of pain. Without the token-identity (between x and y)
Melnyk’s analysis allows us to believe that mental events are realized by physical
events and also that organisms with mental features are realized by physical bodies,
while remaining neutral on the difﬁcult issue of whether constitution counts as
identity—e.g., neutral on whether the mental event is identical with the constituent
neural event, or whether the person with mental properties is identical with the
constituent body.6
Melnyk claims that the tokening of functional type F is necessitated in the
strongest sense by the tokening of a type that meets condition C. In many cases the
connection between a functional type and the associated condition is conceptual. It
is part of the very meaning of ‘soda-machine’ that a soda-machine is designed to
dispense containers of soda given the right input, and a tendon, by deﬁnition, is
ﬁbrous tissue designed to connect muscle to bone; and if analytic functionalists are
correct, then it is a conceptual truth that mental properties are functional properties.
Presumably, this is why Melnyk (2003, p. 21) requires that a token of a type
meeting condition C logically guarantees a token of F (where ‘logically’ is
understood broadly enough to include conceptual ties). He later decides to require
only that “the tokening of some or other type that meets condition C metaphysically
necessitates a tokening of functional type F” (2006, p. 129; emphasis added). With
this weaker constraint, Melnyk wants to allow that the condition essential to a
functional type might not be discoverable a priori—i.e., that there are synthetically
necessary truths about the functional character of various properties. So Melnyk’s
qualiﬁer, “in the strongest sense,” in deﬁnition RM should be viewed as including
metaphysical necessity.
There is reason not to think, as Melnyk does, that both relata of the realization
relation are tokens. While Melnyk’s account does not require that the realizer is
identical with the token that is realized, it does not and should not prevent it either.
Yet, if token x is identical with token y, then thanks to the indiscernibility of
identicals, if x realizes y, then y realizes x, which seems unacceptable. This is one
implausible consequence of the idea that the realizer and the realized are both
tokens. Another, and more obvious, implausible consequence is mentioned by
Polger and Shapiro (2008, p. 214). They point out that property-instances, tokens,
are not the things realized, for if they were, then multiple realizability would be
impossible since only properties are multiply instantiated. However, it is not nec-
essary to worry here about complaints regarding the realized and the realizer both
6 One might think that a mental event is not identical with the constituent neural event for the
same reason one might believe that a statue is not identical with the constituent lump of clay—
namely, the mental episode (statue) has different persistence conditions than the neural event (lump
of clay). For example, an item can continue to be the same neural event (lump of clay) while
ceasing to be a mental episode (statue). We will have more to say about constitution and identity in
Sect. 3.5 when discussing Pereboom’s constitution view.
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being tokens, for the unwelcome consequence that mentality realizes physical
phenomena arises even if RM were rephrased to mention types being realized.
Recall the very general physical type of having a certain density. This is a
functional type, in Melnyk’s sense of ‘functional’, since there is a condition, C, that
must be met (a role to be played) for there to be a token of this type. Condition C in
this case is, instantiated in an item with a certain ratio of mass to volume, and
having density consists in having a property (being of a type) that meets this
condition. Now let G be the mental type that includes all and only organisms that
are sentient. Although immaterial souls seem to be logically possible, it is not
implausible to think, as physicalism demands, that as a matter of fact all sentient
organisms are material objects in physical space, and therefore have a certain
density. So assuming that substance dualism is false, for any sentient being, x, there
is a physical token, y, where y is the physical body of x, and (i) body y is a token of
type F (a bearer of density), and (ii) x is a token of mental type G (sentient
organism) that meets condition C—the condition of being tokened in an item with a
certain ratio of mass to volume. Also, (iii) the fact that x is of a type that meets C
necessitates that there is a token of F (since there being a token of a type that meets
the condition of being tokened in something with a certain ratio of mass to volume
necessitates that there is something with a certain density), and this necessitated
token of F is identical with token y. Now, having density is a genuine property and
a genuine property of physics, and being sentient certainly qualiﬁes as a mental
property. So in this case, a mental token realizes a physical token on Melynk’s
account. (And it is easy to see that RM gives the same result for each of the other
general physical types mentioned in Sect. 3.2—having weight, having potential
energy, and containing fermions).
Moreover, like (a) and (b), RM allows that mental realizes physical in the case of
highly speciﬁc physical properties as well. Suppose that G is a highly speciﬁc
mental property—highly speciﬁc to ensure that the underlying physical feature is
also quite speciﬁc. Suppose, for instance, that G is believing that 72 is 49, hoping
that Gilliam brings exactly 2 cases of beer, or a peculiar tingling sensation quite
unlike anything you’ve experienced before. Consider the purely physical descrip-
tion of some instance x of mental type G, and let F be the complex property denoted
by this physical description. Then x is a token of a mental type that meets the
condition of being instantiated in manner F. Now x’s being a token of a type that
meets the condition of being instantiated in manner F trivially necessitates that there
is a token y of type F. Since F is the way in which mental property G is instantiated
at the physical level, F counts as a genuine physical type. So here we have a highly
speciﬁc physical process (token y of F) being realized mentally (by token x of G)
according to RM.
As mentioned in the previous section, the fact that there are cases in which
physical phenomena are realized by mental phenomena would seem to undermine
the prospect of characterizing physicalism in terms of realization. Physicalists
believe that all concrete phenomena occur solely in virtue of physical phenomena.
But if a mental item can realize a physical property, then it seems that whatever
makes it the case that mentality obtains in virtue of physical phenomena, it is not
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simply that the former is realized by the latter. It appears, then, that mentality being
realized physically is not enough to guarantee that the mental depends on the
physical, and therefore not enough to capture our physicalist intuitions.
One might try to save Realization Physicalism by adding that there is a level of
subvening physical structure with respect to which there are no non-physical
realizers. But as with (a) and (b) this option is not available here either. Again,
consider the purely physical description of instance x of mental type G, and let F be
the complex property denoted by this physical description. Suppose that the
physical description that denotes F is at some highly fundamental level. Still, x is a
token of mental type G that meets the condition of being instantiated in manner F,
and x’s being a token of a type that meets this condition entails that there is a token
y of type F. So here we have an instance of a fundamental physical property being
realized mentally according to RM.
7
And, as mentioned at the end of Sect. 3.3, if mental properties can realize
physical properties, and even fundamental physical properties, then the fact that
mentality is realized physically gives us no reason to believe that mental facts are
necessitated by physical facts in the way that physicalism requires. In fact, given
that mental phenomena can and do realize even basic physical phenomena, the idea
that mentality is realized physically does nothing to prevent not only the possibility,
but also the actuality that the world is ultimately purely mental. So, it seems
consistent with Realization Physicalism—understood in terms of (a), (b), or RM—
that there are possible worlds, physically indistinguishable from the actual world,
but in which everything is ultimately mental. If such worlds were possible, then the
physical details of the actual world (including the physical laws) would certainly
fail to necessitate the way the world is mentally. So whether we construe realization
in terms of (a), (b), or RM, the idea that mentality is realized by physical phenomena
provides no relief from worry II. We are still left wondering how it could be that the
physical facts necessitate the mental facts if mental properties are not physical. The
claim that mental phenomena are realized by physical phenomena, in manner (a),
(b), or RM, does not reveal the answer to that question. In particular, the realization
claim offers no help to understanding why the Absent cases described in Sect. 2.4
should not be metaphysically possible (contrary to physicalism) if mental properties
are not physical.
7 It’s worth mentioning that the non-physical realizing the physical is not found only in the case of
mentality. If mental phenomena can realize the stuff of physics, then it should be no surprise that
chemical and biological phenomena can do so as well. Consider, for example, a token x of the
biological type, tendon, and suppose that x is instantiated in manner P at the level of physics. In
this case, x is of a biological type that meets the condition, C, of being instantiated in manner P,
and meeting this condition necessitates that there is a token of P. So according to RM, and also (a),
biological tendon-token x realizes the stuff of physics. [And if we think of the property of being a
tendon rather than a particular tendon as the realizer, and if we also focus on the second-order
property of being a property instantiated in manner P, we can see that the biological can realize
the physical according to (b) as well].
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Adding Physical Necessitation It should be noted that after giving his analysis
of realization (deﬁnition RM), Melnyk adds an account of what it is for a functional
property to be physically realized. He claims that a
token y of a functional type, F, is physically realized iff (i) y is realized … by a token of
some physical type, T; and (ii) T meets the special associated condition for F solely as a
logical consequence of (a) the distribution in the world of physical tokens and (b) the
holding of physical laws (2006, pp. 130–131).
Adding condition (ii) does not prevent the mental from realizing the physical, but it
does allow us to insist, as physicalism requires, that the realization of mentality is
necessitated by purely physical phenomena. So by adding (ii) Melnyk comes closer,
and perhaps just close enough, to capturing the content of physicalism.8
However, while condition (ii) does seem to be an essential part of physicalism, it
expresses a type of supervenience relation, one that goes beyond the notion of
realization itself.9 One can consistently hold that mentality is realized, and that it is
realized at the physical level—in the sense of (a), (b), or RM—without believing that
the mental facts are necessitated by the physical facts as expressed by (ii). Indeed, as
mentioned above, by allowing that physical items are realized mentally, RM is
compatible even with mental features being the ultimate realizers. Of course, the
fact that (ii) goes beyond the core notion of realization certainly does not prevent
one from adding (ii) to the claim that mentality has physical realizers in an effort to
better capture the content of physicalism. Still, the notion of realization itself brings
us no closer to knowing why we should reject II (and therefore no closer to knowing
why we should accept (ii)). The worry remains that if mental properties are not
physical properties, then it’s not clear why we should deny the possibility of Absent
mentality cases. If mental properties are not physical, then it really does seem that
there’s a possible world with all the physical facts that actually obtain, including all
the same physical laws, but absent some actual mental phenomena. So while
Melnyk’s condition (ii) might be enough along with realization claim (i) to secure
the truth of physicalism, it is not clear why one should accept (ii), i.e., the denial of
II, if one believes that mental properties are not physical. So far it appears that the
notion of realization, which we hoped would reveal why II is false, fails to do so.
Deﬁnitions (a), (b), and RM are clearly functional accounts of realization,
according to which being a realizer consists in playing the functional role charac-
teristic of the realized property/property-instance. However, there are two inﬂuen-
tial accounts of realization that do not explicitly or obviously ﬁt the functional
model. One might wonder whether either of these prevents the mental from real-
izing the physical, while perhaps also helping us see why II is false.
8 Although, we might need to add to the facts about the distribution of physical tokens, facts about
the physical types to which they belong. At the same time, we may wish to drop the idea that the
mental facts are a logical consequence of the physical facts, and talk instead of metaphysical or
even just physical necessitation. (Recall Sect. 2.3.)
9 However, see how Melnyk (2003, Chap. 2) contrasts the truth-making condition expressed by
(ii) with standard supervenience claims.
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3.4 Shoemaker’s Subset Account
“[I]t is arguable,” Shoemaker claims, that the notion of realization “provides the
most revealing characterization of physicalism itself: physicalism, we can say, is the
view that all states or properties of things, of whatever kind, are physical or
physically realized” (2007, p. 1). The description of realization that Shoemaker
provides is ﬁttingly called the “subset” account.
In one of his earlier formulations, Shoemaker proposes that “property X realizes
property Y just in case the conditional powers bestowed by Y are a subset of the
conditional powers bestowed by X” (2001, p. 78).10 The conditional powers con-
ferred by the belief that it’s raining “include, among countless others, one that can
be roughly characterized as being such that if one wants to keep dry and believes
that umbrellas keep off rain, this will result in one’s taking an umbrella if one goes
out” (2001, p. 82). Suppose that this conditional power, and all of the others
conferred at the time by the belief that it’s raining, are a subset of those conditional
powers conferred to the individual by her having some physical property P. Then,
on Shoemaker’s subset account, P realizes the belief that it is raining.
The conditional powers of a property are a matter of its potential effects.
However, the causal proﬁle of a property includes the potential causes of the
property as well as its potential effects. Thus, Shoemaker later expresses his subset
account in terms of forward-looking and backward-looking causal features. He
proposes that “one property realizes another if the set of its forward-looking causal
features contains as a subset the forward-looking causal features of the other, and
the set of its backward-looking causal features is a subset of the backward-looking
causal features of the other” (2003, p. 3).
Shoemaker’s original subset account was developed as an account of same-
subject realization, which he labels ‘realization1’, “in which the instantiation of a
property in a thing is realized by the instantiation of another property in that same
thing” (2007, pp. 28–29). He recognizes, however, that one might prefer an account
10 Shoemaker also requires that “X is not a conjunctive property having Y as a conjunct” (2001,
p. 78). Without this constraint, realization would be too easy to come by. For any property F and any
other property G, the conjunction F & G would realize both F and G. However, Shoemaker later
comes to realize that a total ban on conjunctive properties as realizers is too strict (2007, 26–28).
11 This different-subject realization is what Gillett (2003) calls “dimensioned” realization.
12 A reason for denying that they are identical is that they seem to have different modal properties
(e.g., the body/lump of clay could survive the loss of personhood/statuehood). Shoemaker also
mentions potential differences in historical properties, such as the lump of clay predating the statue
(2007, p. 29).
13 Shoemaker notes, however, that strictly speaking “the realizer in the case of property reali-
zation is the instantiation of a property” (2007, p. 3), which arguably is more in line with the idea
that to realize is to “make real.” He also contends, what philosophers have in mind when they talk
of property realization is “the realization of an instance of one property by an instance of another
property” (2007, p. 31). So, like Melnyk, Shoemaker thinks of both the realized and the realizer as
instances of properties rather than properties themselves.
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of realization that allows the bearer of the realized properties to be something other
than the bearer of the realizing properties.11 Shoemaker actually does prefer a
different-subject account of realization since he is attracted to the idea that con-
stitution is not identity, and in particular to the view that the person who bears a
mental property is not identical with the constituent body (just as the statue is not
identical with the constituent lump of clay).12 The brand of realization he calls
‘realization2’ obtains when “the properties in one of a pair of coincident entities can
be said to realize properties of the other” (2007, p. 29).13
Shoemaker deﬁnes this second brand of realization, realization2, in terms of
realization1. Suppose that x belongs to the sortal, body, and y is a member of the
sortal, person. Suppose, also, that body x constitutes person y, and that x has
physical feature P and y has mental property M. Then x’s having P realizes2 y having
M just in case physical property P plus the property of being a person realizes1
mental property M, i.e., the set of forward-looking causal features of P and being a
person contains as a subset the forward-looking causal features of M, and the set of
backward-looking causal features of P and being a person is a subset of the back-
ward-looking causal features of M. As Shoemaker illustrates: “the instantiation of
C-ﬁber stimulation in my body realizes2 pain in me because (a) I am coincident with
my body, (b) I satisfy the sortal person, and (c) the conjunction of C-ﬁber stimulation
and being a person realizes1 the property of being in pain” (p. 30). Since realization2
is deﬁned in terms of realization1 and Shoemaker’s description of realization1 is a
subset account, his description of realization2 also qualiﬁes as a subset account.
Although, in what follows, by ‘subset account’ I indiscriminately refer to both
realization1 and realization2.
14,15
The subset account appears to differ from what Shoemaker calls the standard
“higher-order property” account of realization which portrays realized properties as
second-order properties the possession of which consists in some ﬁrst-order property
playing the right functional role. Yet, as Shoemaker recognizes, the subset account
of realization can be construed as a version of the higher-order property view:
it can be expressed by saying that the realized property is a second-order property the
having of which consists in having some ﬁrst-order property or other that satisﬁes a certain
condition, namely that its forward-looking causal features include as subset those of the
realized property, and its backward-looking causal features are a subset of those of the
realized property (2007, pp. 14–15).
14 I refer the reader toMelnyk’s (2010) excellent presentationand critiqueofShoemaker’s realization2.
15 As mentioned in footnote 11, since realization2 is different-subject realization, it is what Gillett
calls the “dimensioned” brand of realization. However, Shoemaker mentions Gillett’s notion of the
dimensioned account only when he introduces realization3, in which the realizer properties are had
by the microconstituents of the properties realized. With realization3, a property instantiation of
some macroscopic object is realized “by a microphysical state of affairs involving the instantiation
of micro-properties in micro-entities” (2007, p. 32). See 2007, Chap. 3 for details about this
“microrealization.” I will not discuss Shoemaker’s microrealization here, but only mention that the
objections I raise to the other two brands of realization apply to this one as well.
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Let’s focus here, not on the reference to ﬁrst-order and second-order properties,
but on the idea that realization consists in the satisfaction of a certain condition (the
playing of a certain role) characteristic of the realized property. If the subset account
can be construed in this way, then it should not be surprising that it, like those
accounts mentioned in Sects. 3.1–3.3, yields the result that mental properties can
realize physical properties. The forward-looking causal features (e.g., the potential
behavioral consequences) of perceiving an approaching lion or believing that one is
being stalked by a killer seem to be at least as numerous as the forward-looking causal
features of occupying space or having density or various other general physical
properties. The causal powers of the former properties seem at least as numerous as
those of the latter—especially since (assuming substance dualism is false) exem-
plifying the former guarantees exemplifying the latter, but not vice versa. Also, the
backward-looking causal features of perceiving an approaching lion or believing that
one is being stalked by a killer would seem to be a subset of the backward-looking
causal features of occupying space or having density (since the potential causes of the
latter are far greater). It would seem, then, that in these cases, mental properties
realize physical properties on Shoemaker’s subset account. So as with (a), (b), and
RM, there is the worry here as well that the appeal to realization does not capture the
idea that the mental phenomena obtain in virtue of physical phenomena.
However, it is arguable that this particular worry is avoided with the subset
account. For it would seem that any highly speciﬁc physical property which, unlike
the general physical properties mentioned above, might be sufﬁcient to yield a mental
property, does not itself have a mental realizer on the subset account. Take any
mental property, M, and any speciﬁc physical property, P, that might qualify as a
supervenience base for M. It’s arguable that (i) the causal powers of P are more
numerous than those ofM. It’s arguable also that (ii) there is no other mental property
whose causal powers include as a subset the causal powers of P. Granted, it’s not
entirely clear that (i) and (ii) are true. But if there is reason to think (i) and (ii) are true,
then there is reason to think that no mental property realizes P on the subset account.
And if so, then it’s arguable that with the subset account there is an asymmetry
between mental realizers and physical realizers that we do not ﬁnd with (a), (b), and
RM, an asymmetry which reﬂects the fact that the mental is grounded in the physical.
Suppose, then, that we were to accept Shoemaker’s account of physical realiza-
tion. Would we then have a reason to think that II is false? Would we then know how
it could be that the physical facts necessitate the mental facts even though mental
properties are not physical? Well, that depends on whether we endorse what Shoe-
maker calls the causal theory of properties (CTP). According to CTP, “for each
property there is a causal proﬁle that it has in every possible world in which it can be
instantiated, and which is such that having that causal proﬁle is sufﬁcient for being
that property” (2007, p. 5). If we add CTP to the view that mental properties are
realized in Shoemaker-fashion by physical properties, then we can offer a reason to
think that II is false. For simplicity, consider Shoemaker’s realization1 (same-sub-
ject, i.e., non-dimensioned/“ﬂat” realization), and suppose that physical property P
realizes1 mental property M. Then the forward-looking causal features of M are a
subset of those of P, and the backward-looking causal features of P are a subset of
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those of M. Being facts about causal features, these subset facts will remain the same
so long as the causal laws remain the same. Thus, it is nomologically necessary that if
P realizes1 M, then whenever P is instantiated M is realized. Now, if the causal proﬁle
of a property is essential to that property, as CTP tells us, then it also follows that in
any possible world, whenever P is instantiated there is a realization of M; i.e., there is
no possible world where something has P in the absence of M. So given CTP and the
fact that mentality is realized as the subset account describes, we should expect that
the physical facts necessitate (metaphysically necessitate) the mental facts, and we
should expect that this is the case even if mental properties are not physical.
Shoemaker does endorse CTP.16 But for the sake of his 2007 discussion he claims
only to presuppose the weaker thesis that each property of a concrete thing “is
individuated by a causal proﬁle in the sense that it and it alone has that proﬁle in the
actual world and worlds nomologically like it” (p. 142). However, with this weaker
version of the causal theory, call it “CTP-” even if the mental is realized by the
physical as described by the subset approach it does not follow that the physical facts
necessitate the mental facts in the way that physicalism requires. If properties have
the same causal proﬁle in all nomologically possible worlds, then what does follow
is that all nomologically possible worlds with the same physical facts have the same
mental facts. But CTP- does not guarantee that all possible worlds with the same
physical facts (including physical laws) have the same mental facts. CTP- allows, in
particular, that a complete physical duplicate of the actual world lacks some of the
actual mental episodes. As McLaughlin (2009) points out, with only CTP-, the
subset account allows possible worlds at which P (which actually realizes M) is
instantiated without any instances of M.17
Suppose, then, that we insist on the stronger CTP. As described above, CTP
together with the subset account explains why it should be that physical phenomena
necessitate mental phenomena even though mental properties are not physical.
However, this necessitation is ensured by CTP only at a huge price—the price of
requiring much more than what the thesis of physicalism itself entails. The phys-
icalists’ belief that mental phenomena obtain solely in virtue of physical phe-
nomena does not require that for each property there is a causal proﬁle that it has in
every possible world in which it can be instantiated. One might believe that
mentality is solely a function of physical facts (and even believe that mental
properties are identical with physical properties) without believing that the causal
laws that actually obtain are those that obtain in all metaphysically possible worlds.
16 And he has for some time. See, for example, Shoemaker (1980).
17 As McLaughlin (2009) notes, Shoemaker recognizes this worry and tries to avoid the problem
“by including in the realizer the obtaining of a set of causal laws—normally the laws that obtain in the
actual world,” in which case, when “the instantiation of property P is said to realize the instantiation
of property Q, the full realizer is the occurrence of P together with the obtaining of the laws that give
P the causal proﬁle it has in the world in question” (Shoemaker 2007, p. 6). However, if mental
properties are not physical, then the laws of nature will include more than just purely physical laws;
there will also be irreducibly psychophysical laws, and as McLaughlin indicates, the fact that P
together with the psychophysical laws necessitates Q is less than what physicalism demands.
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So one can believe that mentality is solely a function of physical facts without
believing that properties are individuated in terms of their causal features. In fact,
one might believe that the mental is solely dependent on the physical while being
quite skeptical about the status of causal laws.
So, while the subset account does seem to provide proponents of CTP with a
reason for thinking that II is false, it does not provide a reason for those physi-
calists, many in number, who reject CTP. Thus, even if mentality is realized
physically in the subset fashion, we are still left with the following worry:
(II*) unless CTP is true, mental properties not being identical with physical
properties prevents the physical facts from necessitating the mental facts in
the way that physicalism requires.
This is a worry for all non-reductive physicalists who reject CTP, even if they
accept Shoemaker’s views on realization.
3.5 Pereboom and Constitution
The lump of clay existed prior to being molded into a statue, and it continues to
exist even when remolded and returned to a statueless mass. Since the statue and the
lump of clay do not exist at all of the same times, it seems they are not identical. But
suppose the lump of clay and the statue miraculously come into existence at the
exact same moment and are later annihilated simultaneously. They differ even then.
They differ in some of their modal properties; e.g., the lump could have existed
prior to the statue and could have remained after the statue was destroyed. So given
the necessity of identity, one might conclude that the statue is not identical with the
constituent lump of clay. Those who conclude from arguments of this sort that
constitution is not identity owe some account of the nature of this peculiar con-
stitution relation (“peculiar” because it seems so much like identity while sup-
posedly falling short).
Baker (2000) offers a rigorous analysis of the constitution relation, an account
meant to apply not only to her main concern (the relation between persons and their
bodies) but to constitution generally, including the relation between statue and clay,
dollar and paper, and ﬂag and cloth. Pereboom also offers a precise analysis of
constitution, which focuses on what he calls “material constitution.” Since he
discusses constitution in the context of deﬁning physicalism, I shall focus on his
analysis here.
Pereboom characterizes physicalism as the view that all concrete phenomena are
materially constituted, where
x materially constitutes y at t if and only if
(a) y is made up of and materially coincident with x at t;
(b) necessarily, if x exists and is in D at t, then y exists at t and is made up of and
materially coincident with x at t; and
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(c) possibly, y exists at t and it is not the case that y is made up of and materially
coincident with x in D at t. (2011, p. 140)
Actually, this is the second of two deﬁnitions of material constitution he pro-
vides. In the ﬁrst deﬁnition (2011, p. 139), conditions (b) and (c) make no mention
of x’s being in condition D. However, a reason to favor reference to D is that it
captures Baker’s insight that in many cases, an F constitutes a G only in a certain
context, i.e., only with the right relational features. As Baker illustrates, “it is in
virtue of certain legal conventions that a particular piece of paper constitutes a
marriage license; it is in virtue of the arrangement of molecules that something
constitutes a block of ice; it is in virtue of its evolutionary history that a particular
conglomerate of cells constitutes a human heart” (2000, p. 41). Likewise, on a
standard functionalist account of mentality, a neural event constitutes a mental
episode only by playing the right causal role with respect to sensory input,
behavioral output, and other mental episodes. And, as Pereboom describes, on an
externalist view “the existence of a token belief with some speciﬁc content will not
be necessitated by the existence of its neural or microphysical constitutor, for in an
alternative physical and social environment, this same neural or microphysical
constitutor would not yield a belief with that content” (2011, p. 140).
Pereboom’s deﬁnition of material constitution does not require that an item is
identical with what materially constitutes it. One can hold with his account that the
statue is materially constituted by the lump of clay while denying that the statue is
identical with the lump of clay, and one can accept that a person is materially
constituted by her body while denying that she is identical with her body. With this
deﬁnition, one can also hold that mental processes are not identical with the neural
episodes that materially constitute them. In fact, Pereboom (2011, p. 132) argues
that just as considerations of multiple realizability have been used to show that
mental properties/types are not identical with neural properties/types, multiple
realizability can also be used to show that mental tokens are not identical with the
corresponding neural tokens. Suppose that some mental property M can be realized
by tokens of different physical types on different occasions, and suppose that M is
realized on some occasion by a token x of some physical type P. Given the multiple
realizability of M, M could have been realized by a token z of some physical type
other than P. So it seems, in this case, that while token y of M is accompanied by
physical token x, it is accompanied by x only contingently. Given the necessity of
identity, Pereboom concludes that x ≠ y.
This reasoning can easily be resisted. It is arguable that while any given mental
property could be instantiated in tokens of different physical types, no one token of
the mental type could itself have been constituted by any physical token other than
18 Baker (2013, pp. 739–740) makes the point that the multiple realizability that condition (c)
entails should not be required in an account of constitution, noting that if some diamond were
realized by a different lattice of carbon atoms, it would arguably not be the same (numerically
identical) diamond. Her conclusion regarding Pereboom’s account is a bit different from mine. She
is making a claim about what constitution (not physicalism) should allow, and she is certainly not
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the one that actually did occur on that occasion. It is arguable that if M were realized
on that occasion by a token of some physical type other than P, then while M would
still have been instantiated, the particular token of M that actually did occur on that
occasion would have failed to occur. Still, while Pereboom’s argument may be
resisted, it is not implausible to think that a deﬁnition of physicalism should allow a
physicalist to believe that mental tokens are constituted and not identical with the
corresponding physical tokens. (Although, the deﬁnition should certainly also allow
a physicalist to endorse token-identity, which suggests that condition (c) should not
be included in an account of constitution ﬁt for deﬁning physicalism.18)
In conditions (b) and (c) of his deﬁnition, ‘D’ serves to indicate whatever
contextual/relational conditions are required to have the constituted token. And with
the idea of a description ‘D’ whose satisfaction makes it the case that constitution
obtains, Pereboom has described what may be considered genuine realization,
where ‘D’ indicates the functional role to be played for realization to obtain. But
remember the issue described in the earlier sections of this chapter regarding mental
phenomena realizing physical phenomena. Since Pereboom’s notion of constitution
may be viewed as a brand of realization, the question arises whether the mental can
constitute the physical on his account. Actually, his account seems to avoid the
worry that the mental can realize (i.e., constitute) the physical. According to con-
dition (a), “y is made up of and materially coincident with x.” The requirement that
the constituted is made up of what constitutes it seems to prevent higher-level (e.g.,
mental) items from constituting items at a lower (physical) level. For it would seem
that what’s at the lower-level always makes up higher-level phenomena, and never
the other way around. As he says, “the made up of relation is asymmetric… the
lattice is not made up of the diamond” (p. 138). So with the asymmetric nature of
the made up of relation, it seems we avoid the implausible view that the mental
constitutes the physical. In this respect at least, Pereboom’s account is better suited
to deﬁning physicalism than the more paradigmatic approach to realization dis-
cussed in Sects. 3.1–3.3. Unfortunately, his constitution view still falls short of
capturing all that physicalism requires.
He mentions that by ‘made up of’ he means ‘wholly made up of’; to say that a
collection x of physical processes makes up a mental episode y is meant to entail (as
physicalism requires) that y is not made up of some non-physical processes as well.
However, Pereboom offers little to explain what exactly the (wholly) made up of
relation amounts to. He admits that “the core of the made up of relation is unana-
lyzable and thus primitive,” although he resists “the claim that this proposal amounts
to obscurantism,” since it “is sufﬁciently clear what we mean when we say that the
diamond is made up of a lattice of carbon atoms, and that the brain is made up of a
conﬁguration of various kinds of neurons, even if no reductive analysis is provided
(Footnote 18 continued)
claiming that constitution should allow token-identity. Yet, what she says about the diamond does
serve to illustrate the point I’m making here that Pereboom’s argument from multiple realizability
to token non-identity can be resisted.
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for this relation” (p. 138). However, even on an intuitive understanding of the made
up of relation, it is clear that his constitution account does not capture all that
physicalism demands. Even with a rough, intuitive grasp of what it is to be made up
of, it is clear that an item y can be made up of (wholly made up of) physical items
even though y’s having the mental properties it has is not solely a matter of the
physical details. A non-physicalist can believe that a mental episode is made up of
chemical processes, which are wholly made up of the stuff of physics, without
believing that the mental properties of the episode are wholly dependent on purely
physical features. It is true that to remain faithful to physicalism, the non-reductionist
must insist that all mental tokens are either identical with, or decomposable into, or
made up of physical tokens. But this constitution claim is not enough to make one a
physicalist, since one can accept the constitution claim, and even the token-identity
claim, while denying that mental properties obtain solely in virtue of physical
properties. One can believe that a mental token is wholly made up of physical tokens
while also believing that what gives the mental token its mental status (what makes it
belong to a certain mental type) are its irreducibly subjective, non-physical features.
That’s why rejecting substance dualism does not guarantee that one is a physicalist,
which is why many property dualists can and do reject physicalism.19
It follows that (a) of Pereboom’s analysis does not itself secure the content of
physicalism; although, one might think that with (b) and (c), he adds enough to
secure all that physicalism requires. But that is not the case. According to condition
(b), necessarily, if x exists and is in D at t, then y exists at t and is made up of and
materially coincident with x at t. It is not required that condition D, which x must
satisfy to constitute y, is a purely physical condition. So, for all that (b) demands, it
might be that physical token x constitutes mental token y only by exemplifying
some irreducible element of subjectivity or qualitative character. One step toward
precluding this sort of case is to insist that D is purely physical. To capture the
content of physicalism, we will also need to require that the necessity mentioned in
(b) is stronger than nomic necessity; otherwise, the condition could be satisﬁed with
the help of irreducibly psychophysical laws, which would not guarantee that token
y is present solely in virtue of the physical facts.20
Pereboom (2013) admits that to secure the necessitation essential to physicalism
his deﬁnition would “require supplementation by a no-emergent-law condition” (p.
762). Or, instead, we might specify that the necessity mentioned in (b) is physical
necessity. Given that condition D is a purely physical condition, then we are close
to capturing the idea that the physical facts (physical properties/relations
19 By ‘property dualist’ I mean anyone who denies that mental properties are physical properties,
which includes all non-reductionists, even those who support physicalism.
20 In response to Pereboom’s (2002) claim that the physical token together with the requisite
relational features are sufﬁcient for the mental token, Melnyk points out, “for all that Pereboom
says, this sufﬁciency might be sufﬁciency in accordance with a fundamental law of physical-to-
mental emergence” (2008, p. 1292).
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instantiated and the physical laws) necessitate the mental facts. Although, to ensure
this result we should also say something about the types, the properties, that x and y
instantiate. We want to be assured that x yields y in virtue of the physical properties
that x instantiates, physical properties that might extend beyond the speciﬁed
condition D; and, of course, we also want to be assured that x’s being of that
physical type (under those conditions) necessitates that y is of that same mental
type. With all of the qualiﬁcations in place, the deﬁnition becomes something like:
Token x of physical type P materially constitutes token y of mental type M at t if
and only if
(a) y is made up of and is materially coincident with x at t, and
(b) it is physically necessary that if x exists at t and is of type P in physical
condition D, then y exists at t and is of type M, and is made up of and
materially coincident with x at t.21
But now condition (b) contains a supervenience thesis of brand NP, which tells
us that the physical details together with the purely physical laws necessitate the
mental details. This is a condition that physicalism seems to entail.22 And with this
supervenience condition as part of our deﬁnition (as it seems it should be if used to
formulate physicalism), we are left with our nagging question of why the physical
facts should necessitate the mental facts in this way if mental properties are not
identical with physical properties. The notion of being made up of, for all that
Pereboom says about it, fails to answer this question; as mentioned earlier, one can
believe that a mental token is wholly made up of physical tokens while also
believing that what gives the mental token its mental status are its irreducibly
subjective, non-physical features.
It seems, then, that as it stands Pereboom’s constitution analysis falls short of
capturing the content of physicalism. And if the analysis were strengthened (along
the lines above) to entail all that physicalism requires, we would still be left with
worry II. This issue, again, is not whether there is reason to accept the physical
necessitation that physicalism requires; the issue is how this necessitation could even
obtain if mental properties are not physical. For if we concede that mental properties
are not physical, then we seem compelled to allow possible worlds that physically
duplicate the actual world (same physical laws and same distribution of physical
properties/relations) but without some of the mental episodes that actually obtain.
21 Condition (c) is deleted since, as was mentioned, while the denial of token-identity perhaps
should be allowed, it should not be required by a deﬁnition of material constitution ﬁt for deﬁning
physicalism.
22 Physicalism entails the physical necessitation of NP, or at least NP* (as described in § 2.3).
Recall that NP* is the physical necessitation claim restricted to positive mental facts (to allow the
possibility of mental extras).
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3.6 Recap
Mentality is realized by physical phenomena. The basic and standard idea here is
that a mental property is a functional property, which is instantiated by some
physical process in virtue of the physical process playing the functional role
deﬁnitive of the mental property. We have seen that this basic notion of realization
allows not only that the physical realizes the mental, but also that the mental can
realize the physical; and this is possible even with Melnyk’s rigorous deﬁnition of
realization.
The fact that there are cases in which physical properties are realized by mental
items would seem to undermine the prospect of characterizing physicalism in terms
of realization. For if a mental item can realize a physical property, then it seems that
whatever makes it the case that mentality obtains in virtue of physical phenomena,
it is not simply that the former is realized by the latter. If it were true that there is
some level of physical structure at which none of the physical realizers of mentality
themselves have mental realizers, then perhaps the notion of realization could be
used to at least capture the idea that the physical is primary. However, as shown in
Sects. 3.2 and 3.3, even fundamental physical properties have mental realizers (at
least where realization is construed in terms of (a), (b), or Melnyk’s RM). The fact
that even basic physical properties are realized by mental items certainly threatens
the prospect of characterizing physicalism in terms of realization.
We have also seen that by allowing the mental to realize the physical, the notion
of realization on the standard construal (speciﬁed in terms of (a), (b), or RM) does
not help to show why the worrisome II is false. We are still left wondering how it
could be that the mental facts are necessitated by physical facts (as physicalism
requires) if mental properties are not physical. In fact, since the mental can realize
the physical, and even the stuff of fundamental physics, the idea that mentality is
realized by physical items is compatible with the view that all of the ultimate
realizers are mental instead of physical, and therefore that the mental necessitates
the physical rather than the other way around.
One non-standard view of realization is Shoemaker’s subset account (his reali-
zation1 and realization2). The subset approach does help us see why II might be
false—but only given CTP, according to which, each property has a causal proﬁle
and the same causal proﬁle in every possible world. So while the subset account
provides proponents of CTP with a reason for thinking that II is false, it does not
offer a reason for the many non-reductive physicalists who reject CTP.
Another non-standard view of realization is provided by Pereboom with his
description of material constitution. Since Pereboom’s account relies on the notion of
being made up of, with his account it seems we avoid the result that the physical is
23 Another non-standard view of realization is provided by Yablo (1992), who describes the
relation between mental properties and their physical realizers as a relation of determinables to
determinates. In Francescotti (2010), I show that Yablo’s account also has the worrisome con-
sequence that the mental can realize the physical.
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realized by (constituted by) the mental; if physical token x is materially coincident
with y and y is made up of x, then given the asymmetry of themade up of relation, x is
not made up of y. However, we have seen that as it stands Pereboom’s account still
falls short of capturing the content of physicalism. And if the account were
strengthened to entail the sort of physical necessitation that physicalism requires, then
we would be left again with worry II, wondering how it could be that the physical
necessitates the mental in the way physicalism requires if mental properties are not
physical. The notion of being “made up of” does nothing to answer this question.23
In the next chapter, I offer a deﬁnition of physicalism that I think does reveal
why II is false, showing that the fact (if it is a fact) that mental properties are not
physical does not preclude the necessitation of the mental by the physical that
physicalism demands. The account offered is a way to make sense of the idea that
mentality is constituted by physical phenomena, and one which comes closer than
Pereboom’s to capturing the idea that the former depends wholly on, consisting in
nothing other than, the latter. The account also borrows from Shoemaker’s idea that
there is something about mentality that is a subset of what obtains physically—not a
subset of causal powers, but a subset of the concrete items involved. I warn,
however, that while the deﬁnition of physicalism provided in Chap. 4 shows why II
is false, thereby showing how a non-reductionist can earn the title ‘physicalist’, it
does so only by suggesting a couple of plausible and robust deﬁnitions of ‘physical
property’ according to which mental properties are in fact physical (even if they are
not identical with any properties of the natural sciences).
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Chapter 4
Deﬁning Physicalism
4.1 Token-Identity and Being Nothing More Than
The thought that mental properties are multiply realizable is the main reason why
type-identity theories began to go out of favor in the 1960s and soon became and
remained the minority view. Yet, many who rejected psychophysical type-identity
claims still endorsed the weaker token-identity claim that every token of a mental
type is a token of some physical type or other, though not necessarily the same
physical type on each occasion. Expressed in terms of properties and their
instances, the view is that
(TKI) For any mental property M, and any instance x of M, there is a physical
property or collection of physical properties, P, and an instance y of P such
that x = y.
It is widely recognized that endorsing this token-identity claim is not by itself
enough to make one a physicalist. Even if an instance of some mental property M is
also an instance of a physical property P, it might be that what makes it an instance
of M is something more than its being an instance of P or any other physical
property. Thus, one can consistently accept TKI while also rejecting physicalism,
by claiming (for example) that the physical process that instantiates M manages to
do so only because of certain irreducibly subjective features, ones that do not
depend solely on the presence of any set of physical features. So TKI does not entail
physicalism regarding mentality. However, as will now be shown, there are
derivatives of TKI that do capture the physicalist belief that mental facts obtain
solely in virtue of physical facts.
Suppose that I engage in some peculiar body movements on some occasion and
in doing so I thereby engage in a (pathetic) display of dancing. The property of
being engaged in dancing is not the same as the property of moving one’s body
about as I did on that occasion, since dancing can and (thankfully) often does occur
without those peculiar movements I made. Still, it does seem that I have engaged in
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dancing on that occasion in virtue of nothing more than moving my body in just
those ways at that time with the intention to dance.
In this case, the properties instantiated differ. There is the property, D, of being
engaged in dancing. There is also the property, B, of intentionally moving one’s
body in those dance-resembling ways. And property D is not the same property as B
since dancing can and often does occur without those particular movements I made
on that occasion. However, despite the difference in properties, the act that in-
stantiates D in this case is the very same act as the one that instantiates B. We are
imagining that the very series of movements that is my act of dancing on that
occasion is the moving of my body in just those ways. So the x that is an instance of
D is an instance of B.1 But that’s not all. It also seems that x’s instantiation of D on
this occasion is nothing more than x’s instantiation of B. That very process of
dancing seems to be nothing more than that particular series of dancing-intention
driven body movements on that occasion.2
So, in this case, there are 3 pairs of items to consider. There are the properties, D
and B, and in this case,
(i) property D ≠ property B.
Also, there is the event or process, x, that instantiates D, and the y that instantiates
B, and in this case it seems that x is the same as y. That is, the very process that is
an instance of moving one’s body in those ways is also an instance of dancing. So
in this case,
(ii) there is an instance x of D and an instance y of B, and x = y.3
Furthermore, there is x’s instantiation of D and y’s instantiation of B, and it seems
that:
(iii) the instantiation of D on that occasion is nothing more than the instantiation
of B.
To make the difference between (ii) and (iii) clearer, consider a property more
generic than B. Consider the property of moving one’s body. Call it “B-.” Now in
the case we are imagining, the activity x, which is an instance of B and D, is also an
instance of property B-; an instance of moving one’s body in that speciﬁc dancing
manner requires an instance of the simpler property of moving one’s body. How-
ever, it seems quite clear that x’s instantiating D is something more than x’s
instantiating B-. What makes x an act of dancing is not simply that it is an act of
moving one’s body. What makes it an act of dancing is that it is an act of moving
one’s body with the right intentions in certain speciﬁc ways. In general, then, there
1 Or I should say, this is what seems to be the case. Thoughts of constitution and its difference
from identity (which will be addressed shortly) might suggest otherwise.
2 I specify that the movements are driven by dancing intentions to avoid the potential objection
that being engaged in genuine dancing requires intending to dance (as opposed to, say, moving in
that way due to a seizure).
3 Again, issues of constitution versus identity are put aside for the moment.
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is a difference between the same process instantiating two different properties, F and
G, and the instantiation of F in that case being nothing more than the instantiation of
G. In some cases, there is the former without the latter.
To take a more famous example, consider the stabbing of Caesar. The property
of stabbing is different from the property of killing since one can kill in many ways
other than stabbing. However, Brutus and the others performed an action, x, that
was an instance of both properties; it was a collective stabbing and it was a killing.
So the killing/stabbing counterpart to (ii) seems to be true. Moreover, the analogue
of (iii) also seems to be true. Philosophers debate whether the killing of Caesar is
the same event as the stabbing of Caesar (a debate whose answer depends on
whether events are individuated in terms of the properties exempliﬁed). Yet,
regardless of one’s views on events, it does seem that in some quite plausible sense
of ‘nothing more than’, the killing of Caesar on that occasion was nothing more
than the stabbing of Caesar in exactly that manner (a manner of stabbing which
includes being death-producing).
Now let’s return to mental properties. Suppose that some mental property M is
not identical with the underlying physical property P. Also suppose that while the
type-identity thesis is false, the token-identity claim is true and
(iiM) there is an instance x of M and an instance y of P, and x = y.
Even assuming (iiM) is true, there is the further question of whether
(iiiM) the instantiation of M on that occasion is nothing more than the
instantiation of P.
There is a difference between (iiM) and (iiiM) since one can accept the former
while rejecting the latter. One might think that while an instance x of M is an instance
of some physical property, what makes x an instance of M is a matter of more than its
physical features. One can accept token-identity claims of type (iiM) while agreeing,
for example, with Jackson’s (1982, 1986) classic view that the qualitative character
of a mental state is not exhausted by its physical features.4 And one can accept (iiM)
while endorsing Chalmers’ (1996) proposal that phenomenal properties are funda-
mental features of the world, or even his suggestion that both phenomenal and
physical features ultimately depend on proto-phenomenal properties. Clearly, then, a
non-physicalist can consistently accept (iiM). However, with the “nothing more
than” claim, (iiiM) seems to be something that only a physicalist can consistently
accept. For the claim that an instantiation of M on some occasion is nothing more
than the instantiation of P rules out the presence of M on that occasion being due to
something other than the presence of physical features. And the instantiation of M
being a function of none other than the instantiation of physical features is just what,
and apparently only what, a physicalist regarding M would claim. So, as an initial
attempt at deﬁning physicalism regarding mentality, we might try
4 The non-physicalist property dualism Jackson defends there is a view he has since rejected. See,
e.g., Jackson (2003, 2012).
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(NMT) For any mental property M, and any instance x of M at a time t, there is
some physical property or collection of physical properties, P, such that x
instantiates P at t, and x’s instantiation of M at t is nothing more than x’s
instantiation of P at t,
where ‘NMT’ abbreviates ‘nothing more than’.
To know how well NMT captures the content of physicalism, we obviously need
to get clear on what the nothing more than relation amounts to. It would be nice, for
the sake of simplicity, to regard the nothing more than relation as identity. Then
NMT would amount to the following special brand of token-identity claim:
(TKI*) For any mental property M, and any instance x of M at a time t, there is
some physical property or collection of physical properties, P, such that x
instantiates P at t, and x’s instantiation of M at t = x’s instantiation of P at t.
Unlike the standard token-identity thesis, characterized by TKI, with this
restricted token-identity claim what’s being identiﬁed are not merely tokens of M
and P, but tokens of the higher-order properties of being an instantiation of M and
being an instantiation of P. And for this reason, TKI does not entail TKI*. It might
be that instance x of M is an instance of P without it being the case that x’s
instantiation of M is identical with x’s instantiation of P. Consider any scenario in
which (iiM) is true and (iiiM) is false, e.g., a case in which x is an instance of both M
and P but x’s having the qualitative character essential to M is not solely a matter of
any of the physical features x instantiates. In a case of this sort, x is an instance of
both M and P, but x’s instantiation of M is not identical with, since it is not nothing
more than, its instantiation of P.
The appeal to identity does add precision to talk of “being nothing more than,”
but there are reasons not to rely on identity in our explication of NMT. While
physicalism itself is a metaphysical doctrine, there are a variety of metaphysical
issues on which a deﬁnition of physicalism should remain neutral. One of these
issues is how the property-instantiations I’ve been referring to are best construed.
Should they be considered events, or should they be thought of as states of affairs,
or are they best viewed as belonging to some other ontological category? And
whichever of these ontological categories we choose, what exactly is the nature of
the items belonging to that category? It seems that a deﬁnition of physicalism
should remain neutral on such issues. One’s being a physicalist does not seem to
depend on one’s stance regarding these matters. However, whether TKI* is true
does depend on the answer to these questions.
Suppose, for example, that we regard the items identiﬁed by TKI* as states of
affairs. On the standard view, states of affairs are complex items with objects and
properties as constituents. The state of affairs of Fido’s being ﬁerce, on the standard
view, is an ontologically complex item that is comprised of the individual Fido and
the property of being ﬁerce. But if the items identiﬁed by TKI* are states of affairs
construed in this manner, then TKI* cannot be true unless mental properties are
identical with physical properties. Or suppose the items that TKI* identiﬁes are to
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be understood as events. Then whether TKI* is true depends in part on the correct
view of events. On Kim’s (1966) ﬁne-grained account, an event (like a state of
affairs) is a structured item, comprised of an object (or objects), a property (or
relation), and a time. This view entails that events are identical only if the con-
stituent properties are identical. So if events are what TKI* claims to be identical,
then given Kim’s account of event-identity, TKI* cannot be true unless mental
properties are physical. On the other hand, if events are individuated more loosely,
e.g., in terms of their spatiotemporal location, then TKI* could be true even if
M ≠ P.5
It seems that whether one deserves the label ‘physicalist’ should not depend on
whether one regards the property-instantiations I mentioned as events or as states of
affairs, or as something else altogether, and it seems that whether one qualiﬁes as a
physicalist should not depend on how ﬁnely or coarsely one chooses to individuate
such items. Given that a deﬁnition of physicalism should be neutral on these
metaphysical matters, we should not include in our deﬁnition the identity claim
expressed by TKI*.
It’s arguable that we should also strive for a deﬁnition of physicalism that
remains neutral on whether constitution is identity. As mentioned in Sect. 3.5,
Pereboom (2011, p. 132) points out that just as considerations of multiple realiz-
ability have been used to show that mental types are not identical with physical
types, they can also be used to show that mental tokens are not identical with their
physical constituents. Suppose that some mental type M is realized by tokens of
different physical types on different occasions, and suppose that M is realized on a
certain occasion by a token y of some physical type P. Given the multiple realiz-
ability of M, Pereboom reasons that the token x of M on that occasion could have
been accompanied by a token z of some physical type other than P. And if so, then
it seems that while x is in fact accompanied by y, it is so only contingently. Given
the necessity of identity, Pereboom concludes that x ≠ y. I noted in 3.5 that this
reasoning can be resisted. It is arguable that while any given mental property could
be instantiated by tokens of different physical types, no one token of the mental
property could itself have been constituted by any physical token other than the one
that actually did occur on that occasion. It is arguable that if M were realized on that
occasion by a token of some physical type other than P, then while M would still
have been instantiated, the particular token of M that actually did occur on that
occasion would have failed to occur.6 And if so, then we can accept the token-
identity claim along with the multiple realizability of mental properties without
having to admit that instance x of M is only contingently identical with instance y
of P. Still, while Pereboom’s argument may be resisted, it is arguable that a deﬁ-
nition of physicalism should allow that the constitution of mental tokens by
5 See, for example, Quine (1950, 1985) and Davidson (1969) on events.
6 As Baker (2013, pp. 739–740) points out in her discussion of Pereboom’s account, if some
diamond were realized by a different lattice of carbon atoms, it would arguably not be the same
(numerically identical) diamond. (Recall footnote 18 of Chap. 3.)
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physical tokens is not a matter of genuine identity. It’s arguable that nothing about
the content of physicalism itself entails that mental tokens are identical with
physical tokens; one can arguably remain faithful to physicalism while denying
mental-physical token-identity for either Pereboom’s reason or some other reason.
So, for the purpose of deﬁning physicalism, perhaps we should prefer NMT with
its emphasis on being nothing more than. And to avoid any hint of a token-identity
claim, we might wish to rephrase NMT slightly, as follows:
(NMT) For any mental property M, and any instance x of M at a time t, there is
some physical property or collection of physical properties, P, and an
instance y of P at t, such that x’s instantiation of M at t is nothing more
than y’s instantiation of P at t.
It seems that NMT is sufﬁciently neutral on issues of constitution and identity, and
neutral enough on questions about the nature of the property-instantiations men-
tioned, to be acceptable to all physicalists. Yet, whether NMT is something that
only a physicalist would accept cannot be decided until we clarify the obscure talk
of being nothing more than to which we have returned.
It might be thought that the notion of grounding, which has been the topic of
much recent debate in metaphysics, might help clarify matters.
4.2 Grounding
Talk of grounding is meant to capture the intuitive idea of one fact consisting in or
holding in virtue of another fact. Examples of grounding talk include the following
statements mentioned by Correia (2010, p. 251).
Dispositional properties are grounded in categorical properties.
Legal facts are grounded in non-legal, e.g., social, facts.
Morally wrong acts are wrong in virtue of non-moral facts.
Universals exist in virtue of their having exempliﬁers.
Determinables are exempliﬁed in virtue of corresponding determinates being exempliﬁed.
Holes are grounded in facts about their hosts.
Many who defend the notion of grounding as a valuable philosophical concept
accept the grounding relation as primitive and therefore indeﬁnable. Still, advocates
of grounding generally are prepared to state what they consider some of its dis-
tinctive logical and structural features in an effort to make the notion less than
unacceptably obscure.7
7 See Rosen’s (2010) helpful description of these logical and structural features. The attempt to
illuminate the concept of grounding also involves giving examples of its application (including
those in the list above) and describing its connection to other philosophical notions, e.g., the
notions of truth-making, reduction, and explanation.
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One feature often considered crucial to grounding is determination, i.e., neces-
sitation; it has been claimed that one fact is grounded in another only if the latter
necessitates the former. As Rosen puts it, “If [p] is grounded in [q], then q entails
p”; and when grounding is understood as a type of metaphysical dependence, the
“facts that ground [p] together ensure as a matter of metaphysical necessity that [p]
obtains” (2010, p. 118). Insofar as grounding is a necessitation relation, it might be
thought that the notion of grounding can be used to capture the idea that the mental
supervenes on the physical since supervenience itself is a necessitation relation.8
Another logical feature commonly cited in discussions of grounding is asymmetry.
It is thought that if one set of facts is grounded in another, then the latter is not
grounded in the former. The appeal to asymmetry honors the idea that the ground is
more fundamental than the grounded features. For this reason, irreﬂexivity has also
been considered deﬁnitive of grounding since no fact can be more fundamental than
itself. Transitivity is also mentioned in discussions of grounding. It is tempting to
think that if, for example, a moral fact is grounded in a behavioral fact and the
behavioral fact is grounded in a microphysical fact, then the moral fact is grounded
in the microphysical fact.9
Necessitation seems to be a relation a physicalist would think obtains between
physical facts and mental facts. However, it is doubtful that the sort of physical
dependence that is essential to physicalism has the other logical features mentioned
above. It is a matter of some debate whether one can consistently be a physicalist
while denying the mental properties are physical; but obviously there is no question
that one can be a physicalist while believing that mental properties are physical and
therefore that mental facts are physical facts (on a non-conceptual, worldly view of
facts). Indeed, the acceptance of psychophysical property- and fact-identities would
seem to be physicalism at its most robust. Yet, unlike the grounding relation,
identity is reﬂexive and symmetrical. Thus, a deﬁnition of physicalism should not
require that the dependence of the mental on the physical is irreﬂexive and
asymmetrical as grounding is often thought to be.
It is also arguable that the necessitation of the mental by the physical is not quite
the same sort of necessitation as that found in many of the examples used to
illustrate grounding. Granted, the idea that mental facts are grounded in physical
facts is sometimes used as an example of the grounding relation; the ﬁrst example of
grounding talk on Correia’s (2010) list is ‘Mental facts obtain in virtue of neuro-
physiological facts’. But there seems to be a difference between the necessitation
relation in this case and that present in his other examples of grounding. Assuming
that mental properties are not identical with the underlying physical properties, an
instance of the latter necessitates an instance of the former only with the help of the
physical laws that obtain; even a physicalist can (and perhaps should) hold that the
8 See Correia’s (2008, pp. 1027–1029) discussion of supervenience and ontological dependence.
9 Schaffer (2012) offers counter-examples to the transitivity of grounding, and then proposes a
contrastive approach to grounding along with a differential transitivity principle to handle the
problem cases.
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physical properties instantiated might yield a different distribution of mental
properties in a world with different physical laws. Of course, physicalism is often
construed as the metaphysical necessitation of the mental by the physical, i.e., every
possible world that physically duplicates the actual world mentally duplicates it as
well. The physical duplication, however, is assumed to include duplication of the
physical laws. The idea is that all possible worlds that duplicate the actual world in
the distribution of physical properties/relations and the physical laws that obtain are
worlds that duplicate the actual world mentally.
The role of physical laws in the necessitation of the mental by the physical seems
to make this case different from the other cases cited above from Correia’s list. If it is
true that universals exist in virtue of their having exempliﬁers, then it seems that it’s
true because it is part of the essence of universals that none go unexempliﬁed. The
laws of physics are not what make it the case, if it is the case, that no universals go
unexempliﬁed. And if it is true that morally wrong acts are wrong in virtue of non-
moral facts (e.g., the fact that a surplus of suffering is produced), then it seems that
that’s because of the very nature of morality. While the laws of physics, chemistry,
and biology are what make certain stimuli productive of pain and suffering, these
laws of nature are not what make the production of suffering wrong. Also, suppose it
is true that determinables are exempliﬁed in virtue of corresponding determinates
being exempliﬁed. Suppose, to use one of Rosen’s (2010, p. 126) examples, that the
ball is blue in virtue of being cerulean. Of course, the laws of physics determine
whether an object is cerulean or some other shade of blue. But the truth of the
statement ‘If cerulean, then blue’ has nothing to do with the physical laws; it is part
of the very essence of being cerulean that cerulean objects are blue.10
It is doubtful, then, that the necessitation of the mental by the physical is the
same sort of necessitation that obtains in most of the typical examples of
grounding.11 And even if I am wrong about this putative difference, one can cer-
tainly believe that there is this difference while still deserving the label ‘physicalist’.
Also, as mentioned above, one can warrant the title ‘physicalist’ while believing
that some of the other logical features used to characterize grounding (e.g.,
asymmetry and irreﬂexivity) are not true of the relation between the mental and the
physical. Thus, insofar as NMT is being offered as a deﬁnition of physicalism, it is
perhaps advisable to leave talk of grounding behind here and try to ﬁnd some other
way to clarify the idea of being nothing more than at work in NMT.
10 For a discussion of the connection between essence and ground, see, e.g., Fine (2012, §I.11)
and Rosen (2010, §13). Also see Fine (1994, 1995) for discussion of essence and ontological
dependence in general.
11 Fine distinguishes between the metaphysical, the normative, and the natural conceptions of
ground, and he suggests that assuming mental properties are not physical, “the view that the mental
is grounded in the physical is only plausible for the natural conception” (2012, p. 77). (As a non-
mental example of a statement of natural ground, he gives “The fact that the particle is accelerating
obtains in virtue of the fact that it is being acted upon by some net positive force” 2012, p. 37.) If it
is true that the mental is grounded in the physical only on the natural conception of ground, then
the type of ground that connects the mental to the physical is not the metaphysical brand that
discussions of grounding usually concern.
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4.3 The Principle of Concrete Exhaustion
Recall the dancing example from Sect. 4.1. I exhibit some peculiar body move-
ments on some occasion and by doing so I thereby engage in a display of what
might be called “dancing.” The property, D, of being engaged in dancing is not the
same as the property, B, of moving one’s body in just those dancing-intention
driven ways on that occasion, since dancing can and often does occur without those
particular movements I made. Still, it does seem that I am dancing on that occasion
in virtue of nothing other than the instantiation of B at that time. So it seems true to
say that the instantiation of D that occurred then is nothing more than the instan-
tiation of B on that occasion. However, recall the coarser property, B-, of moving
one’s body. It’s clear that what makes my act an instance of dancing is not simply
that it’s an act of moving my body since there are many series of body movements
that are not instances of dancing. So it is not accurate to say that the instantiation of
D that occurred on that occasion is nothing more than the instantiation of B-.
But what’s the crucial difference here between the instantiation of B and the
instantiation of B-? Why does it seem plausible to say that nothing more than the
former is involved in the act of dancing, while something more than the latter is
involved? Well, strictly speaking, there is something more going on in both cases.
Since D ≠ B and D ≠ B-, an extra property is instantiated in both cases. The
difference between the two cases has to do with what concrete items are involved—
where the word ‘concrete’ here is used to denote any item that is not abstract (and
therefore not a property, construed as either a universal or a trope). Let’s use the
word ‘item’ loosely enough to include all particulars—not just those one would
normally label ‘objects’, but also the events and processes that occur within those
objects and which those objects undergo. Then the point is that the concrete items
involved in the instantiation of D on that occasion includes nothing more than
whatever concrete items were needed for B to be instantiated at the time. That is,
the sum of concrete items at that time that make it the case that D is instantiated
does not include any concrete items other than those required for the instantiation of
B. However, the concrete items involved in the instantiation of D do include more
than those that the instantiation of B- requires. Put simply, dancing involves more,
in the realm of the concrete, than simply moving one’s body—although if one
moves one’s body in just that manner (and with those intentions) on that occasion,
then enough has obtained for dancing to have thereby occurred.
Brutus and the others stabbed Caesar, and in so doing, they killed Caesar.
Philosophers debate whether the killing of Caesar and that series of stabbings
qualify as the same event. However, one can remain neutral on how to individuate
events while acknowledging that the killing of Caesar was nothing more, in terms
of all items concrete, than the stabbing of Caesar in just that way on that occasion.
That is, the set of concrete items (objects, events, processes, or whatever else
concrete) that made it the case that an act of killing occurred on that occasion
contains nothing more than those concrete items at the time required for that death-
causing series of stabbings.
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Let’s use the phrase ‘concretely exhausted by’ to denote the relation that obtains
when an instantiation of one property is nothing more, in terms of everything
concrete, than an instantiation of some other property. And as an initial attempt to
deﬁne this relation, let us start with:
An instantiation of F on some occasion is concretely exhausted by an instan-
tiation of G on that occasion = the set of concrete items on that occasion that
makes it the case that F is instantiated includes nothing more than the set of
concrete items on that occasion required for the instantiation of G.
To know whether the notion of concrete exhaustion can be used to adequately
deﬁne physicalism, the analysis needs to be made more precise. Let’s leave it open
whether the instantiation of D, or B, or B- is best viewed as an event, a state of
affairs, an occurrence, or a fact. (And I think this should be left open in a deﬁnition
of physicalism.) Although, we do need to get clear on what is meant by saying that
some set of concrete items makes it the case that a property is instantiated, or that it
is required for the instantiation of some property.
Let’s start with ‘makes it the case that’. How should that expression be construed
here? I think it is not implausible, for the purpose of deﬁning physicalism, to
interpret the expression as denoting a type of sufﬁciency, and a relatively strong
brand of sufﬁciency. Conceptual sufﬁciency seems to be the sort involved in some
instances of concrete exhaustion. It is arguably part of the very meaning of
‘dancing’ that if one engages in B-type movements (which we are supposing are
dancing-intention driven and also not too dissimilar in movement to paradigm cases
of dancing), then dancing, even if bad dancing, has thereby occurred. Likewise, it is
arguable that stabbing in a death-producing way is by deﬁnition an instance of
killing. However, there are other brands of what might plausibly be called concrete
exhaustion where the necessitation is not purely conceptual. For instance, it might
be that Hank’s being chased by a mammal on some occasion is concretely
exhausted by his being chased by a dog, even though being chased by a dog is
arguably only synthetically sufﬁcient for being chased by a mammal. Also, if an
instantiation of a mental property were concretely exhausted by the instantiation of
some physical property, it seems that the necessitation of the former by the latter
would be no more than metaphysical necessitation.12 So let’s interpret ‘makes it the
case that’ as ‘is metaphysically sufﬁcient for’.
And regarding the talk of being required for the instantiation of some property,
let’s construe this as referring to synchronic dependence, with a dependence of the
sine qua non variety. So, for example, to say that a set S of concrete items is
12 Although, in the mental/physical case, the metaphysical necessitation involves the laws of
nature (the physical laws in particular). It is metaphysically necessary, given the physical laws, that
the same distribution of physical properties is accompanied by the same distribution of mental
properties. We will consider how the physical laws play a role in the concrete exhaustion of the
mental by the physical later in this section.
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required for an instantiation of B is to say that S is a set of concrete items at the time
without which B would not have been instantiated.13
Of course, for any instantiation of B or B-, there isn’t just one set of concrete items
on which it depends. There is the set that contains the complete collection of concrete
items on which the property instantiation depends. Then there is a set that contains all
of those items minus one, and a set containing all of that minus a few more, etc. The
set to consider in our explication of being nothing more than should be maximal or
complete in that it contains all of the concrete items on which the instantiation of the
property synchronically depends. Otherwise, we might choose as the set of concrete
items required for the instantiation of B the set that contains only what is required for
the instantiation of B-. Since this smaller set does not sufﬁce for the instantiation of
D, we would then arrive at the incorrect result that the instantiation of D is not
concretely exhausted by the instantiation of B. At the same time, the set should
contain no more than what is required for the instantiation of the property. The
totality of all concrete items that exist or obtain includes what is required for the
instantiation of B-, and this very large set does metaphysically sufﬁce for the
instantiation of D. So if we focus on this set as the set required for the instantiation of
B-, then we risk the incorrect result that the instantiation of D is concretely exhausted
by the instantiation of B-. Thus, while the set of concrete items to consider when
deciding what is required for the instantiation of a property should be complete
(containing all concrete items required for the property instantiation), it should also
be minimally complete (containing nothing other than those essential items).
To incorporate these qualiﬁcations, let’s reﬁne the formulation above as follows:
An instantiation of F at time t is concretely exhausted by an instantiation of G at
t = (i) there is a set S of concrete items at t that is metaphysically sufﬁcient for
the instantiation of F, (ii) there is a minimally complete set, S*, of concrete items
at t without which the instantiation of G would not have obtained, and (iii) S is a
subset (perhaps a proper subset) of S*.
The notion of concrete exhaustion borrows from Shoemaker’s idea that there is
something about the realized properties that is a subset of something about the
realizers—not a subset of causal powers, but a subset of concrete items involved.
However, unlike Shoemaker’s subset account, the idea of concrete exhaustion does
not require that properties are individuated by their causal powers. As mentioned in
Sect. 3.4, while Shoemaker does endorse a strong causal account of properties,
according to which, “for each property there is a causal proﬁle that it has in every
possible world in which it can be instantiated, and which is such that having that
causal proﬁle is sufﬁcient for being that property” (2007, p. 5), his account of
realization presupposes only the weaker thesis that each property of a concrete thing
“is individuated by a causal proﬁle in the sense that it and it alone has that proﬁle in
the actual world and worlds nomologically like it” (p. 142). The presence of
13 And I leave it completely open here which theory of counterfactuals is most suitable to
capturing the truth-conditions of the sine qua non claim.
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concrete exhaustion as deﬁned above entails neither the weak nor the strong view of
property individuation. And this is as it should be if the notion of concrete
exhaustion is used to deﬁne physicalism, for physicalism itself does not require
even a weak account of property individuation.
Suppose, then, that we deﬁne physicalism in terms of concrete exhaustion.
Suppose we deﬁne physicalism as the view that
(CPE) For any mental property M, and any instantiation of M at a time t, there is
a physical property or collection of physical properties, P, and an
instantiation of P at t such that the former instantiation is concretely
exhausted by the latter,
where ‘CPE’ abbreviates ‘Principle of Concrete Physical Exhaustion’.14
It does seem that all physicalists would (or should) accept CPE. Assuming that
non-reductive physicalism is a coherent position, one can qualify as a physicalist
while rejecting psychophysical type-identity claims. By not requiring that mental
properties are physical properties, CPE is open to non-reductive physicalists. At the
same time, CPE allows that mental properties are physical, which is just as it should
be since physicalists certainly need not deny type-identity.15 CPE is also compatible
with the truth of a token-identity thesis. Recall that Pereboom’s account of material
constitution (discussed in Sect. 3.5) entails that the tokens constituted are not
identical with the tokens that do the constituting.16 Yet, clearly, one can endorse
token-identity claims without thereby forfeiting the label ‘physicalist’. At the same
time, with no mention of identity in CPE, the deﬁnition does allow a physicalist to
agree with Pereboom that the relation between mental tokens and physical tokens is
one of constitution and not identity. (The deﬁnition of what it is to concretely
exhaust does not require that the F-instantiation is identical with the G-instantiation,
and it does not require that the object or objects involved in the F-instantiation are
identical with the objects that participate in the G-instantiation.) Moreover, CPE
says nothing about whether mental properties are functional properties, which does
seem to be a merit since one can qualify as a physicalist while believing that some,
perhaps many, mental properties are not functional in any signiﬁcant sense
(believing, e.g., that some mental properties are intrinsic features).
It appears, then, that CPE does not entail anything a physicalist is forced to reject.
But is CPE a thesis that only a physicalist would (or should) accept? Suppose that
some brand of substance dualism were correct. Then the instantiation of M would
involve concrete items (e.g., souls and their activities or conditions) that are wholly
14 Obviously, the label ‘Principle of Concrete Physical Exhaustion’ is inspired by the Principle of
Physical Exhaustion that Hellman and Thompson (1975) offer, which was described in Sect. 2.2.
Although, as explained here, CPE is more physically exhaustive than their Principle of Physical
Exhaustion.
15 Indeed, it’s arguable that the type-identity thesis is physicalism at its most robust.
16 This is entailed thanks to his condition (c), which reads: “possibly, y exists at t and it is not the
case that y is made up of and materially coincident with x in D at t” (2011, p. 140).
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immaterial—wholly immaterial in the sense of lying outside the physical universe.
In that case, the collection of concrete items sufﬁcient for M’s instantiation includes
more than the (minimally complete) set of concrete items required for the instantiation
of any physical property. So substance dualism is clearly incompatible with CPE.
However, substance dualists aren’t the only ones who reject physicalism. A
property dualist can also reject physicalism. Would they join substance dualists in
rejecting CPE? To see that they would (or should), note that CPE entails more of
what physicalism requires than either the standard token-identity claim, TKI, or the
Principle of Physical Decomposition (PD) mentioned in Sect. 2.2.17 Recall that
according to TKI, every instance of a mental property is an instance of a physical
property, and according to PD, each mental particular (each instance of and each
bearer of a mental property) is either a physical item or possesses a decomposition
into parts, all of which are physical items. While both TKI and PD entail that
instances of mental properties are instances of physical properties, neither entails
that mental properties are instantiated solely in virtue of the instantiation of physical
properties. Both allow that while a mental episode is ultimately fully comprised of
the stuff of basic physics, what makes it the type of mental episode it is (e.g., what
gives it its qualitative or intentional character) depends on more than what physi-
cally obtains. Thus, neither TKI nor PD guarantees that mentality is physically
exhausted to quite the degree that physicalism demands.
Now consider the degree of physical exhaustion that CPE requires. Suppose that
the qualitative character of some mental event depends on more than the instanti-
ation of any physical features. In that case, there is something more than physical
features involved. Of course, an additional property is involved (assuming that
mental properties are not physical). But that is not all that’s additional. It is rea-
sonable to suppose, in general, that which contingent properties (including mental
properties) are instantiated is a function of the concrete phenomena that obtain. It
seems there would be a difference in mental properties instantiated only with some
difference in concrete phenomena, e.g., a difference between the instantiation of
pain and the instantiation of pleasure only with some difference in the concrete
objects, processes, or conditions involved.18 If this is correct, and if the qualitative
character of some mental event is due to more than the physical features instanti-
ated, then the set of concrete items that sufﬁce for the instantiation of that quali-
tative feature includes more than what’s required for the instantiation of any of
those physical properties. It follows that the instantiation of that qualitative feature
17 PD is the “Principle of Physical Exhaustion” of Hellman and Thompson (1975) when applied
to mentality. ‘Physical Decomposition’ is a more ﬁtting description since as explained here the
principle does not guarantee that mentality is physically exhausted.
18 Note, however, that the principle, “no difference in properties instantiated without a difference
in concrete phenomena,” is not true when the properties are necessary features and the items
exemplifying them are abstract. For instance, there is a difference between the number 3’s being
less than 5 and the number 7’s being greater than 5, but this difference in properties does not
require any corresponding difference in concrete phenomena.
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is not concretely exhausted by the instantiation of those physical features, which is
something CPE does not allow.
So CPE captures more of what physicalism requires than either TKI or PD. But
does it capture everything the doctrine demands? As explained in Chap. 2, phys-
icalism seems to entail the truth of a supervenience thesis, according to which, the
distribution of physical properties/relations together with the physical laws neces-
sitates the distribution of mental properties/relations. If this physical necessitation
did not obtain, then mental phenomena would not be solely a function of physical
phenomena, contrary to physicalism.19
It is not hard to see that this physical necessitation is secured by CPE. Consider
some instantiation of a physical property, P, and the (minimally complete) set S* of
concrete items on which it depends, i.e., without which the instantiation of P on that
occasion would not obtain. Which collection of concrete items is required on that
occasion for P’s instantiation would seem to depend on the laws of nature that
obtain; with different laws of nature, a different set of concrete items might sufﬁce for
the instantiation of P, and in that case, P might be instantiated without S*. Given that
P is a physical property, the laws of nature that regulate whether P is or is not
instantiated are the physical laws. So, it seems, whether it is true that without S*, the
instantiation of P would not have occurred is a matter of the physical laws that
obtain. Suppose, then, that world w* contains all of the physical laws that actually
obtain. And suppose that P is instantiated in w*. Then since S* is required for P
(given the physical laws), S* obtains in w*. Now suppose that the instantiation of M
is concretely exhausted by the instantiation of P. Then there is a set, S, of concrete
phenomena that guarantees, across all possible worlds, the instantiation of M, and S
is a subset of S*. Since S* obtains at w*, and S is a subset of S*, S obtains at w*. It
follows that the instantiation of P at w* is accompanied by the instantiation of M.
In general, if CPE is true, then for any instantiation of a mental property, there is
an instantiation of a physical property, such that the minimally complete set of
concrete items required (given the physical laws) for an instantiation of the latter
contains all that sufﬁces for the instantiation of the former. So if CPE is correct, then
the actual distribution of physical properties plus the physical laws that obtain
guarantees the set of concrete phenomena sufﬁcient for the actual distribution of
mental properties.
So it seems that with CPE we have an answer to the threat to non-reductive
physicalism that I labeled ‘II’. Let’s recall the issue. If the mental details were
necessitated by the physical details only with the help of irreducibly psychophysical
laws, then mentality would not be solely a function of the way the world is
physically. What physicalism requires is that the physical details together with the
purely physical laws guarantee all the mental details (as Np and Np* mentioned in
19 As indicated in Sect. 2.1, to allow for the possibility of mental extras (possible physical
duplicates of the actual world that contain all of the actual mental episodes plus a few additional
ones), we might wish to weaken the necessitation claim by insisting only that the positive mental
facts must remain the same with the duplication of physical facts. In Sect. 2.1 there was also brief
mention of some other ways to allow the possibility of mental extras that philosophers have pursued.
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Sect. 2.3 entail). Now if mental properties are identical with physical properties,
then the necessitation of the mental by the physical is automatically guaranteed,
since any property trivially necessitates itself. However, if mental properties are not
physical, then it is not at all clear why we should expect this physical necessitation.
If mental properties are not physical, then there is the worry, described in Sect. 2.4,
that some physical duplicates of the actual world (duplicating the actual world in
every physical respect, including all the same physical laws) are worlds where
zombies exist or where certain mental episodes are blocked. Such worlds would
seem not only to be logically and conceptually possible, but genuine possibilities
(genuinely metaphysically possible)—assuming, that is, that mental properties are
not physical. Since physicalism precludes physical duplicates of the actual world
mentally diverging from the actual world in these ways, to justify their commitment
to physicalism, non-reductive physicalists owe a reason for thinking that II is false
—a reason for thinking it is false that
(II) mental properties not being identical with physical properties prevents the
physical facts from necessitating the mental facts in the way that physicalism
requires.20
CPE helps us see why II is false. Perhaps physicalism does not require that
mental properties are physical. But it does require a nothing more than relation
between the mental and the physical, and when that relation is analyzed in terms of
concrete exhaustion, as described above, we can understand what the various
accounts of realization fail to adequately reveal—namely, how it could be that the
physical phenomena necessitate the way the world is mentally even if mental
properties are not physical. I have, of course, given no reason to think that CPE is
actually true, and therefore no reason to think that physicalism is true. The point is
that CPE provides a way of seeing how physicalism could be true (with the
necessitation of the mental by the physical that it demands) even if mental prop-
erties are not physical.
So CPE provides a way to respond to II. CPE shows how it could be that the
mental is necessitated by the physical in the way that physicalism demands even if
mental properties are not physical properties. However, with CPE there is another
response to II available that one might ﬁnd attractive. As described in the next
section, the notion of concrete physical exhaustion suggests two plausible and
robust deﬁnitions of the word ‘physical’ as applied to properties, deﬁnitions
according to which mental properties can qualify as physical even if they are not
identical with properties of physics or the other natural sciences. According to this
response to II, while mental properties are not physical in one sense—the sense of
20 As mentioned in Sect. 2.4, II is a different issue from the concern (which I labeled ‘I’) that a
mere supervenience thesis leaves the nature of the psychophysical determination unexplained.
With a supervenience thesis that entails NP (or NP*) the covariance of mental properties with
physical properties does have an explanation. The explanation is that the physical laws that
actually obtain are what make it the case that physical sameness ensures mental sameness. Why
this should be the case if mental properties are not physical is what II has us question.
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being properties of physics or the other natural sciences—they are physical in other
plausible and robust senses.
4.4 Physical Properties
The term ‘physical’, when applied to properties, is often restricted to the properties
of physics.21 Although, sometimes the label is used more loosely to include
properties of any of the natural sciences, so that chemical and biological properties
also count as physical. Despite the continued controversy regarding multiple real-
izability, I argued in Chap. 1 (1.8–1.10) that considerations of multiple realizability
really do show that mental properties are not physical in either of these senses.22
However, given the notion of concrete exhaustion described in Sect. 4.3, there are
other and plausible senses of ‘physical’ according to which mental properties do
qualify as physical despite the multiple realizability.
Consider the property of being a rock. While being a rock is not a property of
physics, it is nonetheless not implausible to consider it a physical property. And it
seems the reason why it’s not implausible to consider it physical is that something is
a rock due to nothing more than the instantiation of properties of physics. That is,
any instantiation of being a rock is concretely exhausted by the instantiation of
properties of physics. It’s arguable that the properties of being a lump of clay, being
a piece of cloth, and being a clump of dirt also qualify as physical; even being a
stroll in the park, or being a killing by way of stabbing might arguably be con-
sidered physical properties. It’s arguable that these qualify as physical, not because
they are identical with any properties of physics, but because their instantiation is
concretely exhausted by the instantiation of properties of physics, i.e., the concrete
items at the time sufﬁcient for these properties to be instantiated include no more
than those required for properties of physics to be instantiated.
21 It is a matter of signiﬁcant debate whether we should focus, for the purpose of deﬁning
physicalism, on properties of current physics or some future ideal physics. Consider the issue
famously called ‘Hempel’s dilemma’: see Hempel (1980). If ‘physical’ is understood in terms of
current physics, then the doctrine of physicalism is likely to be false since current physics is
incomplete in many respects. On the other hand, we might deﬁne ‘physical’ in terms of a future,
ideal physics, but since we don’t know what future physics has in store, the thesis of physicalism
would then lack determinate content. For some important work on this dilemma, see Ravenscroft
(1997), Montero (1999), Stoljar (2001, 2010), Melnyk (2003), Dowell (2006), Wilson (2006), and
Ney (2008a, 2008b). If one appeals to physics in one’s deﬁnition of ‘physical’, then for the
deﬁnition to be complete one will need to decide which physics is being referred to (current,
future, ideal,. . .), and one will need to make that decision in a way that eases the threat of
Hempel’s dilemma. Since I will not undertake that project here, I admit that the deﬁnitions of
‘physical’ I offer here are far from complete.
22 The arguments based on either the metaphysical or the physical possibility of immaterial
realizers presented in Sect. 1.8 were shown to be especially effective in establishing non-identity.
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There is, then, a rather plausible sense of the word ‘physical’ applied to prop-
erties, according to which, a property is physical just in case its instantiation is
concretely exhausted by the instantiation of properties of physics. To avoid con-
fusion, let’s introduce the label ‘physical*’, where
F is a physical* property = for any instance x of F at a time t, there is a property
or collection of properties, P, of physics, and an instance y of P, such that x’s
instantiation of F at t is concretely exhausted by y’s instantiation of P at t.23
A physical* property need not itself belong to physics or to any of the other natural
sciences. So even if mental properties are not identical with those of the natural
sciences, as considerations of multiple realizability seem to show, they can still
qualify as physical*.24
Still, to hold that mental properties are physical* is to endorse a fair amount. The
claim that mental properties are physical* is certainly not one that any substance
dualist would accept. Substance dualists would deny that the instantiation of mental
properties is concretely exhausted by the instantiation of properties of physics,
insisting that immaterial concrete items (e.g., souls and their immaterial conditions)
are required. Non-physicalists who reject substance dualism would also deny that
mental properties are physical*. Property dualists who reject physicalism believe
that while a mental event occurs in physical space, what makes it the type of mental
event it is (e.g., what gives it its qualitative or intentional character) is a matter of
more than the features of physics it has.25 As explained in Sect. 4.3, this claim that
the mental is something more entails that the instantiation of a mental property is
not concretely exhausted by the instantiation of any physical properties, where these
“physical properties” clearly include properties of physics. Since the claim that
mental properties are physical* is one that all non-physicalists would reject, the
notion of being physical* does count as a rather robust sense of ‘physical’ when
applied to properties.
There might be some who go by the label ‘physicalist’ but would still reject the
claim that mental properties are physical*. I have in mind someone who extends the
label ‘physical’ to properties of any of the natural sciences, and who also believes
that mentality is solely a function of biochemical or neurological properties, but for
some reason denies that the instantiation of any organic property is concretely
exhausted by the instantiation of properties of physics. A physicalist of this sort
23 The choice is open whether to rely on actual current physics, or something sufﬁciently similar
to current physics, or to appeal to some future and/or ideal physics.
24 Moreover, the deﬁnition does not require that physical* properties are necessarily physical*.
Instantiations of being a rock are in fact concretely exhausted by the instantiation of properties of
physics, which allows that there are possible worlds where rocks are comprised of immaterial
substances of some sort. This metaphysical possibility does not make it any less plausible to call
the property of being a rock ‘physical’.
25 Use of the expression ‘property dualists who reject physicalism’ seems to imply that property
dualists can accept physicalism, and of course they can if non-reductive physicalism is a coherent
position.
4.4 Physical Properties 87
rfrances@mail.sdsu.edu
might deny that mental properties are identical with properties of biochemistry and
neuroscience, but still believe that mental properties are physical**, where
F is a physical** property = for any instance x of F at a time t, there is a property
or collection of properties, P, belonging to the natural sciences, and an instance
y of P, such that x’s instantiation of F at t is concretely exhausted by y’s
instantiation of P at t.
This is a weaker sense of ‘physical’, but it seems strong enough that it, too,
would be rejected at least by the typical opponent of physicalism. Substance
dualists would certainly deny that the instantiation of mental properties is con-
cretely exhausted by the instantiation of properties of any of the natural sciences.
Non-physicalists who reject substance dualism are also likely to deny that mental
properties are physical**. Property dualists who reject physicalism generally
believe that, at least for some mental processes, what gives the process its special
mental character is a function of more than the properties of physics it has, and also
a function of more than its chemical or biological features. So the claim that mental
properties are physical** seems to be one that non-physicalists in general would
reject. Thus, while not as robust as the notion of being physical*, the notion of
being physical** is hardly an anemic sense of ‘physical’.
As explained in Sect. 4.3, the notion of concrete exhaustion reveals why II is
false, thereby showing how one can remain faithful to physicalism even while
denying that mental properties are physical. And yet, the notion of concrete
exhaustion succeeds in this way only by revealing two plausible senses of ‘phys-
ical’, and one can believe that mental properties are physical in either sense
(physical* or physical**) without believing that they are identical with any prop-
erties of the natural sciences. It seems, then, that we have a second line of response
to threat II. We can reply that if physicalism is correct, then there is a dependency
of the mental on the physical (which consists in the relation of concrete exhaustion),
and this dependency is strong enough that mental properties can still qualify as
physical in a plausible and signiﬁcant sense even if they are not identical with
properties of the natural sciences.
4.5 Conclusions
Let’s close by taking stock of what has been established in this chapter. It was
shown in Sect. 4.3 that the appeal to concrete exhaustion captures the physicalist
intuition that an instantiation of a mental property on some occasion is nothing
more than the instantiation of physical properties. So, it seems,
(i) accepting CPE is enough to warrant the title ‘physicalist’.
Accepting CPE does not require believing that mental properties are identical
with any of those of the natural sciences. This fact together with (i) entails that
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(ii) qualifying as a physicalist does not require believing that mental properties
are identical with those of the natural sciences.
In particular, CPE reveals why II is false, since
(iii) CPE shows how it could be that the mental facts are necessitated by the
physical facts in the way that physicalism requires even if mental properties
are not physical.
There is also the fact, emphasized in Sect. 4.3, that CPE seems neutral enough on
various metaphysical issues to be a thesis that any physicalist would (or should)
accept. So it also seems that
(iv) accepting CPE is necessary for being a physicalist,
and from (i) and (iv) it follows that
(v) physicalism is plausibly viewed as the claim that CPE is true.
It was argued in Sect. 4.4 that the notion of concrete exhaustion suggests two
senses of ‘physical’ (physical* and physical**) when applied to properties, each of
which allows that mental properties are physical even if they are not identical with
properties of physics or any of the other natural sciences. Moreover, these are
robust senses of 'physical'; regarding physical*, it seems only a physicalist would
believe mental properties are physical in that sense. Thus,
(vi) there are plausible and robust senses of ‘physical’, and mental properties
can qualify as physical in these senses without being properties of physics,
chemistry, or biology.
But now recall Chap. 1 where I argued that one should be a non-reductionist—in
the sense of denying that mental properties are identical with properties of the
natural sciences. Given (ii), one can qualify as a non-reductionist in this sense while
also being a physicalist. Although, physicalists in general would believe that mental
properties are either physical* or physical**. So now it seems that
(vii) while some physicalists might be “non-reductive,” there is another sig-
niﬁcant sense in which they are reductionist, i.e., by believing that mental
properties are identical with physical* or physical** properties.
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